China’s interests in the Tasman Sea are driven by broader objectives in the Pacific region, including expanding its influence, securing maritime routes, and demonstrating its advancing naval capabilities.
The Tasman Sea, located between Australia and New Zealand, has been the site for two live-fire exercises in late February. Both Australia and New Zealand expressed concerns, not over the exercises as much as the lack of communication and minimal notice, forcing commercial airlines to divert flights.
The United States and its Indo–Pacific Command partners view the behavior as part of the Chinese regime’s broader strategy to project a more permanent military presence in the Pacific and to challenge the existing strategic order.
China typically deploys a variety of naval vessels for these exercises, such as Jiangkai-class frigates, Renhai-class cruisers, and Fuchi-class replenishment vessels. These vessels are equipped with advanced weaponry and significant firepower, including ballistic missiles. The Fuchi-class replenishment vessels provide logistical support to the fleet, allowing Chinese naval ships to operate for extended periods without needing to dock at a port. This is particularly important as China has no friendly ports in the Tasman Sea, relying solely on its resupply vessels for refueling and logistical support.
The typical length of these exercises varies, but they can last anywhere from a few days to several weeks. During that time, Chinese naval vessels conduct a range of activities, including live-fire drills, formation changes, and the deployment of floating targets. China uses the exercises to evaluate and test capabilities and demonstrate its ability to operate far from its shores. The presence of advanced Chinese naval vessels conducting live-fire drills with minimal notice has led to accusations of intimidation.
Additionally, from a PLAN leadership lens, the Chinese navy faces challenges with decentralized command, as indicated by the “Five Incapables” slogan critiquing officers who cannot judge situations, understand higher authorities’ intentions, make operational decisions, deploy troops, or deal with unexpected situations. This problem may reflect PLA-wide reforms that removed the PLAN headquarters from conducting operations, which became the purview of the PLA’s joint theater commands, focusing instead on organizing, manning, training, and equipping naval forces.
The report also indicates the PLAN has not yet demonstrated the type and scale of sophisticated long-distance logistics capabilities required for major contingencies overseas. The Tasman Sea is a crucial maritime route for trade and transportation between Australia and New Zealand. By increasing its regional presence, China can monitor and potentially control these strategic routes, enhancing its ability to influence regional trade and security dynamics.
The Chinese regime continues enhancing and refining activities that fall in the gray zone of operations. One line of effort includes how the regime employs a maritime militia, often referred to as the “Little Blue Men,” to assert its territorial claims in the South China Sea. These civilian fishing vessels, backed by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), engage in activities such as harassing foreign vessels, conducting surveillance, and establishing a presence in disputed waters. This tactic allows Beijing to exert pressure without directly involving its navy, thereby avoiding escalation to open conflict. Unannounced live fire exercises seem to reflect a similar behavior and intent.
A final note from the U.S. Defense Department report indicates that since 2019, the PLAN has been adjusting to changes in the strategic requirements of near-seas defense and far-seas protection, noting that it was “speeding up the transition of its tasks from defense on the near seas to protection missions on the far seas.”
All of these suggest that the CCP’s interests in the Tasman Sea are driven by its broader strategic goals in the Pacific region, including expanding its influence, securing maritime routes, and demonstrating its naval capabilities.
