China’s Xi Purging His Inner Circle

Is the Chinese regime on the cusp of military action, is it a case of paranoia, or both?

Chinese military delegates walk in a line as they arrive at the second plenary session of the Chinese regime's rubber-stamp legislature, the National People’s Congress, at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing on March 8, 2024. Kevin Frayer/Getty Images

Commentary

As you read this, Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leader Xi Jinping is in the midst of purging members of his inner circle. In fact, these are the most intense purges in the Chinese regime in 40 years.

What’s going on?

A Purge at the Highest Levels

There are a variety of plausible explanations for the purges, depending on the source. Corruption, such as “violations of discipline,” is the official explanation for the purges. But given that corruption saturates the Chinese economy and society—with the military and political elite among its greatest beneficiaries, including Xi himself—that explanation is more of a cover story than a reason.

Furthermore, Xi is not only turning against low- or mid-level military leaders, but is also targeting Beijing’s political and military elite, including those at the top levels of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy and PLA Rocket Force.

In November 2024, for example, Xi purged Adm. Miao Hua, a close political ally whom he has trusted for decades. Xi appointed Miao to serve on the Central Military Commission to enforce loyalty in the PLA and oversee the promotions of senior officers.

But Miao isn’t the only victim in Xi’s latest round of purges. In the second half of 2024, Xi removed more than a dozen top defense officials, including two he had appointed to the Central Military Commission.

What’s Xi worried about?

Power, Paranoia, and the Ghost of Mao

History shows us that in one-man dictatorships, purges are commonly used to eliminate political rivals. Soviet Russia’s Joseph Stalin and China’s first communist dictator, Mao Zedong, used them during their time in power, and so has Xi, whose ascent to CCP leadership in 2012 was made possible partly by eliminating his political competitors through anti-corruption purges.

Since then, Xi’s purges have continued, sometimes at lower levels, but at other times, such as today, at very high ones. What’s more, thanks to advances in digital and surveillance technology, Xi has attained and consolidated his power to a level that exceeds even Mao’s at the zenith of his rule.

But why is Xi now purging his own hand-picked military and political allies?

Does he face clear and present challenges to his leadership of the Party?

Are his advancing age and weakening physical and mental powers driving him to suspect disloyalty from even his closest advisers?

Perhaps. For one, Xi may fear that his generals have built their own cadre of loyal officers and that they, given the opportunity, could be used to oust him from power. That could be the case, or it could simply be the paranoia that inevitably comes with one-man rule.

Or both could be true. As former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger has been quoted as saying, “Even paranoids have enemies.”

Domestically, Xi has low public approval ratings, particularly among members of Gen Z, more than 20 percent of whom are unemployed. How anti-corruption purges will help with unemployment remains murky. Still, it may come down to simply the appearance of the authorities doing something to improve the economy, echoing his failed “common prosperity” campaign, which didn’t live up to the CCP hype.

A No-confidence Vote for the Military?

Another possibility is that Xi could be questioning the reliability and confidence of his military leaders. Will they follow commands that may lead to or even equate to overt acts of war in the near future? Are they competent enough to defeat the United States and, almost as likely, Japan?

In that light, the purges could be about replacing potentially hesitant military leaders with ones who, in Xi’s words, “will fight and win wars.” The first of these may be the invasion of Taiwan, which Xi alluded to yet again in his New Year’s Eve speech to his nation.

But won’t purging top military leaders lessen the Chinese regime’s war-fighting capabilities?

Views are mixed on that question. Notably, the military purges are at the top command levels, not at operational ones, so leadership-level purges may not be as impactful. That, however, remains to be seen.

Preparing for War?

Additionally, the reasons could be multifaceted and related to all of those mentioned.

There may be, for instance, an actual loyalty threat to Xi. It wouldn’t be the first time that military leaders have used their position to dethrone a ruler. If one or more of Xi’s top military leaders have doubts or are against his potential intentions to go to war, they may well have positioned themselves to remove Xi from power with military personnel loyal to them rather than to Xi.

There may also be an operational threat because of systemic corruption that undoubtedly exists within the military–industrial supply chain. The current purge focuses on the PLA’s Rocket Force, China’s most elite military branch that’s at the core of Xi’s strategic nuclear force and Chinese national security. In fact, five of the nine PLA officials purged from their positions, including Gen. Li Yuchao, had connections with the Rocket Force.

A similar purge has occurred in the PLA Navy’s South Sea Fleet—again, related to armaments supply chains. Given those facts, the purges could be viewed as a measure to strengthen the readiness and potency of the country’s various military branches, with a focus on the PLA Navy and Rocket Force. Xi’s pledge to unify Taiwan with the mainland by 2027 would make him keen to eliminate any factor that could hinder the PLA and its industrial components from achieving operational efficiency.

If those are indeed the reasons for Xi’s purges, then it would be wise for the world to take notice.

Taiwan certainly is.

Views expressed in this article are opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Epoch Times.