Considerable hand-wringing occurred in Washington; Seoul, South Korea; and other capitals over the June 19, 2024, reaffirmation of the Moscow–Pyongyang mutual defense agreement.
It was misguided.
In fact, the “treaty” was another tocsin, warning of the eventual, perhaps imminent, fracturing of the present Sino–Russian superficial alliance, which is as frail as the Sino–Soviet alliance was when U.S. President Richard Nixon broke it up in 1972.
Both the State Department and the government of the Republic of Korea interpreted the new treaty, signed during Russian President Vladimir Putin’s visit to the North Korean (DPRK) capital, Pyongyang, on June 19 as being implicitly threatening to both the West and the Republic of Korea. But it was not; rather, I believe it was a substantial statement against the People’s Republic of China (PRC); indeed, as far as Moscow was concerned, it was another substantial and emphatic statement against Beijing.
The treaty, which falls short of an actual commitment by either state to go to war to protect the sovereignty of the other, is actually a reaffirmation of the Soviet–DPRK treaty of 1961, and it helps safeguard Moscow’s control over its Far Eastern territories, which PRC leader Xi Jinping just more than a year ago—on his visit to Moscow in March 2023—said belonged to the PRC and would eventually be retaken by Beijing. The statement jarred Mr. Putin, but, for the cameras, he and Mr. Xi called each other “dear friends,” while a Russian commentator noted that the friendship was “joylessly warm.”
The South Korean government indicated that the DPRK–Russian document was of sufficient concern that Seoul would consider contributing weapons aid to Ukraine in its war against Russia. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, attempting to show President Joe Biden’s strength as he enters the final months of his bid for reelection, said the treaty posed a “serious threat” to peace and stability on the Korean peninsula and that the United States would consider “various measures” in response.
But Mr. Putin is well aware that Mr. Xi is attempting to dominate Russia while Moscow is distracted by the Ukraine war and Western economic sanctions. Moreover, he has benefited from the DPRK’s supply of munitions to Russia during the Ukraine war while also being aware that he needs Pyongyang to act as an obstacle to PRC incursions into the Russian Far East. Moreover, the DPRK owes its origins to Moscow—Soviet leader Joseph Stalin—and not to the PRC, even though PRC troops poured into North Korea to help it during the Korean War. Pyongyang has always been closer to Moscow than to Beijing, despite Western impressions that it was closer to Beijing.
- The origins of the great Russian and Korean historical empires were equally linked to the great Mongol descendants of Genghis Khan (1162–1227), and, while the Rus derived much of their origins from Swedish and other Viking sources, it was the Mongol Golden Horde’s Kipchak Khanate (1259–1480) that embraced what is now much of Russia, including Moscow and Kyiv, while one Genghis grandson, Kublai Khan, essentially broke from the other grandsons to dominate China and create the Great Yuan Dynasty (1271–1368) there.
- In the 1960s and ’70s, the United States felt that the USSR was focused exclusively on its war with the West, but at that time, the Soviets had overwhelmingly larger forces on its border with China than it had on its borders with the NATO states of Europe. Moreover, strategist Stefan Possony indicated in 1970 that the Soviets negotiated the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) with the United States to keep the United States tied down while Moscow sought to dominate the PRC. He also noted that “before World War II, it was customary [for Moscow] to conclude non-aggression pacts as overtures to war.” Make of that what you will.
