“The greatest trick the Devil ever pulled was convincing the world he didn’t exist” is a quote generally attributed to Charles Baudelaire—or possibly Keyser Söze, depending on who you ask on the internet. Something similar can be said about Big Brother.
You definitely don’t think of a guy in a lawn chair jotting down the license plate numbers of passing vehicles in a notebook. And that’s partly how the surveillance state is going to emerge as it creeps its way into one small town at a time.
Whether a surveillance state is the end goal is hard to say. The police chief of Pawnee, Indiana, probably isn’t plotting the development of his own mini-Oceania. But 18,000-plus mini-Oceanias operating across multiple platforms with varying degrees of integration, both locally and nationally, is undoubtedly the direction in which we are heading as salespeople peddle shiny new surveillance gadgets to cities big and small, making often unverified but intuitively appealing claims of how their devices will decrease crime or prove to be useful investigative tools.
Depending on the vendor and the particulars of their contract with a municipality or private entity leasing the cameras from them, the information the cameras collect is maintained usually for 30 days but sometimes for a period of months or even years.
If ALPRs were as prevalent during lockdowns as they are now, it’s not difficult to imagine that at least some governors or mayors would use them to track and reprimand those who dared violate Corona law.
As for the benefits they provide in terms of making communities safer, quantitative data demonstrating their success tend to be lacking.
However, when vendor reps and local law enforcement are trying to gain approval from city councils and assuage the fears of wary citizens, the surveillance potential of the devices, along with their questionable effectiveness and the devastating consequences that can follow when one makes a mistake, tend not to be what they lead with.
Instead, proponents emphasize how common they are in surrounding cities, cite anecdotal evidence of their utility, and try to present ALPRs as non-threatening, normal, and perhaps even a little old-fashioned.
You have nothing to worry about, you’re told. The town down the road brought them in six months back. Chief Jones over there said they helped solve that murder from the news. And, by the way, they’re not really that much different from a concerned citizen just keeping an eye on things.
At the town hall in Urbana, for example, Bryant Seraphin, then the police chief, worked to dismiss the notion that ALPRs actually pose a threat to privacy or even constitute a surveillance tool.
“[ALPRs] are not surveillance cameras,” Mr. Seraphin said early in the event. “I cannot pan, tilt, [or] zoom them. There’s no live looking to see what’s happening at the corner.”
Repeatedly, he emphasized that ALPRs don’t capture any information about the person driving a car or automatically link to information about the person to whom a vehicle is registered. Their ubiquity in the area was accentuated. Supposed success stories were shared.
To allay any remaining notion that there might be something scary about ALPRs, Mr. Seraphin described them with a folksy metaphor:
“One of the things that I’ve talked about with these things is that if you pictured somebody sitting in a lawn chair writing down every plate that went by, the date, and the time when they wrote ‘red Toyota ABC123’, and then they would make a phone call and check the databases and then hang up and then go on to the next one—that’s what [an ALPR] does automatically, and it can do it over and over again ... with incredible speed.”
Yet when Anita Chan, the director of the University of Illinois Community Data Clinic, proceeded to raise concerns regarding “the potential violation of civil liberties” and said that a license plate alone is sufficient for the police to not just find out “where you live and where you work but also ... who potentially your friends are, what religious affiliation you might have, essentially where you get medical services ... [and] suss out essentially who’s traveling and where,” Mr. Seraphin acknowledged all this is possible.
However, he assured her with a frustrated chuckle, ALPRs simply provide a notebook that would only be referenced when investigating serious crimes.
By the same logic, facial recognition simply provides a notebook as well. As do cell site simulators. As do any surveillance device. Yet, there is a fundamental question of whether such a notebook should exist. Does the chief of police in Urbana or the sheriff in Pawnee need a notebook containing your approximate location three Thursdays ago at 8:15 p.m. and a record of who attended last week’s political rally in order to solve a murder? Should he be allowed to keep such a notebook if it might help solve an extra murder in his town each year? If the answer is yes, then what are the limits to the tools he and his department should be afforded?
Furthermore, there is also something a little off about the disarming metaphor of a guy who spends his days sitting around in a lawn chair jotting down the license plate numbers of passing vehicles. Something a little insidious. Something that perhaps Anita Chan was picking up on.
One guy in a lawn chair jotting down license plate numbers is a nosy neighbor, maybe even a neighborhood crank, but not someone to whom you would pay much attention. When he starts following you around though to the point of knowing who your friends are, where you worship, and when you go to the doctor, he kind of becomes a stalker. But when he develops the ability to gather this kind of information on everyone, he starts to develop a level of omnipresence and omniscience with which no one should be comfortable—which may be why you’re told he’s just a guy in a lawn chair.