Commentary
In his
recent speech in Warsaw, U.S. President Joe Biden stated that one of the consequences of Russia’s recent actions in Ukraine was that neighboring Finland applied to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, or NATO. Now this has become a reality, after the Finnish parliament voted in favor of NATO membership with an overwhelming majority of
184 to 7.
The only part currently missing from the official application for full membership in the alliance is the signature of President Sauli Niinistö, which he has promised to provide. After that, full membership of Finland requires only ratification by two remaining NATO countries who have not yet done it: Turkey and Hungary.
In this article, I will discuss the current geopolitical position of Finland. I will also discuss why Finland’s full membership of NATO is likely to lead to an escalation of the Russo-Ukrainian war and possibly even to a wider European war.
The nature of NATO has been changing during the Russo-Ukrainian war, which has also been acknowledged by its leadership. On
Feb. 15, Jens Stoltenberg, the secretary general of NATO, stated that it’s now important to ensure that Ukraine defeats Russia militarily. Stoltenberg effectively stated what many of us following the Russo-Ukrainian war closely
have known for months. NATO is committed to a proxy-war against Russia by supporting Ukraine with funds, arms, operational intelligence, heavy weaponry, and volunteers. This view is also now shared by the Kremlin, as recently
stated by President Vladimir Putin.
There’s no indication that those in Finland supporting efforts to rapidly join the military alliance have given any attention to this. Any such discussions have apparently been held in confidential surroundings. To the public at large, membership has been marketed as an opportunity to unquestionably and simply enhance Finland’s security. The very modest domestic discussion on possible preconditions indicates a lack of willingness to formally commit to any constraints on what the alliance may place at or do along the (long) Finnish–Russian border.
Given that NATO at least temporarily appears to have evolved into an offensive alliance, the concrete implications of Finland’s NATO membership have evolved too. Russia has repeatedly indicated that it doesn’t welcome NATO at its borders and refers to this as a reason for the Ukraine war. If Finnish politicians as well as NATO members are interested in reducing the likelihood of Finland becoming an object of particular military interest to Russia, the implications and desirable constraints of Finland’s positions should now finally be made clear. After all, one would assume that Finland and NATO certainly wouldn’t want Finland’s membership in NATO to become a major point of escalation in the tensions brewing between the alliance and Russia.
From Neutrality to Escalation
Finland and Russia have a long, somewhat complicated but also prosperous, joint history. Finland was part of the Swedish Empire for over 500 years, until Russia finally took the whole of Finland from Sweden, effectively ending her empire in 1809. Finland became a rapidly developing autonomous Grand Duchy of the Russian Empire. Finland got her own currency, the markka, in 1860, which basically started the long process toward Finland’s independence, which was declared on Dec. 6, 1917.Finland gained her independence as a result of the Socialist revolution in Russia, with the hope of the leader of the revolution, Vladimir Lenin, that Finland would soon find her way to socialism by herself. In Finland’s civil war, which erupted shortly after the declaration of independence, Russia did support the “Reds,” consisting of the industrial and agrarian populace, against the middle- and upper-class “Whites.” The war ended with a victory for the Whites on May 15, 1918. This marked the beginning of a somewhat uneasy coexistence between Finland and Soviet Russia, temporarily interrupted by two wars.
The two wars between Finland and the Soviet Union were a reflection of the wider World War II. The Winter War was largely bilateral, caused by territorial claims of the then-leader of the Soviet Union, Joseph Stalin, and the secret amendment of the
Molotov-Ribbentrop pact placing Finland under the Soviet “sphere of influence.” The Continuation War was fought alongside Nazi Germany in an effort to reclaim territories lost in the Winter War. Finland actually had very little choice under the constraints created by the ongoing European war. There was a constant threat of a Soviet invasion, and Finland held the largest known nickel deposit in Europe in Petsamo, the northern “arm” of Finland, which both Hitler and Stalin sought to command. It thus had to either join forces with Germany or face a possible new Soviet invasion. The wars resulted in the loss of around 12 percent of Finland’s territory, including Petsamo.
The Moscow Armistice, signed on Sept. 19, 1944, marked the beginning of a period of eight decades during which Finland has, until now, generally chosen to remain neutral in geopolitical matters. The Agreement of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance, or ”YYA,” signed on April 6, 1948, cemented Finland’s position. It agreed to remain outside alliances and to treat Germany or any of its allies threatening Russia (the Soviet Union) through its territory as an enemy and defend itself “as an independent nation.” The agreement kept Finland outside the Warsaw Pact and also initially outside Western organizations.
