Deterring China’s $5 Trillion Blockade of Taiwan

Deterring China’s $5 Trillion Blockade of Taiwan
Taiwan President Lai Ching-te (C) and Defense Minister Wellington Koo arrive on a visit to inspect military troops in Taoyuan, Taiwan, on May 23, 2024. Sam Yeh/AFP via Getty Images
Anders Corr
Updated:
0:00
Commentary

The immediate damages to trade and industry caused by a blockade of Taiwan by communist China would far outweigh the cost of deterring such a blockade, not to mention the likely U.S.–China war that would follow. Yet deterrence is a certain and upfront cost, while a war is deferred and might never happen. This tempts some to ignore the future uncertain cost to avoid the certain current cost.

Yet the damages from a blockade are so substantial and probable that the risk is becoming hard to ignore. Even Bloomberg News, which is typically soft on China in a manner that pleases its business clientele, has published a $5 trillion estimate of the effect of a blockade from the loss of Taiwan’s semiconductor exports alone.
The possibility of such a blockade is getting more real. On May 23, Beijing “punished” Taiwan for its new president’s past support for independence and democracy through yet another military exercise of a blockade around the island just three days after his inauguration. On May 27, Memorial Day, Taiwan detected 11 Chinese ships and 21 military planes near the island. On the same day, China engaged in military exercises near Nanji island, which belonged to Taiwan until it evacuated under fire from the mainland in 1955.
A U.S. congressman who visited Taiwan, House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Michael McCaul (R-Texas), said that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was using an “intimidation tactic to punish democracy.” These are wise words, as the CCP’s targeting of Taiwan is a threat to democracies everywhere, not just in Taiwan.

Mr. McCaul said more weapons would be delivered. Unfortunately, he did not have any with him. But he did give the new president, Lai Ching-te, a cowboy hat, which was promptly modeled for the press. With grins all around, “Don’t mess with Texas” became in that moment, “Don’t mess with Taiwan.” That message of determination in defense of democracy is as important as the weapons themselves.

Democracies around the world must stand behind America’s “Don’t Tread on Me” sentiment if we are to survive in the long run. If allowed to capture Taiwan, the CCP’s power would increase immeasurably through its capture of the island’s computer chip expertise, economy of $803 billion, highly educated workforce, and strategic location from which to attack Japanese and Philippine islands. Each new island that the CCP captures apparently whets its appetite for more, including the Paracel Islands in the South China Sea in 1974, several Spratly Islands in 1988, Mischief Reef in 1994, and Scarborough Shoal in 2012.

The lack of an effective U.S. defense of these islands, including those of South Vietnam and the Philippines during active U.S. defense treaties with these countries, broadcasts to Beijing that Washington and its alliances are weak. Unfortunately, Beijing’s track record indicates that it won’t stop its expansionary march until it feels the chill of U.S. gunmetal. It’s sad that it has come to this, but that is the reality.

Now, the CCP wants to capture its biggest prize yet, Taiwan. The island of just 24 million people is a political irritant, in part because it is the only ethnically Chinese democracy in the world. It is far more successful than China economically, politically, and culturally, as it celebrates its market, competition, diversity, and diplomatic popularity rather than trying to homogenize internal and external populations through communism against the wealthy, genocides against minorities such as the Uyghurs, Tibetans, and Falun Gong adherents, and invasions of neighboring countries.

The good news is that the United States is, to some extent, at least attempting to deter China from the latest planned aggression. Key to this effort are threats of retaliatory economic sanctions, increased export controls, diplomatic isolation and, of course, U.S. military action to defeat any blockade or invasion. The U.S. Marines have boots on the ground at various Japanese and Philippine islands near Taiwan and are actively mapping the terrain to develop shoot-and-scoot plans for maximum damage to China’s navy while evading retaliatory fire. U.S. troops are in Taiwan training its forces.
But there is more the United States can do. In 2019, we promised to sell Taiwan 66 F-16 jet fighters. Yet they have not been delivered five years later. The same goes for HIMARS mobile rockets, Harpoon coastal defenses, and Abrams tanks. This failure to provide Taiwan with what is required for its defense is an invitation to Beijing, a weight tied to the U.S. defense industry, and a risk that could lead to trillions of dollars in damages, expenses, and lost global trade.
U.S. allies that depend on us for their defense should also be pressured to do more. First, we should tell them in no uncertain terms that alliances are a two-way street. Europe should better support Taiwan in its hour of need, including in exchange for U.S. support of Ukraine. The Philippines wants help in the South China Sea, so it should commit to assisting U.S. forces that defend Taiwan in case of attack.

That eternal vigilance is the price of freedom sounds trite, it has been used so much. Yet it has been used so much because it is such a constant reality. Dictators throughout history seek to conquer their neighbors and extinguish their liberty.

Views expressed in this article are opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Epoch Times.
Anders Corr
Anders Corr
Author
Anders Corr has a bachelor's/master's in political science from Yale University (2001) and a doctorate in government from Harvard University (2008). He is a principal at Corr Analytics Inc., publisher of the Journal of Political Risk, and has conducted extensive research in North America, Europe, and Asia. His latest books are “The Concentration of Power: Institutionalization, Hierarchy, and Hegemony” (2021) and “Great Powers, Grand Strategies: the New Game in the South China Sea" (2018).
twitter
Related Topics