Commentary
China is building a canal in Cambodia that will give it greater access to the sea, threatening the security of Taiwan, Vietnam, and U.S. interests in the region.
On Sept. 9, Cambodia broke ground on the Chinese-funded
Funan Techo Canal, set for completion by 2028. The 110-mile-long canal will connect Phnom Penh to the sea, giving China its first direct access to the Gulf of Thailand. This would enable Chinese warships to navigate more easily in the region, strengthening its naval presence near crucial sea lanes. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy would no longer need to sail through the South China Sea and
around Indochina to reach the Gulf of Thailand, significantly shortening travel time.
China has become Cambodia’s largest investor, funding both infrastructure and military facilities, leaving Cambodia heavily indebted and increasingly dependent on Beijing. This financial reliance has effectively made Cambodia a client state, with its foreign policy closely aligned with China’s interests. A clear example is Cambodia’s reluctance to assert its maritime claims in the South China Sea, unlike neighboring countries such as Vietnam,
the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei.
Cambodia is believed to host Chinese military facilities, particularly at
Ream Naval Base near Sihanoukville, despite
official denials from Phnom Penh and Beijing. Reports suggest that the base has been developed as a PLA Navy facility, making it China’s first military foothold in Southeast Asia.
The Funan Techo Canal, starting just below Phnom Penh, runs from the Tonle Sap River to
Kep on the Gulf of Thailand, approximately 62 miles from Ream Naval Base. This canal, combined with the naval base, would enhance transportation within Cambodia, facilitating the movement of goods, resources, and military supplies between the interior and the coast. Together, these developments could streamline logistics for the Chinese military, enabling more efficient support and resupply for naval vessels in the region.
The Funan Techo Canal could significantly affect Taiwan’s security by expanding China’s military reach in Southeast Asia and addressing the “
Malacca Dilemma.” This vulnerability stems from China’s reliance on the Strait of Malacca, through which
approximately 80 percent of its oil imports pass—a chokepoint easily blockaded in a conflict, threatening China’s energy security and stability. Securing alternative routes for oil has long been seen as essential before China could consider an invasion of Taiwan. The canal would allow China to reduce its dependence on the strait, enabling more effective military encirclement of Taiwan and challenging U.S. and allied naval forces in the region.
Vietnam’s national security is increasingly threatened by the Funan Techo Canal and the growing Chinese Communist Party (CCP) influence in Cambodia, its immediate neighbor. Cambodia, which has historically had a close but troubled relationship with Vietnam, is now moving further into China’s orbit, shifting the regional balance of power. China’s plans to build a
deep-water port in Kep, about 15 miles from Ha Tien, Vietnam, raise significant strategic concerns. This development would give the PLA Navy direct access to both the Vietnam–Cambodia sea and river borders, heightening security risks for Vietnam.
With a military resupply and logistics center in Kep,
CCP maritime forces, including the PLA Navy, coast guard, and fishing militia, could exert greater control over the Mekong River, Southeast Asia’s most vital waterway. As part of China’s broader “
Blue Dragon” strategy to dominate the region, control over the Mekong is crucial. Originating in China, where it is known as the Lancang, the river flows through Burma (Myanmar), Laos, Thailand, Cambodia, and Vietnam, providing water for millions. China’s construction of multiple dams upstream has already allowed it to manipulate water flow, affecting downstream nations, especially Vietnam. The Funan Techo Canal project is linked to the construction of
additional dams, which are part of the CCP’s broader strategy to control the region’s water supply.
This presents both environmental and economic challenges for Vietnam, which heavily depends on the Mekong for agriculture. Any disruptions in water flow, such as reduced levels caused by Chinese dams, could lead to droughts, lower crop yields, and damage to fisheries, particularly in the Mekong Delta, a critical rice production and fishing hub. The canal will also reduce transshipping through Vietnam to
Cambodia by 70 percent, affecting trade. Beijing’s control over the river gives it significant leverage, turning water into a geopolitical tool to influence Vietnam and other Southeast Asian nations.
This canal project in an often-overlooked region has significant implications for U.S. foreign policy, Taiwan’s independence, and freedom of navigation. Expanded access to the Gulf of Thailand could enable quicker deployment of Chinese military assets, including warships, closer to key sea lanes critical for regional security and trade.
The canal also fits into the Chinese regime’s broader strategy to secure supply chains and trade routes, which are essential for both its economy and military logistics, especially in a potential conflict over Taiwan. Completing the project could bring the CCP one step closer to preparing for an invasion of Taiwan.
Views expressed in this article are opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Epoch Times.