The masters of the Kremlin fancy themselves as experts at the game of geopolitical chess. A fact as true of Tsarist Russia as it was of the Soviet Union and today’s contemporary Russia.
Looking over the developing crisis in Ukraine over the past few months and the seemingly unrelated events that have swirled around it, from the European gas crisis to the recent dramatic, stepped-up deployment of Russian naval forces across many of the world’s main shipping routes, it’s hard to shake the feeling that what we are observing is a carefully orchestrated plan to precipitate a regime change in Ukraine while demonstrating to the United States and its NATO allies that any intervention will be ineffective, prohibitively expensive in men and materials, and lead to an escalating confrontation.
Suggesting that these events are all part of a carefully preconceived and orchestrated plan smacks of a conspiracy theory. Funny thing about conspiracy theories—sometimes there really are conspiracies.
The European Gas Shortage
The opening gambit was a European natural gas shortage that quickly transformed into skyrocketing prices and a supply crisis. Europe had gone into the autumn with historically low amounts of natural gas in storage facilities. Unexpectedly low wind conditions resulted in higher gas usage over the summer, further compounding the low gas reserves. Surprise, wind turbines don’t generate a lot of power when there’s no wind.Another fortuitous coincidence from the Kremlin. Then again, do you really believe that anything emanating from the Kremlin is a coincidence?
Russia’s Opposition to NATO Expansion
As the gas crisis was developing, the Kremlin announced that the eastward expansion of NATO was unacceptable, that it threatened Russian sovereignty and security, and that it was prepared to invade Ukraine to put a halt to it. While it’s true that NATO has expanded eastward since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the last new member to join the alliance was North Macedonia in 2020. The last former Warsaw Pact country to join NATO was in 2004. NATO is deeply split over allowing Ukraine to join and there are no plans to do so for the time being.Nonetheless, there was no imminent danger that Ukraine would join NATO or that the amount of Western military aid slated for Ukraine’s armed forces was about to dramatically increase. Nonetheless, the Kremlin chose to draw a line in the sand. The Ukraine crisis was the result.
Unprecedented Russian Naval Deployment
There is one other interesting coincidence that is playing out. Over the next month, Russian naval forces are slated to carry out a series of naval maneuvers, in part with the navies of China and Iran. Those exercises happen to be in the vicinity of major international shipping lanes in the Arabian Sea, the Mediterranean, the Baltic, Black Sea, and elsewhere. A total of 140 ships, about half of the Russian Navy, are being deployed.Is Russia considering interdicting vital Western maritime supply lines should the United States and NATO respond forcefully to an invasion of Ukraine? Moscow hasn’t linked the two events implicitly or otherwise. Such a move would represent a major escalation and could lead to a wide-reaching conflict between Russia and NATO.
For now, it’s more a non-escalation escalation; in other words, it’s only an escalation if you assume that the naval maneuvers are linked to what’s transpiring in Ukraine. Otherwise, it’s just a coincidence. Funny how those coincidences keep cropping up. The United States and NATO’s naval forces are less enthralled by coincidences. They have dispatched additional ships to keep an eye on what the Russians are up to.
It’s hard to believe that the Kremlin’s masters of geopolitical chess would not have noticed that the Russian military was planning an unprecedented series of naval maneuvers across the world’s major shipping lanes at precisely the same time Russia would be escalating the Ukraine crisis.
The Consequences of Putin’s Geopolitical Chess Game
The best time to invade Ukraine may already have passed. Russia’s leverage vis-a-vis Western Europe was at its peak when Europe was most in need of Russian natural gas. Russian gas does not appear instantaneously at Europe’s gas mains. Even if Russia was to alter the supply of gas to Europe, it would take several weeks for the changes in supply, either up or down, to manifest themselves in Europe’s gas utilities.An early, warm spring could rob Moscow of its gas leverage. Then again, a polar vortex might increase it. Either way, making the success of your foreign policy dependent on the vagaries of the weather is a very risky strategy.
Will Russia invade Ukraine? If I had to hazard a guess, I would say no, but only Putin can answer that question and he isn’t talking. So if Russia opts not to stage an invasion of Ukraine, what was the point of this manufactured crisis? I think there are many repercussions to Putin’s Ukrainian chess game. Here are the three I think are most important.
First, Putin has sent a powerful message to the oligarchs that control Ukraine’s economy and government that the United States and NATO will not expend blood and treasure to defend Ukraine. They may send arms, but there’s no appetite in Washington or elsewhere in Europe’s capitals to go to war with Russia over defending Ukraine’s sovereignty.
Putin has made it clear that Ukraine will always be more important to Russia than it will be to the United States and NATO. Moscow is willing to go to war over Ukraine, Washington is not. To Ukraine’s power brokers the message is not lost—better to make a deal with the Kremlin now than to get a worse deal down the road.
Second, by forcing the United States and NATO to deal with a possible Russian invasion of Ukraine, the Kremlin has highlighted the internal fissures within NATO and the fecklessness of the Biden administration.
To the countries of Western Europe, the prospect of a Russian invasion has long since faded. Russia is still a formidable opponent, skilled at political manipulation, cyberwarfare, and fomenting social unrest. But the once widely held fear that Russian jackboots would echo in the streets of Bonn or Paris has long since dissipated.
