How Does India Move Strategically Over the Next Term?

How Does India Move Strategically Over the Next Term?
India's Prime Minister Narendra Modi flashes a victory sign as he arrives at the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) headquarters to celebrate the party's win in the country's general election, in New Delhi on June 4, 2024. (Arun Sankar/AFP via Getty Images)
Gregory Copley
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Commentary

India faces an extremely challenging immediate future, with uncertainties now arising domestically, as well as on the global stage.

Crises in governance in its main rival, communist China, as well as in the United States and the European Union (EU), and potentially with Russia and Iran as vital near neighbors, all raise challenges to New Delhi’s trajectory.

Other concerns in neighboring Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia are, in many ways, less difficult (or more predictable) issues. What seemed like a golden path of continued Indian growth in economic and strategic terms has now become clouded. While the ramifications of possible political-social implosions in China and the United States would normally be manageable for the Indian government, India’s own instability in its new ruling coalition potentially dampens it at a crucial time.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi theoretically has a new five-year electoral mandate to govern India. Still, for the first time, he has coalition partners who can—and almost certainly will—pressure him and possibly abandon him and his Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), toppling the government. Certainly, they will at least be distracting.

The Indian elections of April 19–June 1 introduced the first real element of uncertainty into India’s future since Mr. Modi and the BJP dominated the government in 1994. That wasn’t India’s first BJP government, but the party was sufficiently overwhelming in the 2014 and 2019 elections, and now, under a decisive, charismatic leader, it set India on a new course.

Even committed supporters of Mr. Modi and the BJP admit that the requirement for harmony among the coalition partners will require the prime minister to show a new and conciliatory side to his nature, especially as at least one coalition partner has shown itself to be committed to its own interests, and only recently moved across from the opposition coalition—the Indian National Developmental Inclusive Alliance (INDIA)—to join the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), which includes the BJP.

The fact that the BJP’s allies hold relatively few seats in the Lok Sabha adds to Mr. Modi’s frustration. The Telugu Desam Party (TDP), which dominates the southern coastal state of Andhra Pradesh, holds only 16 seats, yet was able to use this to leverage four cabinet posts for its members. Janata Dal (United) Party has only 12 seats, but its leader, Nitish Kumar, 73, is known to have changed political allegiances to suit his interests in the past. He only switched from the Congress Party-dominated INDIA alliance to Mr. Modi’s NDA six weeks before the election.

The loss of Janata Dal’s 12 seats would not be catastrophic for the BJP alone, but Mr. Modi needs to be careful with his coalition allies to ensure that he completes the five-year term.

Moreover, the decline in the popular vote for the BJP in the 2024 election, quite apart from the decline in seats won, highlights the probability that the incoming government may have to move some of its priorities from prestigious national growth and defense to more immediate local concerns. It is a historical reality that public dissatisfaction and expectations rise not so much when things are difficult but when the promise of a free and prosperous future is perceived to be achievable. And Mr. Modi’s India certainly gave rise to the belief that the coming century would be India’s. So, to achieve this, will defense spending suffer?

Many of the factors impacting this coming five-year government term are outside Mr. Modi’s or the government’s control.

Even so, this is, in many respects, India’s period to shine, even though its growth rate in gross domestic product (GDP) was, by 2023, only starting to recover (to a very strong 8.2 percent rise over 2022). Indeed, India’s median population age by 2023 had risen to 28.2 years, indicating that the most productive years of its workforce were dwindling.
Clearly, India fares better than China, with a median population age of 39 years in 2023, and mainland China is already facing major economic pressures because of its aging population. So it is to be expected that India’s economic surge, so evident in the past few years, will begin to moderate in the coming decade, even though India seems likely to avoid the consequences of Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s anti-growth policies, which have plagued neighboring mainland China in recent years.
With its $3.57 trillion GDP in 2023 (estimated to be $4 trillion in 2024–25), India needs a vibrant international market to continue its strong growth. And it is here that perhaps Mr. Modi will face his most severe challenges. Indeed, it is a challenge that most of the world is unprepared to face, with little real study of the impact of the already-underway implosion of the Chinese economy and the potential for real political “diversion” in the United States after the November 2024 presidential and congressional elections.

The United States, China, the EU, and the UK, as well as other key next-tier players—such as Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the like, as well as Australia and Canada—are all facing severe economic dislocations, which can be expected to worsen in the coming five years.

Moreover, the United States, China, and the EU all seem set to face socio-political implosion or severe debilitation during that timeframe. Business as usual has certainly ended, and that means that India’s markets will suffer from global decline.

But the bottom line for India is that less decisive or less bold leadership will be possible for Mr. Modi; the global marketplace and security situation will be greatly disturbed in the coming few years. It may become India’s century, but it will not be easy.

Views expressed in this article are opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Epoch Times.
Gregory Copley is president of the Washington-based International Strategic Studies Association and editor-in-chief of the online journal Defense & Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy. Born in Australia, Copley is a Member of the Order of Australia, entrepreneur, writer, government adviser, and defense publication editor. His latest book is “The New Total War of the 21st Century and the Trigger of the Fear Pandemic.”
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