Ukraine’s death toll continues rising while U.S. politicians dither over aiding or not aiding that country. The war has become stalemated, with neither Russia nor Ukraine able to achieve a major breakthrough. Meanwhile, the United States and its allies need to consider the consequences of a Ukrainian defeat or collapse.
Aggressors and dictators are encouraged by appeasement and Western defeats. Moreover, Russian President Vladimir Putin is not the only one watching. As the calamitous withdrawal from Afghanistan and 2022’s mass U.S. flight from Ukraine encouraged him, so will abandoning Ukraine inspire other aggressors elsewhere.
However, given Ukraine’s extensive corruption, financial aid is not the answer. Rather than repeating the mistakes the United States made in Afghanistan, Iraq, and, more distantly, Vietnam, Ukraine’s aid providers should dispatch only weapons and material. More importantly, they should monitor and track what they send to ensure it reaches the fighting forces, not the black market.
Ukraine President Volodymyr Zelenskyy needs to make corruption elimination his political priority and leave the fighting to his generals. He should treat graft as treason since his nation is fighting for its survival. The guilty should be found and harshly punished. Eliminating corruption will increase domestic and foreign confidence in his government and ensure his troops are better equipped and supplied.
Strategically, Ukraine is on the defensive. It is using its special forces, drones, and long-range weapons to strike deep into the Russian rear area and selectively attack political and economic targets. Ukrainians remain determined, but war fatigue lies not far away. Last summer’s losses and recent material shortages have cost Ukraine the battlefield initiative, giving Russia renewed momentum in the Donbass. Fortunately, Kyiv’s coastal defenders and drone warriors have kept the Russian navy at bay, preventing any assault from its Black Sea flank.
Operationally, modern technology, such as drones and precision weapons, has rendered the two militaries’ doctrines and tactics obsolete. That has prevented their armies from conducting maneuver-based operations. Instead, they have been forced into “position warfare” that favors the defenders. Thus, the war has evolved into one of attrition, with both countries trying to break the other’s political will. Their operations are intended more to inflict casualties than retake or hold territory. It is much like World War I, where massed firepower destroys an area and its defenders. Still, the defender has the firepower to prevent the attacker from advancing beyond the devastated area. Advances are limited to hundreds of meters or 1–2 km at a time and at great cost.
Layered air defenses, integrated long, medium- and short-range surface-to-air (SAM) missiles, and close-in anti-aircraft artillery have reduced traditional air power’s contribution to the war effort. Unmanned aerial systems (drones) largely have taken over the close-air-support (CAS) mission in ground combat. But neither country has developed a comprehensive doctrine or tactics that integrates their mass employment to support a scheme of maneuver. However, the drones’ reliance on data links back to their controllers and has given new impetus and importance to electronic warfare. Detecting and jamming drone control links has become as important as engaging the drones themselves.
Russia has responded with long-range weapons and massed artillery. It is employing ballistic missiles against Ukraine’s cities and infrastructure. The Russian air force has learned not to challenge Ukraine’s air defense systems directly. Instead, it is using standoff weapons that enable its planes to launch strikes from outside or along the periphery of Ukraine’s SAM envelopes. Once Ukraine brings its F-16s into the fight, the Russian air force will try to draw them into the Russian SAM coverage rather than engage them over Ukrainian-held territory.
Both armies are digging deep trenches with overhead cover and placing their troops in concrete buildings and strong points wherever possible to protect them from artillery, bombing, drone, missile, and mortar attacks. They also lay minefields to restrict enemy ground movements and channel attackers into “kill zones” where the defender can mass firepower against them.
Ukraine’s tactical units are better trained than Russia’s and more adept at employing modern technology such as drones and precision weapons like HIMARS. However, they suffered heavily last summer. Ukraine tried to use 1980s mobile tactics to retake territory, believing its modern artillery, precision weapons, and drone tactics could overcome Russian multi-layered and well-prepared defenses supported by massed artillery.
Ukraine’s troops paid a heavy price for little gain as a result. Proportionally, its 31,000 reported killed in action over the last years is equivalent to the United States suffering over 300,000 combat deaths. Noncombat deaths typically add another 10 percent to the toll. If that continues, morale and combat effectiveness will diminish. Additionally, civilian casualties often exceed military losses, further affecting the national sense of sacrifice. Fortunately, Russia’s tactical units remain inadequately trained, ill-disciplined, tactically inflexible, and ill-supplied.
The war’s outcome will be determined by which country first loses its political will. Mr. Putin hopes that Ukraine’s continuing losses will destroy its troop morale and effectiveness. However, Mr. Putin must be worried about his own military losses and domestic morale. After all, the massive losses and economic sacrifices of World War I led to the Czar’s fall.
Mr. Zelenskyy should also remember that historical example. He seems fixated on retaking territory and appears to take his country’s political will for granted. His people are committed but tired. Their will is not infinite, and he should adjust his strategy and operations to prevent that limit from being reached.
Predicting a war’s outcome is a fool’s errand, but its future course can be assessed. Barring a complete collapse of public morale in either country, the war will continue through next year, but the level of the fighting will decline to sporadic exchanges of fire by next fall. The Russo-Ukrainian War will not end per se but rather continue in a state of high tension but limited fighting until both sides’ political leaders can find acceptable peace terms. Meanwhile, the United States and its allies must do all they can to assist Ukraine’s defense.
