One might get the impression that Taiwan’s defense is just a question of having the right weapons and hardware.
But there’s more to it than that, including a huge psychological component, as a friend noted the other day when he asked: “What is the sentiment of Taiwanese youth in defending their nation from Chinese aggression? Is there a consistent stance?”
These are difficult questions for an outsider to answer about any nation. And even “locals” never really know until the time comes.
But I’ll give it a try and start with a story.
One day, while living in Taiwan a few years back, I was outside a subway station studying a map board.
A young woman, maybe in her early 20s, approached me and asked if she could help.
The place I was going wasn’t far away, so she offered to walk me there.
On the way, she asked where I was from. I said, “America.”
She said, “Please don’t let us be part of China.”
That said a lot.
At least from my perspective, a majority of young Taiwanese do not want to be part of the People’s Republic of China or come under Chinese communist domination.
They know enough about life on the mainland and, more recently, have watched the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) smother Hong Kong and persecute people who exercise freedoms taken for granted in Taiwan.
They also increasingly see themselves as Taiwanese. Relatively few young people have substantial firsthand experience with the mainland, and anyone they know who does is likely their grandparents or even great-grandparents. It is perhaps akin to how Irish Americans came to see themselves as American rather than Irish (except for one day a year).
But what about actually defending Taiwan?
I think a lot of young Taiwanese would indeed do something to defend their nation. Or, at least, they would want to.
A big problem is that they don’t know what they can do.
But beyond that mandatory participation, few continue being involved in defending the nation. There are a few reasons for this.
Taiwan’s armed forces are largely composed of volunteers, who are, by definition, young or relatively young people. Despite all the obstacles, they are highly professional and will fight if they are well-led.
However, attracting enough volunteers is a chronic problem for the Taiwanese military.
Maybe more would join if a war starts—although it would be too late at that point.
Why the reluctance to sign up?
Military service is not widely considered an attractive career in Taiwan. It’s a hard life with low pay, bad housing, and no G.I. Bill sort of benefits.
Some Taiwanese have told me that military service simply isn’t respected in traditional Chinese society, going back many centuries.
Successive Taiwan administrations have not done nearly enough to change these mindsets and give the military and its people the respect they deserve, which might solve recruitment problems.
At the same time, there are limited opportunities for young people who want to do something to defend their nation—but don’t want to sign up for full-time military service.
Taiwan’s “reserve force” is shambolic. And that’s being charitable.
There is no “territorial” or militia force either.
Taiwan also lacks a civil defense scheme that one might participate in.
Recently, as a way to jump-start interest in national defense, private organizations in Taiwan have been offering first-aid training and education on national defense—and even the chance to shoot air rifles.
But this is not a substitute for a government-run effort—well-organized and funded—that will also put the citizenry to work.
This gets to the main problem: Taiwan’s administrations haven’t done their job of getting the military ready and getting citizens mobilized and psychologically prepared for the oncoming threat from the CCP—a threat that has been obvious for years.
Visitors to Taiwan are often surprised at the seeming absence of a sense of urgency among the population.
Some foreign commentators also often dismiss the prospects of Taiwan putting up a solid defense by claiming that “the Taiwanese all have U.S. passports and will flee as soon as things get dangerous.” Some do, and some will, but 99 percent do not have another passport.
So in response to my friend’s question, the will is there to defend the nation, but it needs some structure to channel that will and put it to work.
Taiwan also needs a clear sense that it has some powerful friends who will back it up. Recent efforts by the United States to allow useful military-to-military engagements between American and Taiwanese forces are a positive, if overdue, sign.
Continue this and have the Taiwan government do its bit as well, and you’ll find Taiwanese—and particularly younger citizens who bear the brunt of any war—willing to do plenty to defend themselves.
Just give them a way to do so.
