3 Key Points on President Trump’s Taiwan Policy

3 Key Points on President Trump’s Taiwan Policy
A Chinese coast guard ship sails toward the zone where China said it would conduct live fire exercises northeast of Pingtan island, the closest point in China to Taiwan, in Chinas southeast Fujian Province on April 10, 2023. Greg Baker/AFP via Getty Images
John Mills
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Commentary

The Trump administration’s policy on Taiwan and the dynamic between Taiwan and China remains unclear at this time. However, three key indicators have emerged that suggest the direction and tone of the administration’s intent.

These developments have received relatively little attention—except from the Chinese foreign ministry, which responded sharply. That reaction may be the most telling sign of all.

Historically, the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act has guided U.S.–Taiwan relations. Additional clarification was, in theory, provided through three U.S.–China communiqués and six assurances from the United States to Taiwan. The term “One China” originates from the first communiqué between the United States and China in 1972, a reflection of a very different era. Now, under Secretary of State Marco Rubio, the U.S. State Department has begun to signal a new approach to managing the three-country relationship.

China Is Now Officially ‘China’

The U.S. State Department’s updated fact sheet titled “U.S. Relations With China” no longer uses the term “People’s Republic of China.” This change is notable. Naming conventions matter, and the Trump administration appears committed to rebranding major global designations.

In response, Chinese foreign ministry spokesman Guo Jiakun accused the United States of “denigrating China’s foreign policy and advocating so-called strategic competition.”

The fact sheet states: “The United States will address its relationship with China under the principles of reciprocity and fairness. The United States works to deter China’s aggression, combat China’s unfair trade policies, counter China’s malicious cyber activity, end China’s global trafficking of fentanyl precursors, mitigate China’s manipulation of international organizations, and promote accountability for China’s violations of human rights within China and around the globe.”

When asked about the significance of the name change, a State Department spokesperson explained: “The United States recognizes the People’s Republic of China (PRC), while also noting many know the country colloquially simply as ‘China.’ This administration is focused on public messaging that is clear and relevant.”

US Stance on Taiwan’s Independence

For decades, U.S. policy traditionally included a statement with the phrase that it does not support Taiwan’s independence, in deference to the Three Communiqués. This language is now absent in the State Department’s fact sheet titled “U.S. Relations With Taiwan.”

Beijing reacted even more strongly to this omission than it did to the naming issue. Zhu Fenglian, a spokesperson for China’s Taiwan Affairs Office, said the change “will only damage peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.”

The fact sheet also includes a new statement with significant implications: The United States “will continue to support Taiwan’s meaningful participation in international organizations, including membership where applicable.” This suggests potential support for Taiwan’s inclusion in bodies such as the United Nations and the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO).

A media inquiry was made to the State Department regarding whether the United States is encouraging Taiwan to update its official name from “Republic of China” to something like “Republic of Taiwan.” No response had been received at the time of publication. Distinguishing the two entities more clearly could ease tensions by resolving the issue of “which China is which.”

$1 Billion in Weapons for Taiwan Unfrozen

While many areas of U.S. foreign aid remain stalled by Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) reviews or court proceedings, military aid to Taiwan has been prioritized and released. Nearly a quarter of this aid supports Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence capabilities—most notably the Link 16 data link system, which enables Taiwanese weapons systems to communicate with U.S. and allied platforms.

Commenting on this move, Chinese foreign ministry spokesman Lin Jian stated: “We are deeply concerned over relevant reports. China has all along opposed U.S. military assistance to China’s Taiwan region, which has severely violated the one-China principle and the three China–U.S. joint communiqués.”

Lin’s reference to the Three Communiqués underscores the growing divide in how the documents are interpreted. The Trump administration’s actions—reflected in fact sheets and aid decisions—are actively reshaping U.S. policy in the region.

Views expressed in this article are opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Epoch Times.
John Mills
John Mills
Author
Col. (Ret.) John Mills is a national security professional with service in five eras: Cold War, Peace Dividend, War on Terror, World in Chaos, and now, Great Power Competition. He is the former director of cybersecurity policy, strategy, and international affairs at the Department of Defense. Mr. Mills is a senior fellow at the Center for Security Policy. He is the author of “The Nation Will Follow” and “War Against the Deep State.” ColonelRETJohn2 on “X”, ColonelRETJohn on Substack, GETTR, and Truth Social