Beyond Tariffs: Trump Admin’s Silent Strategy to Contain the CCP

Beyond Tariffs: Trump Admin’s Silent Strategy to Contain the CCP
Japanese Defense Minister Gen. Nakatani (L) and U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth review an honor guard during a welcome ceremony at the Ministry of Defense in Tokyo on March 30, 2025. Kiyoshi Ota/AFP/Pool/AFP via Getty Images
Antonio Graceffo
Updated:
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Commentary

While tariffs dominate headlines, the Trump administration is quietly rebuilding the United States’ Pacific island defenses to counter the expanding reach of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

Chinese leader Xi Jinping is busy preparing China’s economy to withstand the onslaught of U.S. President Donald Trump’s renewed tariffs. The Chinese economy has been slowing ever since the early blows dealt by Trump during his first term. With GDP growth down to 5 percent or less, and key indicators still lagging after the COVID-19 lockdowns, China has yet to fully recover.

By publicly threatening tariffs, following through on them, and occasionally delaying their implementation, Trump forces Xi—and much of the world—to react. While they scramble to respond, Trump quietly advances other priorities, such as reinforcing U.S. military and economic ties in the Pacific to counter the CCP’s rising influence.

Central to this strategy is the Cold War-era island chain strategy—originally designed to contain the Soviet Union—to stem Chinese communist expansion. It divides the Pacific into three concentric defensive lines. The first island chain includes Japan, Taiwan, and the Philippines. The second island chain consists of Guam, the Mariana Islands, and parts of the Caroline Islands, such as Yap and Palau. The third island chain extends from Hawaii to New Zealand via the Aleutians, a chain of islands belonging to the U.S. state of Alaska.

Admiral Liu Huaqing, architect of China’s modern navy, outlined a phased strategy: dominate the first island chain by the 2000s, the second by the 2020s, and achieve global naval reach by the 2040s. In response, both the Trump and Biden administrations reinforced U.S. military presence along these chains. The United States and its allies have expanded joint exercises, deployed land-based anti-ship missiles in the Philippines, and prepared detailed contingency plans for a Taiwan conflict.

Analysts emphasize that controlling the island chains is critical to checking the Chinese regime’s expansion and maintaining the regional balance of power. China’s navy—now the world’s largest by number of ships—continues to test these boundaries, fueling a strategic competition in the “gray zone,” a space between peace and war defined by posture, influence, and deterrence.

As part of its focus on the first island chain, the United States in 2025 repositioned elements of the Marine Corps, upgraded carrier group infrastructure, and strengthened military ties with Japan and Australia to counter Chinese expansion near flashpoints, such as the Senkaku Islands and the Taiwan Strait. The III Marine Expeditionary Force intensified joint exercises across the region, including new trilateral amphibious training involving U.S. Marines, Japanese troops, and Australian forces in northern Australia. Washington and Canberra also expanded U.S. access to Australian training areas, enhancing basing flexibility and overall force readiness in support of forward operations.

The second island chain in particular holds immense strategic value, forming a key outer ring of defense beyond the Chinese regime’s immediate reach. These islands serve as vital outposts for power projection, surveillance, and deterrence, especially as the regime modernizes its military and grows more assertive in the South China Sea.

In late March, U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth made a landmark visit to Guam, reaffirming that any attack on Guam or the Northern Mariana Islands would be treated as an attack on the U.S. mainland. The visit underscored the Trump administration’s stance that these Pacific territories are integral to Washington’s homeland defense strategy, particularly amid rising tensions over Taiwan and the Chinese regime’s maritime assertiveness. Hegseth also announced a $400 million military infrastructure initiative in Yap, in Micronesia, further anchoring the U.S. presence in the second island chain.

Building on that momentum, a project begun under the Biden administration in 2023 is quietly progressing under Trump and now represents a critical element of his Pacific containment strategy. The restoration of Tinian’s North Field—once the busiest airfield in the world and launch site for the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki—has become the most prominent symbol of Washington’s renewed focus on the second island chain.

The $78 million initiative is part of the broader Agile Combat Employment (ACE) strategy, which emphasizes dispersing aircraft across multiple small bases to complicate enemy targeting. More than 20 million square feet of runway and infrastructure have been rehabilitated, creating a grid-like base layout designed to frustrate Chinese missile targeting. The restored airfield will support short-takeoff aircraft, such as the F-35B, enhancing survivability and rapid response capabilities.

The buildup complements ongoing expansion at nearby Tinian International Airport, where a new apron and fuel storage facilities are under construction. Both airfields will serve as forward alternatives to Andersen Air Force Base on Guam, enhancing operational flexibility in scenarios involving Taiwan or the South China Sea.
Meanwhile, infrastructure upgrades to Tinian’s dilapidated World War II–era port—initiated under former President Joe Biden—are continuing under Trump. The Defense Department plans to use the port for expanded training, fuel storage, and future construction. Together with the airfields, the port will form a logistics hub anchoring U.S. power in the northern reaches of the second island chain.
While Xi remains fixated on defending against Trump’s economic offensive, the U.S. military is methodically securing the Pacific, preparing to deter, or if necessary, defeat the CCP’s military.
Views expressed in this article are opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Epoch Times.
Antonio Graceffo
Antonio Graceffo
Author
Antonio Graceffo, Ph.D., is a China economy analyst who has spent more than 20 years in Asia. Graceffo is a graduate of the Shanghai University of Sport, holds an MBA from Shanghai Jiaotong University, and studied national security at American Military University.