Commentary
Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s restructuring of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), involving the removal of top officials, prompts questions about his confidence in the military’s capabilities and whether the purges have undermined the strength of the PLA.
In the latest series of military purges, Beijing removed nine senior PLA officers from the national legislature in early January and revoked the roles of three top
defense-industry executives as government advisers. In the previous wave of dismissals, back in August 2023 and September 2023, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) fired several high-ranking officers from the PLA and appointed Adm. Dong Jun, a 62-year-old former head of the Chinese navy, as the minister of national defense.
Xi justified these dismissals and appointments as part of his ongoing anti-corruption campaign. However, throughout Chinese history, leaders have often used anti-graft purges to eliminate political dissenters and opposition figures.
The dismissals
encompassed key figures such as the minister of defense, the head of the PLA Rocket Force, the commander of the PLA Air Force, and the southern theater commander, marking one of the most significant purges in the history of the PLA.
In addition to removing high-ranking military officials, there have been several mysterious disappearances. Former Defense Minister Wei Fenghe, who retired in March 2023, hasn’t been seen in public since. His successor,
Gen. Li Shangfu, disappeared for four months prior to his replacement by Adm. Dong. Gen. Ju Qiansheng, commander of the PLA’s Strategic Support Force responsible for space and cyber warfare, has also been absent since the summer, even skipping the ceremony in July 2023 commemorating the 96th anniversary of the PLA’s founding.
The graft investigations have been focusing on weapons procurement and the PLA Rocket Force, which is responsible for the country’s strategic missile forces, including both nuclear and conventional missiles. The Rocket Force, as one of the keys to the modernization and enhanced capabilities of the PLA, is also one of the largest recipients of increased funding, making it susceptible to corruption related to procurement. Rockets and missiles are costly, and China is expected to have
1,500 missiles by 2035, meaning that a significant amount of money is flowing into the Rocket Force.
Experts suspect that Gen. Li had been
involved in bid rigging when he oversaw the Equipment Development Department. The nine senior military officials who were expelled from China’s rubber-stamp legislature, the National People’s Congress, in September 2023 all had a connection to Gen. Li, either through the Equipment Development Department or the Rocket Force or space program. Therefore, allegations of corruption are
most likely justified. However, the PLA has always been riddled with corruption, and anti-corruption measures have been deployed selectively, targeting the disloyal.
Regardless of the reasoning behind these moves, the restructuring of the military administration indicates two significant points. Firstly, Xi, serving as the chairman of the Central Military Commission, is reshaping the military in alignment with his vision, mirroring his influence on the economy and civil society. Secondly, it suggests a lack of trust in the previous PLA administration. This prompts questions about the capability of the prior PLA to engage in a conflict with the United States and raises uncertainties about the capabilities of the incoming military leaders.
This marks the first instance of a naval officer being appointed as the head of the military. The selection of a naval officer as defense chief aligns with the CCP’s emphasis on maritime power for global influence. Moreover, Adm. Dong, having previously served as the naval head, played a crucial role in the CCP’s assertive actions toward Taiwan and its activities in the South and East China seas. His experience in joint naval drills with Russia underscores the potential risks associated with the increasing collaboration between the world’s second- and third-largest militaries.
One benefit of the recent shakeups is that U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin now has a counterpart to engage with. For the past several months, he had no counterpart in China, leaving
military-to-military diplomacy up in the air. On the other hand, the changes in leadership aren’t expected to alter Xi’s goal of
surpassing the United States militarily. Despite the purges, the PLA continues to conduct incursions in the Pacific and around Taiwan, indicating that the deployability of the PLA hasn’t diminished. However, combat deployability may have been negatively affected.
Beijing is closely watching the Russia–Ukraine war, in which one of the world’s most powerful militaries has so far failed to defeat a developing country with a third of the population. Taking note, the CCP wants to ensure that it doesn’t meet a similar fate in a war for Taiwan. The Rocket Force, which is absolutely crucial to a Taiwan war, has been upgraded to a full armed service.
While the United States doesn’t have a dedicated rocket force, it has integrated missile capabilities across different military branches and a great deal of combat experience. In contrast, the Rocket Force has no combat experience, and now, the leadership has changed to one with no experience commanding the force during peacetime.
Views expressed in this article are opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Epoch Times.
