Communist China Plays Nuclear Hardball With the US

China's DF-41 nuclear-capable intercontinental ballistic missiles are seen during a military parade at Tiananmen Square in Beijing on Oct. 1, 2019. (Greg Baker/AFP via Getty Images)

Commentary

Communist China is playing nuclear hardball with the United States. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) sent two nuclear-capable bombers near Alaska on July 24, accompanied by another two Russian bombers. Russian fighter jets led the way.

This “strategic signaling” is a subtle nuclear threat against the United States that the administration in Washington is downplaying so as not to give Beijing and Moscow too much propaganda value. Yet it indicates Chinese and Russian willingness to engage in nuclear brinkmanship on a range of issues, the most important of which are U.S. military support for Ukraine and Taiwan. The flight plan’s proximity to the Arctic also sends a message about the coordinated Arctic ambitions of both Moscow and Beijing.

As the flights were within the U.S. and Canadian air defense identification zone, U.S. and Canadian fighter jets scrambled to meet the incursion and send our own message: Stay out of North America.

A week prior, on July 17, China’s foreign ministry suspended nuclear arms control negotiations with Washington to protest U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. This additional threat is similar to Beijing’s non-cooperation on fentanyl, as thousands of Americans die annually from the illegal drug.

On July 22, China’s foreign ministry published two nuclear demands: that the United States leave itself vulnerable by pledging “no first use” of nuclear weapons, and that the United States leave its allies vulnerable by removing its “nuclear umbrella,” including no sharing of U.S. nuclear weapons flown on European planes as is currently practiced by NATO countries. That proposal is a non-starter, given that it would leave most of Europe vulnerable to invading Russian armies and make it more difficult to defend U.S. allies in East Asia.

Japan and South Korea, which are under frequent missile threats and air incursions by China, Russia, and North Korea, are responding by asking for more nuclear deterrence, not less. Since about 1985, Japan has had the latent ability to break out of its non-nuclear status and build a nuclear weapon. Now, South Korea is moving in the same direction.

Seoul has indicated that because the United States has not provided South Korea with NATO-style nuclear sharing and a seat at the table as the United States makes nuclear policy for East Asia, South Korea could build its own nuclear weapons. The conservative mayor of Seoul, as well as 66 percent of South Korean respondents in a survey published in July, support an independent nuclear deterrent for their country. Another option includes Seoul building its nuclear capabilities to the point of “nuclear latency” or having a breakout option at short notice, like Japan.

The United States could slow nuclear proliferation in East Asia by offering to base U.S. tactical nuclear weapons on Japanese, South Korean, and Taiwanese soil. The United States has done this for some European countries to deter Russia, and the same could be done to deter China.

However, that puts us in the middle of what could become a nuclear war. Giving our support for an independent nuclear deterrent for our East Asian allies would remove us as the nuclear middleman. That decreases the risk to the United States were a nuclear war to break out and arguably decreases the probability of such a war in the first place.

Beijing’s promotion of a nuclear “no first use” policy would put smaller and more peaceful countries that want to spend less on their conventional militaries, like Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, at a disadvantage. For example, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has at its disposal many more soldiers, sailors, ships, and planes than Taiwan. If the PLA attacks Taiwan with conventional forces, as it might around 2027, and Taiwan and the United States do not have the conventional forces necessary for defense, an independent tactical nuclear weapons capability possessed by Taipei could make the difference. The credible threat of a tactical nuclear strike on PLA forces crossing the Taiwan Strait, or about to cross, might deter the decision to invade in the first place and, thus, keep the peace even without strategic nuclear weapons.

Thus, wars can be averted through the threat of a nuclear first strike, especially if that threat were made more credible by providing Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea with their own nuclear weapons. The peace in East Asia is currently unstable in part because Beijing could believe that Washington is bluffing about its willingness to defend these countries. It is difficult for Washington to credibly commit to this deterrent, given the risk of nuclear retaliation against the United States. If Taiwan were under an overwhelming attack anyway, Taipei would have less to lose through the use of its own independent nuclear deterrent. This makes its deterrent more credible, rather than just cheap talk, and so more likely to stop a war from starting.

As successive U.S. administrations hope that they can convince the CCP to return to a path of peace and trade, the CCP’s expansive territorial ambitions appear to be hard-baked into the organization. This is evidenced by its attempt to expand its own nuclear weapons capabilities while stopping the nuclear deterrence capabilities of its neighbors. Nothing could be more irresponsible and destabilizing. The United States and allies in both Asia and Europe need a better and more unified plan to keep the peace.

Views expressed in this article are opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Epoch Times.