Nothing Will Change Until Something Changes

Nothing Will Change Until Something Changes
Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Benfold (DDG 65), forward-deployed to the U.S. 7th Fleet area of operations, conducts underway operations in the South China Sea on July 13, 2022. U.S. Navy/Handout via Reuters
John Mills
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Commentary
Kurt Campbell, now at the White House, came up with the “Pacific pivot” in approximately 2010. It was a good, pithy, and impactful slogan. That was 2010. To be frank, progress on the “Pacific pivot” has been painful, slow, and curiously void of hard accomplishments.
In the Obama, Trump, and now Biden administrations, the plodding, laborious iterations of the Navy shipbuilding plan (the foundational enabling element of the Pacific pivot) have taken multiple, no-notice changes in ship numbers, types, and projected in-service dates, so many as to become an object of humor among the halls of the Pentagon while action officers and planners go to the food court for their morning coffee.

Good Intent, Absence of Progress

In contrast, President Ronald Reagan’s military buildup was palpable, real, and touchable by the end of the 1980s. The Navy grew to 600 ships and 15 carrier battle groups, and Europe was beginning to look again like it was preparing for another Normandy invasion as bases grew, were hardened, and bristled with tanks, aircraft, and missiles. That was in less than 10 years. After 12 years, the Pacific pivot has little more than talking points and PowerPoint slides to show for progress.

The crowning tip of the spear of the Pacific pivot was supposed to be four littoral combat ships (LCSs) forward deployed out of Singapore. I traveled to Singapore multiple times, and deploying four trouble-ridden LCSs to Singapore for some mysterious reason was beyond the abilities of a country that had put a man on the moon. Watching the simultaneous collapse of the LCS program and the inability to implement the Singapore LCS support effort was painful.

There are, however, two positive initiatives. First is a massive, bipartisan Shipyard Act to modernize and expand American shipyards. There’s also a new fund called the “Pacific Deterrence Initiative” (PDI) to help fund the needs of the Indo-Pacific commander for base expansion, hardening, missile defense, and other matters in the Pacific. It would be a good idea to merge these initiatives together because of their significant dependencies and place both under one leader for implementation.

Find a Modern Gen. Leslie Groves

The biggest program effort of World War II was the Manhattan Project—the incredible effort to develop and build an atomic weapon. The Manhattan Project was arguably the largest singular defense program in human history. Its scope and scale were breathtaking, and President Franklin D. Roosevelt spared no expense to fund this effort. Army Gen. Leslie Groves had impressed everyone with his building of the Pentagon. Groves was an Army engineer through and through. He led the mammoth Manhattan Project in a disciplined march to success in a few short years.
The Navy shipbuilding plan is foundational to the success of the American ability to deter and, if necessary, defeat China. Despite years of Navy staff effort, there’s actually a decreasing trendline of American warships into the future in some variants of the plans. Despite 12 years of effort, the more the Navy staff works on this issue, the worse it becomes. We need to be candid and honest about performance and delivery, and in 12 years, there’s little to show on shipbuilding and Navy force structure.
In 2014, I released a research paper titled “Down to the Sea in Ships (Again),” which inspired the later Epoch Times article by the same name. It was a bold and different approach to the expansion of the U.S. Navy and its infrastructure. I shared it with Navy staff, and the responses I received from many were visceral and volcanic. Elements of the paper, such as the proposition of a new American shipyard to build diesel submarines, some for the U.S. Navy, some for strategic partners such as Taiwan, caused Navy captains to faint (even with the caveat of the simultaneous need to accelerate the expansion of the nuclear submarine fleet). How dare I, an Army officer, interlope in Navy affairs. The definition of insanity is 12 years of little progress, and in some cases, reverse progress. It’s time to place an Army general in charge to march the Navy shipbuilding program to success.
Concurrently, the PDI is much needed and appreciated. It gives Adm. John Aquilino, the Indo-Pacific commander, spending money to apply to significant and badly needed base infrastructure improvements, expansion, and missile defense. But it needs to happen now, not later. The scope and scale of the PDI are perhaps beyond the staff abilities of the Indo-Pacific Command staff. I have extensive experience at the Joint Staff and Combatant Command Staffs, and while the PDI is greatly needed, it will likely overwhelm and/or consume the staff at Camp Smith in Hawaii and distract them from plans and operations for projecting American military capability.

We’re at the point where a wise suggestion is for the secretary of defense to appoint an Army engineer general at the four-star level to lead a merged PDI and Shipyard Act. Herculean tasks require focus, rank, and specialization. A modern Leslie Groves is needed now so that the Indo-Pacific and Navy leadership and staff can focus on plans and operations for the successful generation and projection of American military forces.

Given a modern-day Leslie Groves, there should be an acceleration of Navy force structure and infrastructure in the Pacific to support the Indo-Pacific commander. Everyone’s timeline for tension in the Pacific seems to be moving to the left, not to the right (a scheduling term of art). Even Adm. (Ret.) James Stavridis had to explain a likely faster timeline of events shortly after releasing his novel projecting 2034 as the year of military conflict between China and the West. This effort should also be closely linked and coordinated with the AUKUS agreement.

Placing an action-oriented Army four-star engineer in charge of the merged PDI and Navy shipbuilding plan should help. The current efforts, especially on the Navy side, have little to show. What’s there to lose at this point?

Views expressed in this article are opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Epoch Times.
John Mills
John Mills
Author
Col. (Ret.) John Mills is a national security professional with service in five eras: Cold War, Peace Dividend, War on Terror, World in Chaos, and now, Great Power Competition. He is the former director of cybersecurity policy, strategy, and international affairs at the Department of Defense. Mr. Mills is a senior fellow at the Center for Security Policy. He is author of “The Nation Will Follow” and “War Against the Deep State.” ColonelRETJohn2 on “X”, ColonelRETJohn on Substack, GETTR, and Truth Social
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