In a direct threat to American interests, China is systematically building up dual-use military-civil capabilities in Antarctica to exploit this region’s growing strategic importance. This is a serious concern that will require a coordinated response from the United States and its allies.
For the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), control of Antarctica would assure access to its unexploited resources and fish stocks and assist the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA’s) nuclear superiority and space control.
This is essential for the CCP to achieve its ambition of global military-political hegemony, but as of today, it is prohibited under the Antarctica Treaty—which China joined in 1983—and that has so far deterred conflict over the world’s fifth-largest continent.
An impending 2048 expiration for a key provision of the agreement regarding resources, however, could open the continent to energy exploration and mining, raising the specter of a future power struggle.
Caution about the endurance of the Antarctic Treaty was noted in Britain’s Telegraph on March 19 by retired Royal Navy Commander Tom Sharpe, who commanded the Royal Navy icebreaker HMS Endurance.
“The Antarctic Treaty has endured and expanded, due partly to its wisdom and partly because defying it, in practical terms, is hard to do. However, when working down there, one always had the sense that as soon as Antarctica’s vast resources become economically worth the risk of exploiting, this would change. We may be seeing the start of this now,” wrote Mr. Sharpe.
While the treaty prohibits “any measures of a military nature, such as the establishment of military bases and fortifications, the carrying out of military maneuvers, as well as the testing of any type of weapons,” it does not prohibit the use of military personnel or equipment for scientific research.
To that end, China has undertaken a large dual-use civil-miliary expansion in Antarctica.
Primary among these efforts has been the construction of three coastally located, seaport-equipped, and provocatively placed permanent year-around bases: Great Wall Base that straddles the strategic Drake Passage across from Chile and Argentina; Zhongshan Base that faces the Indian Ocean; and the latest, Qinling Base, that faces Australia and New Zealand.
These bases can host distant signals and electronic intelligence monitoring equipment. Great Wall Base could assist in interdicting U.S. Navy forces transiting between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. Qinling Base could help block Australian and New Zealand access to the continent.
In addition, these bases form a “triangle” over Antarctic territory, which is required to conduct intensive surveillance and precise targeting of the large number of U.S. and allied polar orbit surveillance satellites that make multiple passages closer to the Earth over the South and North Poles daily.
On March 1, CCP mouthpiece People’s Daily reported on a new near-infrared telescope now equipping China’s seasonally occupied Kunlun Station closer to the South Pole to conduct “astronomical observations and full-time monitoring experiments on the near-Earth space environment,” which most likely includes monitoring global satellite traffic.
In February 2021, Chinese state media Xinhua reported that Chinese researchers had installed a “fluorescence doppler lidar system” at Zhongshan for atmospheric research.
A lidar is a laser radar that could also conceal larger, more powerful military lasers for “dazzling” or attacking Western satellites; as the ozone layer of the atmosphere is much thinner at the poles, a lower-power laser could do more damage.
Then, in early February 2023, an article in the Chinese publication China Space News revealed that the China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation (CASIC) will build a space tracking and control (STC) facility at China’s Zhongshan Base; all Chinese STCs, like the greater Chinese space program, are controlled by the PLA.
While the United States, Germany, and Norway operate STCs in Antarctica, China is developing fractional orbital bombardment system (FOBS) nuclear missiles designed to fly over Antarctica to attack U.S. targets undefended from southern trajectories.
China’s future Zhongshan STC will greatly assist the CCP’s efforts to dominate Earth orbits and the moon, but it will also help guide PLA nuclear FOBS attacks against the United States.
China’s ability to support year-round activities in Antarctica will also be enabled by its current construction of two new large icebreakers, for a total of four. The U.S. Coast Guard and Britain’s Royal Navy only have three large icebreakers to defend interests in the Arctic and Antarctica.
In March 2019, the South China Morning Post reported that China was preparing to build a massive 33,000-ton nuclear-powered icebreaker, but little has been revealed about this project.
Further dual-use developments include the late February revelation by Chinese state media of the deployment to Antarctica of a second version of the “Snow Leopard” tandem-hull articulated tracked vehicle that could carry about a dozen troops over snow in harsh weather.
However, the new Snow Leopard was accompanied by a smaller unmanned tracked vehicle similar to what China’s Norinco Corporation used to build small gun and missile-armed unmanned combat ground vehicles (UCGVs).
Given this multitude of threats, Washington should respond on three levels to China’s dual-use buildup in Antarctica.
First, the United States should shift bureaucratic authority over official U.S. activities in Antarctica from the National Science Foundation (NSF) to the Pentagon, which, since 1955, has been responsible for the logistic support of the U.S. presence under Operation Deep Freeze.
While this would change the optics of a “civilian-led” U.S. presence, it would not violate the Antarctic Treaty. Still, it would better align the U.S. presence to more rapidly respond to potential Chinese military violations and better coordinate defensive activities with allies and partners like Australia and New Zealand.
Second, the United States must increase its ability to intervene militarily in Antarctica by assuring funding for the planned construction of three new 23,000-ton Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter icebreakers to be followed by three smaller Arctic Security Cutter icebreakers.
The U.S. Army has been rebuilding capabilities to respond to the Russian and Chinese buildup in the Arctic for several years. Still, the Army and the U.S. Marines should also build capacity to respond to Antarctic threats.
The U.S. Air Force should similarly create a second West Coast or Pacific-based unit of ski-equipped Lockheed LC-130 transport aircraft in addition to the 109th Airlift Wing in Scotia, New York, which has about 10 LC-130s.
A third effort should be to work with Australia and New Zealand to increase their ability to support rapid Antarctic deployments. This task will be helped by Australia’s 2023 decision to buy 20 new C-130J transports to replace and expand upon its current fleet of 12, supported by 7 Airbus KC-30 large refueling aircraft.
New Zealand, however, has not replaced its combat air force of A-4K strike fighters, which was disbanded in 2001. Thus, it lacks basic aerial defenses and has no aerial refueling tankers, but it is in the process of replacing its five older C-130H transports with five new C-130Js.
Since Soviet-funded activists manipulated New Zealand into its 1984 “defection” from the Australia-New Zealand-United States (ANZUS) Treaty alliance, there has been a breakdown in Wellington’s defense consensus, which continues today.
This has only aided the CCP’s aggressive search for military bases in neighboring Pacific Island states, which, in addition to its Antarctic buildup, threatens a strategic isolation of both Australia and New Zealand.
The bottom line is that the CCP’s potential aggression in Antarctica, as in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea, and its support for Russian, Iranian, and North Korean aggression demands that the United States provide necessary leadership as it must also mobilize for future conflicts.
