The incursion of China’s seafaring vessels into the waters surrounding the Philippines and Taiwan has attracted global attention as the world’s largest Coast Guard.
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) employs a gray zone strategy and leverages the China Coast Guard (CCG) to carry out the maritime law-enforcement activities that dominate the South China Sea, along with fishing boats, fishery patrol vessels, and People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy warships, as the CCP exerts its claims and postures for dominance. This gray zone strategy is a concept rooted in its unrestricted warfare doctrine that, on multiple occasions, has sparked heated territorial disputes.
Over the past month, CCG ships have repeatedly intruded into waters near the Philippines and Taiwan.
On March 6, Philippine officials accused CCG ships and accompanying vessels of intercepting the Philippine Coast Guard and resupply vessels near the Second Thomas Shoal, resulting in two minor collisions between Chinese and Philippine ships. Two other CCG ships used water cannons to attack a small Philippine Navy resupply boat carrying a Navy admiral and crew.
On March 16, four CCG vessels entered restricted waters around the Kinmen Islands for two consecutive days, according to Taiwanese coast guard reports.
The latest incident happened on March 23. While on a routine mission to resupply the remote outpost of the disputed Second Thomas Shoal in the South China Sea, a Philippine Navy vessel was fired upon with water cannons by the CCG. The Philippine military released footage of the incident, alleging the CCG vessel “intentionally” targeted the supply ship. It said that before this water cannon attack, the CCG conducted an interception and “dangerous” maneuvers against the Philippine vessel.
The CCP’s assertive behavior in maritime sovereignty disputes has led to the militarization of its Coast Guard.
In March of this year, the CCG conducted joint exercises with the Chinese navy and air force near the Taiwan Strait. The state media Global Times quoted a military expert in Beijing as saying, “The recent joint exercises indicate that in emergencies, the Coast Guard will receive support from the PLA.”
Control of the CCG was transferred from the State Council to the Central Military Commission in March of 2018, and it was integrated into the PLA. Specifically, article 83 of the Chinese Coast Guard Law assigns maritime defense operations to the Coast Guard, a duty traditionally reserved for its navy.
The CCG has also been equipped with military weapons, including PLA warships with 76mm guns. Above and beyond its law enforcement mandate, the CCG’s operational capabilities surpass those of most Asian navies.
Andrew S. Erickson, a professor at the U.S. Naval War College, refers to China’s Coast Guard as its “second navy.”
The CCG consists of 150 large, 1,000-ton patrol ships, many of which are former naval escort vessels capable of extended operations. These ships feature helicopter decks, powerful water cannons, and guns with calibers matching that of the M1 Abrams tank. Some ships have previously been equipped with anti-ship cruise missiles, which can be swiftly reinstalled.
To put this into perspective, Japan has 70 ships this size, the United States has 60, the Philippines has 25, and Taiwan has 23.
China’s Coast Guard Granted Unprecedented Authority
Without initiating any formal declarations, the CCP allows its Coast Guard to perpetrate acts of war against other countries. This departure from what is considered to be traditional Coast Guard duties marks a significant shift in China’s maritime strategy.Traditionally, coastguards worldwide operate within civilian frameworks. For instance, the U.S. Coast Guard operates under the Department of Homeland Security, focusing on search and rescue, port security, drug interception, and environmental protection.
Canada’s Coast Guard operates under its Department of Fisheries and Oceans, engaging in maritime search and rescue, buoy maintenance, marine pollution response, and icebreaking services.
China followed a similar civilian model when it established its Coast Guard in March 2013. Various agencies, including the State Oceanic Administration, China Marine Surveillance, China Marine Police (under the Ministry of Public Security), China Fishery Law Enforcement Command (under the Ministry of Agriculture), and Maritime Anti-smuggling Police of the General Administration of Customs, were merged into the “China Coast Guard Bureau.”
However, in a significant departure from its original civilian structure, China enacted the “China Coast Guard Law” in 2021. This legislation empowers the Coast Guard to employ deadly force against foreign vessels in waters claimed by Beijing. Consequently, China has authorized its coast guard to engage in acts of war against other countries without formal declarations of war.
An illustrative incident occurred in 2023 when the CCG utilized military-grade lasers, temporarily blinding Philippine sailors. Such actions exemplify China’s adoption of a “gray zone” strategy, leveraging ambiguous tactics to achieve strategic objectives.
Coast Guard an Important Part of China’s Gray Zone Strategy
Over the past decade, China’s approach to ensuring its maritime superiority combines military and non-military measures to gradually assert its Coast Guard’s dominance over neighboring territories while carefully avoiding full-scale conflict. CCG is a crucial component of this gray zone strategy.One example of this is an arbitration case initiated by the United Nations in the South China Sea. Chinese Major General Zhang Zhaozhong elucidated China’s approach in 2013, outlining a phased integration: beginning with fishing boats, followed by fishery patrol vessels, then coast guard ships, and ultimately PLA Navy warships. Dubbed the “cabbage strategy,” this tactic involved layering islands to gradually restrict access to other countries’ vessels.
The integration was recently expanded to include armed maritime militia, military aircraft, government survey ships, and oil drilling platforms. These activities are augmented with social media engagement, radio deception, cyber warfare, and GPS interference. This multi-faceted strategy is adaptable and can escalate depending on the circumstances, as demonstrated by the Scarborough Shoal incident in March 2021, which involved over 200 Chinese fishing boats.
In the East China Sea, the CCP’s gray zone strategy boasts a significant array of military aircraft. The PLA Air Force routinely dispatches hundreds of planes annually into Japanese airspace. China’s persistent harassment has compelled Japan to reduce interceptions of intruding aircraft, responding only to the most egregious provocations. Japan fears that prolonged acquiescence to China’s actions may lead other nations to accept or tacitly acknowledge China’s territorial assertions against Japan.
China has similarly employed a gray zone strategy on its western border with India. In May 2020, near eastern Ladakh, PLA forces encroached into areas controlled by India, obstructing Indian border patrols. This maneuver is emblematic of China’s “salami slicing” approach, characterized by incremental provocations that individually do not warrant a military response.
China’s Gray Zone Strategy Mirrors Its Unrestricted Warfare Concept
According to former PLA Air Force Major General Qiao Liang and former Colonel Wang Xiangsui, unrestricted warfare represents a novel approach to war that employs a wide array of tactics, including economic warfare, cyberattacks, terrorism, and ecological warfare. This concept transcends traditional boundaries and constraints, encompassing all means available to achieve strategic objectives.In August 2016, Mr. Qiao further expanded the concept to encompass cyber warfare, resource warfare, media warfare, financial warfare, and cultural warfare in his book “Unrestricted Warfare and Anti-Unrestricted Warfare.” He described unrestricted warfare as operating beyond political, historical, cultural, and moral limits, employing any means necessary to achieve victory.
The book “Nine Commentaries on the Communist Party” delves into the CCP’s historical origins, identifying nine major characteristics, including “Evil, Deception, Incitement, Struggle, Plunder, Thuggery, Division, Annihilation, and Control.”