To the countries on NATO’s eastern periphery—those nations that once comprised the Warsaw Pact or were constituent republics in the USSR—the echo of Russian jackboots still rings loudly. For them, Russian aggression is not a theoretical construct, it is a vivid and painful historical memory and remains a very real fear to this day.
An alliance where half of its members feel threatened by an external enemy, and the other half do not, is fundamentally unstable and will have a difficult time articulating its mission. To its credit, NATO has rallied to support Ukraine, but Germany, arguably its most important European member, has been conspicuously non-committal. For the Kremlin, that’s already a significant win.
The Biden administration has been unable to articulate a consistent policy response in the event of a Russian invasion of Ukraine. It has threatened what it claims will be wide-reaching, but as yet largely unspecified, financial sanctions. It has stepped up military aid to Ukraine and indicated it might increase U.S. troop deployments within neighboring NATO countries, but failed to explain what that stepped-up troop presence might entail or what those troops would be prepared to do.
It has been keen to engage Moscow diplomatically, even though the agenda Moscow has presented is a non-starter. At one point, President Joe Biden seemed to imply that a limited intervention might not even warrant a U.S. response, a position which his minders at the White House quickly walked back.
What the crisis underscores is that the U.S. and EU strategy of imposing sanctions on the Kremlin to punish bad behavior hasn’t worked. It hasn’t changed Russian behavior—it has only made Moscow more combative. Sanctions are cheap, they don’t put men and military assets at risk, and they don’t cost much to impose. They also don’t work. An easy response that isn’t effective is not a solution—it’s a delusion of action.
Perhaps the lack of clarity emanating from the Biden White House simply reflects a policy of strategic ambiguity. Better not to tell the Kremlin how Washington would respond in order to increase its perception of the risks in going forward. Then again, it might simply reflect the fact that the White House foreign policy denizens are completely clueless about what to do. After all, this is the same foreign policy team that brought you the Afghanistan debacle.
For his part, Putin is eager to point out to the rest of the world that if you are looking for consistent, clear leadership, best you look elsewhere than Washington.
Finally, the manufactured crisis in Ukraine has given the Kremlin what it craves most of all—maneuvering room and a stage on which to play out its great power prerogatives. Amid the drumbeat of war, the breathless media coverage and the United States’ desperate attempts to craft a diplomatic solution, the Kremlin can confidently claim that Russia is back; that it’s firmly a member of the great powers club. Fair warning to Russia’s neighbors to get onboard as Putin proceeds to reconstruct a semblance of the USSR.
It’s a pipe dream of course. Russia can give the illusion of being a great power, but a country whose economy is smaller than the state of Texas, and largely stagnant, does so with smoke and mirrors, its nuclear arsenal notwithstanding, and by increasing bold bluffs that one of these days will get called out.
Like Benito Mussolini’s ambition to recreate the Roman Empire, Putin’s Soviet revivalism will be for naught. Il Duce’s grand plan ended in disaster. Putin’s will meet a similar fate.
So what’s to be done about Russia’s Ukrainian gambit? The United States has no strategic interests in Ukraine. It would be a mistake to get embroiled in a military conflict with Russia over Ukraine. There are no dominos in Kyiv. Washington has more important challenges, none the least of which is China.
Russia has three possible futures ahead of it. A reconciliation and integration into Europe, becoming a de facto vassal of China, or eventual dissolution.
It’s highly unlikely that Moscow could find a reconciliation with the West while the current KGB clique is in power.
Russia will fight hard to avoid becoming an economic and political vassal of China. But in the end, if it retains its hostility to the West, it may be the only way it can retain its current territorial integrity.
Or Russia may simply fall apart, in much the same way the Soviet Union dissolved, leaving its neighbors to pick up the pieces. A stagnant economy, declining population, and widespread corruption may ultimately make it impossible to maintain the integrity of the Russian state regardless of its nuclear arsenal or Putin’s bluffs.
The problem is rooted in the Kremlin’s conception of its own security. Russian history gives Moscow plenty of reasons to be paranoid about the intentions of the United States and Europe. De facto U.S. and EU support for color revolutions on Russia’s periphery, as well as NATO’s eastward expansion, only stoke that paranoia. The West is right in resisting the consequences of Moscow’s paranoia, but neither have they done anything to assuage those fears.
What Europe and the United States must do is to make it clear to Moscow that it cannot enjoy the benefits of being in the international system while at the same time striving constantly to undermine that system. The EU needs to tell the Kremlin that the price of continued bad behavior is European disengagement. The United States would disengage, too, but Russia is just not as dependent on the United States as it is on the EU.
That means the EU needs to wean itself off Russian energy and be willing to halt export of technology and goods to Russia. That’s the ultimate call of Putin’s bluff and that’s not a bluff he can afford to lose. Disengagement is not an easy thing to do, and it will come at a high economic cost. In the short term, it will also push Moscow into Beijing’s embrace. In the long term, however, Moscow has no desire to be a Chinese vassal. Reconciliation with the United States and Europe may be the only way to forestall that.
In one sense that’s not terribly different than Moscow’s current attempts at maneuvering between Washington and Beijing. The difference is that Moscow would be responding to the U.S.-EU agenda and not the other way around.
The current U.S.-NATO strategy toward Russia is the diplomatic equivalent of alternating between ignoring Moscow and provoking it when it’s cornered. Neither strategy makes sense, neither will lead to a stable diplomatic system, and both will lead to a continuing succession of political crises. A never-ending round of geopolitical chess with the masters of the Kremlin is not a long-term solution.