Commentary
From the trade and loans to ports and space stations in Latin America, China is flanking the United States.
In recent years, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has been actively courting Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), using various tools to expand its influence. Beijing’s primary strategy is economic, but this economic engagement goes hand in hand with diplomatic engagement.
The CCP’s motivation for its overtures toward LAC is twofold: first, to obtain natural resources, and second, to weaken U.S. influence. This includes supporting countries with strained relations with the United States and encouraging a “multipolar world” view, downplaying American dominance. Beijing also encourages Latin American countries to transfer their recognition from Taiwan to China.
China holds observer status within the Organization of American States and has offered to collaborate with the members through its Global Security Initiative. Beijing also holds membership in both the Inter-American Development Bank and the Caribbean Development Bank. Additionally, China has established comprehensive strategic partnerships with Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela. Over the past nine years, CCP leader Xi Jinping has participated in three summits with leaders and foreign ministers from the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), excluding the United States and Canada.
No less than 21 LAC nations are members of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and many are increasingly indebted to China. China’s propaganda in the region underscores a “win-win” relationship and “respect for sovereignty,” concepts that, according to China’s interpretation, entail refraining from intervening in the human rights and democracy issues of borrower nations.
Beijing and Caracas have entered into an agreement for Chinese rockets to transport Venezuelan scientists to the International Lunar Research Station (ILRS), which China intends to establish on the moon. This collaboration is part of China’s broader strategy to secure ground stations and space communication sites globally, thereby bolstering its expanding space capabilities. With space technology anticipated to play a critical role in future wars, the CCP aims to ensure China maintains a competitive advantage over the United States.
Through the China-led Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organization (APSCO), Beijing has already provided several LAC countries—including Venezuela, Bolivia, and Brazil—with satellites. Beijing has also constructed ground stations in Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, and Venezuela. The station in Argentina is particularly concerning for the United States because it is operated by the China Satellite Launch and Tracking Control General (CLTC), a part of the People’s Liberation Army Strategic Support Force, and primarily staffed by Chinese military personnel.
Besides space, the 2022-2024 China-CELAC joint action plan outlines cooperation in several areas, including politics, security, economics, agriculture and food, industry and information technology, and high-quality infrastructure. The infrastructure aspect supports China’s capability to acquire food, metals, and natural resources from LAC countries. A recent development in infrastructure cooperation is China’s state-backed Cosco Shipping’s construction of a $3.5 billion port in Peru, where China has surpassed the United States as the country’s largest trading partner. While the port will enhance Beijing’s efficiency in processing and extracting metals, minerals, and other natural resources for transportation back to China, it also presents a national security concern for the United States.
China’s security engagement in the LAC region is evolving, including arms sales to states that oppose the United States. Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador have been the principal Latin American purchasers of Chinese military equipment and weapons, including aircraft and armored vehicles. Additionally, China has provided certain weapons, military vehicles, and training to Latin American nations at no cost, intending to nurture security alliances.
PLA personnel have had an increasing presence in LAC. The PLA has an electronic listening post in Cuba, sustained military presence in Latin America, expanding operations of Chinese private security firms in the region, and heightened training initiatives for Latin American security personnel within China. LAC governments are receiving visits from high-level PLA delegations with increasing frequency.
Beijinga’s expanding influence in LAC is fueling a deterioration in the quality of democracy. The CCP disseminates its authoritarian governance model through soft power avenues like media, education, and cultural exchanges. Moreover, it extends security aid, exporting technologies for mass surveillance and curbing civil liberties. Additionally, the CCP offers economic and diplomatic backing to regimes experiencing a decline in democratic standards. As regimes like Venezuela or Cuba face sanctions from the West, they become increasingly isolated from the international community, gravitating further into China’s sphere of influence.
China is strengthening its bonds with LAC countries through trade, investment, and the provision of military and space training and technology. This strategic alignment allows the CCP to bolster its capacity for surveillance and, if required, for launching attacks against the United States.
Views expressed in this article are opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Epoch Times.
