It seems implausible that now, with China dominating global mineral production and the United States vulnerable to a cutoff of imported minerals, the United States has allowed its military stockpile of critical raw materials for national defense to dwindle.
Hard as it might seem to believe, we do not have a clear national policy for mineral production, hindering our stockpile’s ability to satisfy mineral demand at key U.S. industrial sectors during a national emergency. Absent actions to maintain the defense stockpile at safe levels, the United States could be ill-prepared for a defense sector more reliant on batteries and renewable energy technologies—let alone a conflict with the world’s mineral superpower, China. The Defense Department has stated that if strained relations with China turn into a military conflict, the United States would have shortfalls in 69 minerals, most of them used in weapons production.
For some minerals and metals, U.S. production has stopped completely. For example, niobium, which is used in steel and as a superalloy, has not been mined in the United States since 1959. Bismuth is used in U.S. defense systems, but it is not stockpiled. Moreover, in the event of a mineral shortage, the United States could not depend on its closest allies for critical raw materials. NATO has limited mineral production. The European Union imports between 75 percent and 100 percent of most metals it consumes, and neither the EU nor its member countries have stockpiles. Nor do Canada or Great Britain have mineral stockpiles.
A new study of military readiness by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace warns that the problems surrounding the U.S. mineral supply are terribly serious—and are likely to be permanent. The difficulty is not a lack of domestic resources but rather a lack of political will to produce them. Domestic mining for minerals is in a sort of political limbo. According to the U.S. Geological Survey, China is the leading producer of 29 of 43 key industrial minerals. Furthermore, the United States relies on China for about half of the critical minerals, including lithium, cobalt, and rare earths.
If war breaks out with China, U.S. merchant vessels can carry minerals across the Pacific and risk attacks by Chinese forces and bear the cost of sharply higher insurance premiums. Or they can sail thousands of extra miles by taking minerals around Africa, adding 10 days in each direction. There is another option: send minerals overland by truck from mines in South America. None of these options is appealing, but the weaponization of global supply chains is something that must be taken seriously because of tense U.S. relations with China and dependence on China for critical minerals. And China is not the only country with whom we have brittle relations. The United States imports nickel, titanium, uranium, and aluminum from Russia.
The threat to U.S. supply chains argues for a much larger mineral stockpile. And instead of relying on imports, the United States should procure domestically produced minerals where reserves exist. Such a policy would help facilitate domestic production. The United States should also consider prepaying for minerals to help fund a number of prospective mineral projects. It would help make U.S. mining more economically attractive—whether the minerals are used in commercial production or for stockpiles.
Can anything else be done to protect the United States against a sudden cutoff of critical minerals? Absolutely. The single most important thing that the federal government can do is shorten the permitting process for both new mines and processing facilities. The time was never riper for a national policy to support domestic mineral use and stimulate production.