Presidents Juho Paasikivi and Urho Kekkonen formulated a policy line of passive neutrality called the Paasikivi–Kekkonen doctrine in the 1950s. While the Paris Peace Treaty limited the size of Finland’s military for some time after World War II, Finland systematically built up her army to be able to counter any further Soviet Union aggression. The policy was a great success, with Finland strengthening its independence while trade with the Soviet Union, whose international trade was heavily sanctioned by several Western governments, grew rapidly, feeding Finland’s economic growth. Its military policy was aimed at creating a credible threat to counter or at least inflict heavy damage on any Soviet (or other) aggression. The Paasikivi–Kekkonen doctrine made possible a peaceful and prosperous co-existence with the Soviet Union.
Finland is one of the crucial pieces in the pan-European security structure, with a 1,340 km border with Russia. When Finland now apparently ends her close to 80-year-old policy of neutrality, it will, most likely, have consequences for all of Europe. It will most likely be seen by Russia as another act of major escalation by NATO. Russian leadership will probably feel threatened by the increase in the number of countries in Europe unwilling to consider its perceived national security needs. Finland can now, unless it applies some visible brakes, be seen as a newly revealed enemy of Russia, its future credibility compromised, committed to taking part in NATO’s external policies, which have been turning increasingly hostile toward Russia.
Finland Is an Asset NATO Wants
The extent to which Finland’s territory may be available for permanent future NATO military assets is presently quite unclear to probably everybody in the country. However, Putin has already made
clear that Russia will respond if NATO military assets are placed in Finland (or Sweden). The
president and the
defense minister of Finland have suggested that nuclear weapons or permanent bases might not be immediately required or desired. However, no formal decisions have been made.
As a full member of NATO, Finland will surely be expected to support war operations in Ukraine more actively. If the conflict between NATO and Russia escalates further, the risk of military incursions and a nuclear attack by Russia on Finland will also rise accordingly. A common claim in Finland has been that the nuclear shield of NATO members would prevent any attacks. This view, however, doesn’t consider the fact that a full-scale war between NATO and Russia (and China) is now a real possibility, which would make Finland a key frontline state.
There would probably be a lesser risk for Finland if it weren’t a full member of NATO. Using (limited) Russian resources to defeat one of the strongest armies in Europe, not posing a direct threat, would be simply foolish. Moreover, in a region where NATO is increasingly active—the Baltic Sea and Scandinavia—Finland holds a strategically important position due to geography and its sizable army. We can thus safely assume that if a bilateral war between Finland and Russia does ignite for some reason, NATO would be very likely to provide Finland with all the assistance it needs regardless of membership (c.f. Ukraine).
Finland definitely is an asset NATO wants. As Max Bergmann and Sophia Besch report in
Foreign Affairs, European forces are in worse shape than previously thought, and many nations have depleted their stockpiles of weapons to assist Ukraine, including
the UK. This, quite straightforwardly, implies that the relative weight of Finland in NATO’s European security structure has increased, likely dramatically.
Now, if NATO seriously intends to weaken Russia militarily, which seems to be the case in Ukraine, using Finland as a buffer could prove very attractive to NATO planners. Indeed, should Ukraine lose its war, as seems increasingly likely, NATO might wish to increase military pressure elsewhere. This could be done by, for instance, establishing new bases containing strategic long-distance armaments along the Russian border, in practice Finland and
Poland, which have national armies still able to defend their own territories. This, as warned by Putin, would force Russia to act.
There’s No Fate but that Which We Create
Recently, Fiona Hill and Angela Stent
argued in Foreign Affairs that the victory of Russia in Ukraine would pose a direct threat to the Baltic States and Finland. However, it’s difficult to see how a possible Russian victory in Ukraine would change the concrete security situation of Finland (I can’t take any stance on Poland or the Baltics). While Russia has been building up its military during the Putin presidency, it’s still no match for the relative military power of the Soviet Union. The assumption that Russia would choose to establish a security zone in Finland through military aggression is simply not credible. Finland’s well-trained and well-equipped army would be very costly to eliminate. The Finnish population would very actively oppose occupation, increasing the cost of managing a mandatory buffer zone. Any such zone would therefore have to be based on voluntary neutrality by the Finnish state, which has been the case until now.
