How should this phenomenon, that lending is cooling while inflation is still heating, be interpreted? Notice that for the graph, we have already used core inflation, which excludes food and energy, so the volatile components and potentially the supply side shocks should be much reduced. The gap between broad money growth and inflation (price growth) is determined by real transactions (or roughly, real GDP) growth and money velocity growth. GDP growth should not be the reason, as it has recently slowed significantly to 0.2 percent.
Eliminating GDP growth indicates that money velocity growth explains the situation. Indeed, credit growth has been negative since mid-2022. But money velocity growth still being high means firms and households are not really borrowing (expanding the money supply) but transacting actively.
Manufacturing activities are likely highly associated with lending, and both have been shrinking for a year. Services activities are not big transactions but are being conducted actively, thus increasing money velocity growth. Now the question boils down to how tightening policy can contain lending and real (mainly services) transactions. This is nothing more than asking people to put their money back in the bank rather than using it (for consumption).
The Bank of England (BoE) policy rate is now 5 percent while core inflation is 7 percent (the overall one even higher, near 9 percent). Putting money in a bank earns 5 percent (in fact, lower because banks offer a deposit rate of about 4 percent) but loses the purchasing power by 7 percent, that is, 2 percent real depreciation. Any rational agent would use it rather than save it. So, it is not the problem of money amount and lending (that contributes to broad money) but its price, which BoE still doesn’t understand.