Commentary
When discussing American military spending and defense industrial base policy in the context of great power competition with the Chinese Communist Party, it has become common to
hark back to the Second World War and the “Arsenal of Democracy.” However, the unfortunate reality is that the United States is unlikely to be capable of perfectly replicating the economic and industrial marvel that it pulled off in the Second World War, when it
spent roughly 40 percent of GDP on defense. This is particularly true because any conflict with the CCP is likely to be protracted, which demands spending that can sustain the military over a long period.
Various defense professionals have already
argued that Great Britain’s participation in the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, which lasted from 1793 to 1815, might offer better strategic lessons for the U.S. to draw on when thinking about competition with the CCP. The same is also true for Britain’s wartime spending during the same series of conflicts.
Britain’s
credibility as a debtor was fundamental to its ability to finance the fight against Revolutionary, and later Napoleonic France. The scale and length of the war demanded that it sustain higher spending and deficits than many of its previous wars, with nearly ninety percent of British wartime spending from 1793 to 1798 financed through borrowing. However, the British Government was able to borrow this money at fairly low interest rates owing to its credibility, and trust by its financiers that the money would be paid back.
In terms of actual military spending, Britain not only focused on maintaining a strong military of its own, but also on bolstering its allies, who could offset areas in which Britain was militarily weak. This was especially true on land. The British Army remained relatively small throughout the wars,
peaking at roughly 250,000 soldiers in 1813, well below Napoleon’s army fielded over a
million troops that same year. This significant difference in size was balanced out by the armies of Britain’s allies, particularly Austria, Russia, and Prussia, who were able to afford substantial land forces in part due to British
subsidies.
While the British Army remained small throughout the war, the Royal Navy grew to become the largest and most capable in Europe, securing command of the seas after Vice Admiral Horatio Nelson
defeated a combined Franco-Spanish fleet off Cape Trafalgar. While it would be ten years between Nelson’s victory at Trafalgar in 1805 and Napoleon’s ultimate defeat in 1815 at the hands of the Duke of Wellington and Prince Blucher at
Waterloo, Britain’s command of the sea was essential in securing its final victory. Trafalgar guaranteed that France would not be able to mount an amphibious invasion of the British Isles, enabled Britain to secure the trade that was vital to its economy, and allowed for secure seaborne logistical support to land forces on the European continent during the Peninsular War.
What lessons do these hold for the United States in its own great power rivalry with the CCP?
As noted above, Britain’s command of the sea was essential to its victory over France. It therefore sacrificed some degree of capability in its Army to ensure the Royal Navy was properly organized, manned, trained, and equipped, with the shortfall in British land forces made up for by subsidizing the armies of its allies. This could be an especially important guide for the United States.
Modern day “command of the sea” must include both traditional control over the maritime domain (or at least relative dominance in it), but also extends into the air, space, and cyberspace, given their importance to both global commerce and power projection. In a resource-constrained defense environment, the United States may have to take a page from Britain’s example and accept reductions in landpower in order to pay for a larger Navy, and more capable air, space, and cyber forces. The corresponding reduction in landpower could be offset by the U.S.’s allies.
While the overall U.S. Army is significantly larger than any allied land force in the Indo-Pacific, with over a million soldiers, it only fields around 106,000 in the theater itself, under U.S. Army Pacific. This is significantly smaller than the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force, Republic of Korea Army, and Philippine Army with 150,700, 365,000, and 150,000 active soldiers respectively, and only slightly larger than the Taiwanese Army with 94,000 soldiers. U.S. Army Pacific would undoubtedly surge forces in the event of conflict, but allied armies will always remain closer to the fight than a surge American land force. Allied armies could represent a better way of carrying out land operations in a protracted war with the PLA. Meanwhile, the U.S. Army’s maneuver elements could be reduced in size in order to pay for a more capable Navy and Marine Corps (as well as Air Force and Space Force). An American armored brigade combat team
costs roughly $3.2 billion to support and maintain. A reduction of just two such units (i.e. from 11 to 9) could buy an additional 2.5
Arleigh Burke-class Flight III destroyers or 2.3
Virginia-class submarines.
Difficult military choices must be made if the United States hopes to finance long-term competition with the Chinese Communist Party. Great Britain’s ability to fund a protracted series of conflicts against France from 1793 to 1815 offers lessons in wartime financing that U.S. policymakers would do well to heed. Power projection capabilities at sea and in the air, space, and cyberspace are critical to Indo-Pacific security, demanding reductions in land capabilities in order to properly finance them. This disadvantage in landpower could be offset by the armies of the U.S.’s allies in the Indo-Pacific.
Views expressed in this article are opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Epoch Times.
