Following a recent media report that Katie Telford, chief of staff of Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, had in 2017 requested a briefing be produced on Beijing’s foreign interference, Liberal and NDP MPs voted on Feb. 9 against a Conservative Party motion to have Telford testify before committee and obtain relevant documents.
“In order to get to the bottom of the memo, and what the prime minister knew, and wherever he failed to act, it’s important that we hear from Katie Telford,” Conservative MP Michael Cooper said after his motion was passed with a major amendment removing Telford from having to testify.
“This is just an effort to, let’s just say it for what it is: cover up the facts.”
The Commons Procedure and House Affairs Committee was holding a meeting on the issue of foreign interference in elections, with witnesses from the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), the Communications Security Establishment (CSE), and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP).
Many of the questions raised during the meeting pertained to reporting from Global News journalist Sam Cooper, who in recent months has been exposing the extent of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) interference in Canada.
MP Cooper tabled a motion at the end of the meeting to explore the new revelations with additional committee meetings. He also requested hearing from Telford, Jean, and then clerk of the Privy Council Michael Wernick, who had been copied on the memo.
The motion also asked that all the documents related to what Global News reported be provided to the committee. Cooper said obtaining these documents would be important in order to ask questions to the witnesses.
Liberal MP Ryan Turnbull tabled an amendment to remove Telford from the list of witnesses and also strike the request to obtain relevant documents.
2017 Memo
The 2017 memo obtained by Global reportedly says CCP agents were “assisting Canadian candidates running for political offices.”Sam Cooper wrote that it’s not clear whether the document was presented to the prime minister, noting it was neither signed nor stamped, hence he surmised it was likely an advanced draft copy.
The memo said the CCP’s efforts to infiltrate “all levels of government” are well-documented and that “[T]here is a substantial body of evidence that Chinese officials are actively pursuing a strategy of engagement to influence Canadian officials in ways that can compromise the security of Canada and the integrity of Canadian institutions.”
On Nov. 22, Trudeau said “there has never been any information given to me on the funding of federal candidates by China.”
The PCO was responding to a question from Conservative MP Arnold Viersen, asking: “Has anyone in the Office of the Prime Minister or the Privy Council Office received such information, and, if so, (i) who received the information, (ii) on what date was the information received, (iii) why did that person not inform the Prime Minister?”
The PCO replied that the information was coming from sensitive sources and needs to be protected.
CSIS and CSE Tight-Lipped
Officials from CSIS and CSE who testified did not provide much information on the topic of interference, being bound by secrecy.They also emphasized their role as collectors and advisers, leaving to others the task to action the information in many cases.
Conservative MPs expressed frustration at not being able to find out more details to guide them in their role as elected officials.
“But the problem is, during an election period, this non interventionist approach, or this decision to follow the process, can directly have an impact on the election result,” said MP Luc Berthold.
Berthold tried to get a bit more out of CSIS by asking “yes or no” questions based on the latest Sam Cooper report.
“‘It also alleges that to avoid detection, Chinese officials used local, pro-Beijing community groups as intermediaries to engage Canadian politicians they identified as strategically valuable.’ True or not,” asked Berthold.
“Yes, it’s true,” said Adam Fisher, director general of intelligence assessments at CSIS.
“We see China using ... non-traditional methods of foreign influence activity. So they’re not relying necessarily on trained agents, they use cutouts, they use proxies, they use community groups, they use diaspora organizations, and community leaders.”
There are ongoing discussions about establishing a foreign agent registry in Canada to help deal with such issues.
On that topic, Fisher said that “behind the scenes, certainly the Service and our partners are engaged in giving advice to government on what we see is potentially useful tools that could address foreign influence activity,” but added that no measure is a silver bullet given the sophistication and adaptability of the adversaries.
