Though Biden has thus far abstained from formally declaring a national emergency, this becomes more likely by the day. Such a declaration would amount to an end-run around democratic processes and would have dramatic consequences on the integrity of our democratic institutions, further eroding the capacity of the legislative and judicial branches to provide a meaningful check upon an already powerful executive branch. Moreover, it would set an alarming precedent for future arrogation of power under future administrations.
Yet the activity surrounding declaring a climate emergency is just one microcosm of a much larger problem.
The first ruling—1983’s Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha—found the use of a legislative veto to be unconstitutional, thereby forcing Congress to pass a joint resolution that can be vetoed by the president. As a recent article from the Brennan Center explains: “You can imagine that a president who has declared the emergency will most likely not sign that. They will veto that type of bill. And then you need a supermajority in Congress to override that veto.” Especially in today’s hyper-partisan environment, a congressional supermajority is nearly impossible to attain.
The second ruling—1987’s Beacon Products Corp. v. Reagan—found that emergencies are still legally binding even if Congress fails to meet at the six-month interval stipulated within the NEA. A president need only send an annual renewal notice to the Federal Register, and the national emergency can continue in perpetuity.More than 40 national emergencies are currently in effect today, including five of the Clinton administration’s, 10 of Bush Jr.’s, nine of Obama’s, 10 of Trump’s, and all seven that Biden has declared in just 18 months on the job.
As mentioned, the statutory powers a president can invoke are substantial and wide-ranging, covering almost every conceivable subject area including the military, public health, trade, agriculture, transportation, communication, property rights, criminal law, land use, contracts, and more.
Specifically, some of these powers include the ability to shut down and take over television and radio stations, restrict travel, seize private property, freeze financial assets, and even suspend prohibitions on testing chemical and biological weapons on human subjects.
Even more concerning, the powers a president can unleash don’t have to be specifically related to the emergency.
In practice, emergency proclamations have historically been confined to the foreign policy realm. They are most often used to legally authorize the use of economic sanctions against foreign governments, companies, or individuals, as has been the case in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
While a president’s unilateral authority to freeze assets and suspend financial activity to any organization he or she chooses does present substantial problems, more concerning is the recent trend toward using emergency declarations to push domestic agendas.
- seize farmland on behalf of the federal government (under Title 7 of the U.S. Code)
- direct the military to construct green-friendly infrastructure (Title 10)
- direct federal agencies to use noncompetitive procurement procedures, executing contracts with only “climate-friendly” companies (Title 41)
- impose a ban on crude oil exports (Title 42)
- make direct federal loans to green energy companies with no spending cap (Title 50)
- allow the Department of Transportation to curtail or restrict automobile or truck use (Title 49)
To be clear, a declaration of a climate emergency—regardless of whether one believes that such an emergency exists in the first place—would give the president substantial means by which to expand executive power. Moreover, it would further erode the viability of Congress as a co-equal branch of government. Finally, it would set a disturbing precedent for future presidents to use national emergencies to solve whatever crises they unilaterally deem important, with no input from Congress, or the people.
That is how dictatorship begins and democracy dies.