The other threat Hill and Stent
present, namely subversion to favor Russia, is also quite unrealistic. While one can imagine extreme theoretical scenarios, where a large portion of Finns could resort to a widespread revolt, the risk of an actual Russian-led coup in Finland is essentially zero. Finland’s society is one of the most stable in the world and it has over time grown very resilient to Russian influence, which, again, is minuscule compared to that encountered during the Soviet era.
The arguments of Hill and Stent of even an indirect threat to Finland from the Ukrainian conflict seem unfounded. However, joining an alliance engaged in a proxy-war against Finland’s eastern neighbor (Russia) would naturally change things radically, as it would immediately become a party in an ongoing war. A much more relevant question is, what will happen to NATO’s ability to provide a “security guarantee” for Finland and others if Russia isn’t defeated in Ukraine as the NATO leadership so fervently wishes to do? In the worst case, Ukraine will become the country that breaks the credibility of NATO. In that case, NATO membership could actually become a serious new security concern for Finland.
Finland Joins a (Proxy-) War, but at What Cost?
Fear has seldom been a good ally to important decisions, but that’s what both the mainstream media and the political leadership in Finland have fomented. The fear of a Russian military threat has become important in opinion polls, which have seen a majority of the populace turning to support membership of NATO for the first time ever. However, the level of popular support isn’t unequivocally established. There was no referendum held on NATO membership, even though Niinistö stated, for example on
4 Feb. 2022, that the question of NATO membership is so fundamental that the people need to be heard.
The favorite quote of Paasikivi, who was the mastermind behind the YYA -agreement, was, “The beginning of all wisdom is acknowledgment of facts” (attributed to English historian Thomas Carlyle). If this had been the guiding principle among EU and NATO leaders concerning Ukraine, we would probably not be on the brink of yet another all-European war. Russian leadership has made clear, time and time again, that Ukraine is the “red line.” These warnings were analyzed thoroughly by John J. Mearsheimer in Foreign Affairs in
October 2014.
For example, Mearsheimer reported that Alexander Grushko, Russia’s former deputy foreign minister, stated in 2008 that “Georgia’s and Ukraine’s membership in the alliance is a huge strategic mistake which would have [the] most serious consequences for pan-European security.” One Russian newspaper reported that when Putin and President George W. Bush met, Putin hinted that “if Ukraine was accepted into NATO, it would cease to exist.” These were clear warnings, indicating that Ukraine was an integral part of the security concept
bezopasnost (directly) translated as “the absence of threat,” as understood by the Kremlin. Moreover, in 2021, George Robertson, a former British Labour Party defense secretary who led NATO between 1999 and 2003, stated in an
interview that in the first meeting with Putin, it became clear that “they [Russia] wanted to be part of that secure, stable prosperous west [Western Europe] that Russia was out of at the time.”
Such views were monitored closely in Finland, where the economic and societal ties with Russia grew stronger. Naturally, the unusual openness of Russia was taken with a grain of salt, as Finns knew very well how fast the mood could change in the Kremlin. Yet, the Finnish political elite has, at least until now, understood that an integrated Russia is a much safer neighbor than a nationalistic and isolated Russia, and that Finland has a major role in that integration.
Still, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Finland took the opportunity of her newborn freedom to join the Partnership for Peace program of NATO in 1994. After the annexation of Crimea in 2014, Finland and NATO
signed a memorandum of understanding, which allowed for joint military exercises on Finnish soil and made it possible to accept assistance from NATO in “disasters, disruptions, and threats to security.” These were clear steps toward a NATO membership, but Finland remained a neutral country, which was a stance in the geopolitical theater widely supported by the general populace. That stance is now changing in a profound manner, which could have serious consequences for the whole of Europe and possibly the world.
Possible scenarios of what NATO membership could mean for Finland, and Europe, were virtually absent from the public discussion before the parliamentary vote. It even remains unclear whether the Finnish leadership truly comprehended what it is likely to be committing to as a full member of NATO. Be that as it may, the
proposal by the government of Prime Minister Sanna Marin, accepted by the Finnish Parliament, didn’t even mention that NATO is engaged in a proxy-war against Russia, much less analyze what this implies for Finland now or in the near future. Transparency was avoided, very effectively, even though Finland will be having parliamentary elections on April 2.
The question that now faces us is, what does NATO want? If they want an outright war with Russia, Finland as a full member may bring just that. If they want peace, Ukraine and Finland should remain neutral.
Has the die already been cast?
The author wishes to thank Dr. Peter Nyberg and an anonymous Constitutional law-office for their comments and suggestions.
Views expressed in this article are opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Epoch Times.
