The incursion serves Beijing on multiple levels.
While two minutes may not seem a lot of time, that shortness is likely part of Beijing’s strategy of incrementalism designed to gradually break boundaries, take territory, and gain influence abroad in a manner that does not elicit a strong response.
The target in incrementalist strategies is often described as a live frog getting boiled or salami being sliced. Heat the frog too quickly, and it jumps from the pot. Steal too much salami at once, and the owner is angered. That emotionality could lead to a fight. But if done slowly over time, the frog stays in the pot, and the salami owner doesn’t take action until it is too late.
Japan scrambled fighter jets to intercept China’s most recent spy plane but held back from firing flares. Tokyo likely feared “provoking” Beijing. A Chinese official was summoned for a tongue-lashing. But the incident apparently did not rise to the level of an ambassadorial rebuke. Not a shot was fired in anger as China invaded Japan for those two minutes. Shots would have been rash, goes the reasoning.
But the lack of a response is nearly an invitation to double the incursion next time, perhaps into four minutes over two islands, which can turn into eight minutes over the main island and, ultimately, after repeated unresisted transits, the ability to drop a bomb on Tokyo with so little warning as to make no defense possible.
Tokyo’s defense requires a standoff distance in which the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) respects Japanese borders, including its far-flung islands. That respect cannot be the normal respect of Japan as a people and nation that you and I have. The CCP cares nothing for that. Any CCP “respect” for Japan’s boundaries requires “deterrence,” which is another way of saying that Beijing must fear provoking Japan at the border, and only then will it “respect” that border.
The CCP prefers a rational, predictable actor for its deadly games of incrementalism and brinkmanship. This is a partner that does not yell during negotiations but instead reveals private information, such as where exactly the U.S. “red lines” are when it comes to protecting our allies in Asia. If our adversary can discover our “red lines,” much as a skilled business negotiator discovers our “best alternative to a negotiated solution” (BATNA), our adversary beats us at the bargaining table and can take everything up to our red line. That makes the adversary more powerful for the next round of negotiations and the next, each time slicing a bit more from the salami until it is gone, and we are left holding nothing at all with which to defend our capital city.
It’s possible that some U.S. or Japanese interlocutors of the past subtly or even unconsciously communicated to Beijing that a brief spy flight over the Danjo Islands would not rise to the level of a serious military or even diplomatic response. That type of “tell” is what the CCP looks for in its interminable negotiations that fuel its take-and-talk strategy. That “tell” would be sufficient for the CCP to plan an operation that attempts to set a precedent—a short flight into Japan, a foot in the door that can be pried open even more over time with no major consequences.
One never wants to give an adversary too much information about our red lines or the ability to accurately predict our moves. We want to keep them off balance by fearing U.S. sanctions and military might. This is the “deterrence” that keeps the PLAAF from doing even worse against Japan than it already has, or from attacking Taiwan. A strong and principled defense of every man, woman, and child on these islands from CCP tyranny is precisely what is needed today. The lack of defense is what gives the CCP a fighting chance of extending its rule, over time, to the world.
