Rumors of Xi Jinping’s poor health in the wake of the BRICS summit on top of China’s collapsing economy compel us to query how long the Chinese regime will last and what will succeed it.
Mr. Xi’s health is a major wild card, and there are persistent rumors and physical indications that he has serious health problems beyond what a man entering his 70s would have. Were he to die or become incapacitated, there would be a leadership struggle akin to that after Mao Zedong’s death.
The scope of the struggle would be colossal, and much would depend on the calculus of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) leadership and the loyalty of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and Ministry of State Security (MSS), both organizations no doubt would themselves be riven by factionalism. The PLA and MSS would be key actors, with the former of great weight in this context. But either might generate Bonapartism and sustain, alter, or eliminate the Chinese regime depending upon his inclinations.
This occasion would provide the greatest opportunity for the Chinese people or diaspora to act against the CCP as it would be a period of maximal vulnerability for the Party as Mao’s death or Deng Xiaoping’s. However, unlike after Mao’s death, where the centripetal force of Maoism was still powerful, there is no such force. Unlike during Deng’s tenure, the Chinese economy is plateauing or declining. Resistance to Deng’s rule was eased by prodigious economic growth. As that is absent, there is the opportunity to move against the Party to permit a transition to a single leader or a junta that, in turn, might permit a transition to a hybrid democratic form of government.
Singapore Model of Lee Kuan Yew
Lee Kuan Yew dominated Singapore’s politics since its independence in 1965 and was prime minister until 1990. He remained influential as senior minister until 2004 and minister mentor until 2011. Lee was perhaps the most prominent advocate of both political pragmatism and “Asian Values” or Confucian political principles, which heavily informed Singapore’s politics.
Taiwan Model
The Taiwan model is defined by China’s transition along the same path as the Republic of China (ROC: Taiwan’s official name). That is, multiple decades-long transitions from a military junta under Chiang Kai-shek to an authoritarian regime and finally to a democratic regime. In this case, the Chinese military and security apparatus generate a junta that lasts for some time, perhaps decades. After this period, it would segue into an authoritarian regime that tolerates limited political participation. As with the Singapore model, this might be in place for decades before transitioning to democracy. Under the Taiwan model, China would also be non-liberal, even illiberal, in the end stage of the transition. Nationalism and ethnocentrism will also be potent and hinder relations with the West. The Taiwan model offers a well-known path for a CCP transition if it loses control after Mr. Xi’s death or a profound domestic or international crisis. It has the promise of democracy if the multiple transitions can be successfully navigated.
Strong Man Model
The “Strong Man” scenario would be a new emperor akin to Oliver Cromwell during the English Civil War or Napoleon Bonaparte’s coup in 1799 that overthrew the Directory for military dictatorship. In the Chinese context, the Strong Man model would be a return to China’s politics in the first half of the 20th century, as evidenced by Sun Yat-sen or Chiang Kai-shek’s rule. This would be a strong authoritarian rule under one leader.As the examples from Central and Eastern Europe demonstrate, post-communist transitions are always difficult. It would likely result in the rule of a Strong Man model as we witnessed in Russia and some former communist states in Central Europe like Vladimir Meciar in Slovakia in the 1990s or Slobodan Milosevic in Yugoslavia also in that decade. These had a difficult transition to democracy, and of course, Russia never transitioned to one.
A Cromwell or Bonaparte would come from the PLA, Party, or security apparatus as Russian President Vladimir Putin did. The leader would certainly appeal to China’s greatness and advance a narrative that the country’s greatness has been hindered by decades of CCP rule and nefarious foreign powers, such as Japan and the United States.
If the CCP fails, then China will follow Russia’s path toward increasing authoritarian rule. Post-communist China will be weak but possess a strong desire to restore past glories. This might be conceived as a return to Confucian principles of governance that informed the rule of dynastic China. There would be a pretense of democratic rule, but China would not be a democracy. The potential for abuse of the Chinese people is probable as human rights will not be advanced.
In sum, China’s political evolution will require multiple transitions. There will be a metamorphosis from the communist polity to the post-communist one. The post-communist polity is likely to undergo multiple subsequent transitions, each difficult and with ample risks associated with each one for stability in China and their implications for world politics. Moreover, a post-communist China will be ruled by a single, great leader—essentially an emperor—as it has been for almost all of China’s past. This is due to China’s political history, tradition, and culture, as well as to the external threat environment that China confronts, which will remain precarious for China. The final issue is the degree to which it will be a hybrid, incorporating some democratic elements into what is likely to be an authoritarian government led by a strong man or a junta for many decades, as occurred in Russia and China under Sun and Chiang before the Japanese invasion.
Mr. Xi’s mysterious ailments require an analysis of what will happen after his death or incapacitation and how the Chinese people and the diaspora can influence China’s political evolution. This may be upon us sooner than we anticipate.
