China has turned left under Xi Jinping. The direction of China’s society in the past decade parallels the country’s journey before and during the Cultural Revolution, a violent sociopolitical movement that swept the country between 1966 and 1976.
Xi has aspired to be another Mao Zedong or even surpass Mao, China’s founding communist leader and the architect of the Cultural Revolution.
So far, Xi has mirrored two significant milestones of Mao’s power trajectory: consolidating the power of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in one person and removing senior Party leaders who held different opinions.
The next milestone is a “Lin Biao moment.”
The Lin Biao incident was a defining moment for Mao. Lin, Mao’s official successor, died in a plane crash in September 1971 on his way to the Soviet Union, according to the official story of the CCP. The Party didn’t reveal Lin’s death until almost two years later.
Mao began gathering blind followership after 1949, when the CCP took over China. His cult of personality peaked during the Cultural Revolution. The rapid change in the Party narrative following the news of Lin’s death—redefining him from a revolutionary hero to a traitor—didn’t help preserve Mao’s authority. Instead, the Chinese began questioning the Cultural Revolution and, ultimately, Mao’s character. Mao began to step down from the pedestal in the people’s eyes.
Xi took over China in 2013.
After securing his third term in 2022 by changing the Chinese Constitution to lift the term limit, he consolidated power and abandoned collective leadership within the top ranks of the CCP, making his status similar to Mao’s. We could call this Xi’s “Mao Zedong moment.”
Then, Xi’s “Liu Shaoqi moment” occurred.
Liu was eliminated by Mao two years into the Cultural Revolution. He was the then-CCP vice chair and president of China and was once considered a potential successor to Mao. As an economic reformer, Liu didn’t agree with the political movements that led to the decade of sociopolitical upheaval. Consequently, in 1968, Liu was stripped of his positions and publicly denounced as a “capitalist roader.”
While we don’t know the long-term effects of these relatively recent events, when the “Lin Biao moment” occurs, Xi’s power base could be fundamentally shaken—much like what happened following Lin’s death, which dealt a heavy blow to Mao’s authority.
After the CCP seized power in China, Mao established an absolute dictatorship, enjoying unwavering reverence from the Party, including senior officials. Lin’s death, however, significantly changed this dynamic.
Mao personally chose Lin as his successor. Because Mao’s image was always glorious, wise, and correct, the public firmly believed Lin was a fantastic, loyal general.
Lin’s downfall severely undermined Mao’s authority, leading many veteran Party members to question the latter’s judgment and decisions.
The labeling of Lin as a traitor quickly disillusioned the Chinese people. They realized that even Mao, whom they had once considered as wise as a deity, could make mistakes. This shift in perception led to a broader skepticism of all Party narratives.
In addition, many young people who had endured the hardships of the Cultural Revolution started to reflect on what went wrong and doubt it and Mao himself.
Therefore, many believe that the Lin Biao incident served as a precursor to the end of the Cultural Revolution and marked a significant ideological shift for the Chinese people, including those who had fought alongside Mao and the younger generation who had single-mindedly followed Mao in carrying out violent “revolutionary” acts.
Many CCP historians believe that the tragic fates of Mao’s two successors, Liu and Lin, can be traced to Mao’s anxiety when he saw Nikita Khrushchev’s denunciation of Joseph Stalin.
Khrushchev appeared to have great respect for Stalin, and Stalin trusted him deeply, often entrusting him with important responsibilities during crises.
Mao couldn’t help but worry about the emergence of a “Khrushchev” in China, a successor whom he trusted but who would betray him and expose his misdeeds after his death.
This deep-seated fear also explains why Mao ruthlessly targeted numerous high-ranking cadres during the Cultural Revolution. As a result, even in his old age, he was unwilling to relinquish power entirely for fear that his political rivals would take revenge.
Sources told me that the CCP elders want Xi to designate a successor—an issue that has been postponed since Xi secured his third term.
Xi wants a successor from his inner circle, possibly debating between Premier Li Qiang and first-ranked Vice Premier Ding Xuexiang. However, within the broader CCP, including the Hu Jintao faction and influential elders, there is a strong preference for Hu Chunhua, Hu Jintao’s confidant.
Xi’s “Lin Biao moment” might not unfold in the exact way as Mao’s. However, an unexpected incident associated with a successor may significantly weaken his power.
