NATO member Turkey has walked a fine line between the West and Vladimir Putin’s Russia under President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his Islamist-leaning Justice and Development Party (AKP).
But that may change after May 14, when Turkey holds crucial elections that could spell the end of the party’s two decades in power.
The latest opinion polls show that Kemal Kilicdaroglu—Erdogan’s primary challenger—enjoys a slight edge over the incumbent. Kilicdaroglu has vowed to pursue a “credible continuation of Turkey–Russia relations,” in response to questions about his position on Moscow.
“Kilicdaroglu has explicitly said that Turkey–Russia relations will not be subjected to a new test,” Aydin Sezer, a prominent political analyst, told The Epoch Times.
In the election, Turks will cast ballots for the presidency and also for 500 seats in parliament.
Erdogan will face three opponents, with Kilicdaroglu, the 74-year-old leader of the People’s Republican Party (CHP)—by far the most formidable. If no candidate wins an outright majority, a second round of voting between the two top performers will be held two weeks later.
The AKP has been in power since 2002, handily winning several elections, both presidential and parliamentary. That’s largely attributable to the support it enjoys in rural areas, where voters are typically more conservative.
Since 2018, the AKP has been allied with the Nationalist Movement Party, which is known for its hardline approach to Kurdish separatist movements.
During his tenure, Erdogan has pursued an activist foreign policy, which has often clashed with those of his country’s NATO allies. He has also nurtured close relations with Moscow, despite the latter’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine.
But in recent years, the AKP and its 69-year-old leader have seen their popularity wane. This has been particularly evident since 2021, when a currency crisis led to rampant inflation and widespread discontent with Erdogan’s economic policies.
Sezer attributes the party’s declining popularity to “unfavorable economic developments” and what he describes as an “environment of persistent crises.”
United in Opposition
The AKP, for its part, typically ignores the allegations, choosing instead to focus on its economic and foreign-policy achievements.At a recent election rally, Erdogan asserted that Turkey’s national income had tripled during his tenure. He has also defended his cordial approach to Moscow, without which, he has said, “the West would have dragged us into war with Russia.”
But with the ruling party’s popularity in decline, Kilicdaroglu’s CHP sees its chance to return to power after decades in the political wilderness.
Often described as “center-left” and devoted to Western principles of secularism, the CHP was established by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, who founded the Turkish Republic in 1923.
In previous electoral contests with Erdogan’s AKP, the CHP has been soundly defeated. But it managed to garner roughly 20 percent of the vote, making it Turkey’s leading opposition force.
Erdogan’s Balancing Act
The polls come at a critical time for Erdogan, under whom Turkey has struck a delicate balance between Moscow and its Western NATO allies.When Russia invaded Ukraine early last year, Ankara was quick to condemn the move. What’s more, Turkey has provided advanced drones to Ukraine, which have been used by the latter—with deadly effect—against Russian forces.
At the same time, however, Turkey has declined to support Western-led sanctions on Russia, with which it shares deep commercial ties and a lengthy maritime border.
Erdogan has also remained on good terms with Putin, with whom he enjoys a close relationship. While this has irked Turkey’s NATO allies, it has allowed Ankara to play the role of mediator—when few others could—between the warring parties.
Shortly after Moscow’s invasion, Turkey hosted top-level peace talks between Russia and Ukraine. It also helped broker a landmark deal between Moscow and Kyiv that allowed the latter to export grain through the Black Sea.
In the past, the United States has taken a dim view of anything resembling Turkey–Russia cooperation.
Tilting Toward Moscow
Despite mounting U.S. displeasure, Ankara in recent years has drawn closer to Moscow.Last August, Erdogan signed a bundle of agreements with Putin aimed at stepping up bilateral cooperation. At the time, U.S. media outlets reported “mounting alarm” in Western capitals over Ankara’s “deepening ties” with Moscow.
Erdogan has also embraced Russian proposals, tabled by Putin last September, to transform Turkey into a “regional hub” for the distribution of Russian natural gas.
Indeed, energy—of which Turkey remains a net importer—has been a pillar of the burgeoning Russia–Turkey relationship. As it currently stands, almost half of Turkey’s domestic energy needs are met by natural gas imported from Russia.
Last month, Turkey inaugurated its first nuclear reactor, which was financed by Moscow and built by Russian energy giant Rosatom. The reactor is part of a wider joint project to build four nuclear power plants near the Turkish town of Akkuyu.
Addressing the inauguration by video-link, Putin hailed the two countries’ “multifaceted partnership,” which, he asserted, is based on “mutual respect and consideration of each other’s interests.”
‘Institutionalizing’ Foreign Policy
If elected, the CHP-led opposition has vowed to work toward bringing Turkey into the European Union, return the country to a parliamentary system of governance, and reduce inflation by reversing Erdogan’s economic policies.It has also pledged to replace Erdogan’s “personal” approach to foreign policy with what it describes as an “institutional” one.
“Erdogan–Putin relations have taken precedence over Turkey–Russia relations,“ under the AKP, according to Sezer. ”This will not be the case in the new period.”
Under a CHP-led administration, by contrast, “relations will be carried out in the institutional sense,” he said.
Erdogan, for his part, defends his foreign-policy achievements, especially those pertaining to Russia and Ukraine.
“We are able to talk to both sides and realize concrete goals, like the Black Sea grain deal and prisoner swaps, and keep the possibility of peace on the table,” he told supporters on April 11.
‘Return to Its Factory Settings’
If the CHP comes to power, Turkey will “return to its factory settings in foreign policy,” said Sezer, who is the head of Turkish–Russian studies at the Ankara-based Turkish Democracy Association.That, he explained, means the “institutionalization” of Turkey’s political relations with the EU, its military relations with NATO, and its economic relations with Western countries.
But he went on to assert that such a reorientation “will not have a negative impact on Turkey’s relations with Russia.”
“Even during the Cold War, Turkey’s relations with the Soviet Union were excellent, especially economically,” added Sezer, who previously served as commercial adviser at Turkey’s embassy in Moscow.
Ferit Temur, a prominent Turkish expert on Russian and Eurasian affairs, voiced similar sentiments.
“If the opposition comes to power, a pro-Western foreign-policy course can be expected to be institutionalized again,” Temur told The Epoch Times.
“But this new orientation is unlikely to lead to a sharp break in relations with Moscow,” he added, noting the deep “interdependence” that characterizes the two countries’ commercial relations.
Kilicdaroglu has repeatedly stated that Turkey’s relations with Russia wouldn’t be adversely affected under a CHP-led administration.
In an open letter written late last month, he told a group of Russian academics that “healthy” relations with Moscow are “in Turkey’s interest.”
In the letter, widely cited by local media, he also criticized what he described as the “anti-Russia position” adopted by certain countries (which he didn’t name).
Turkish–Russian cooperation, he added, is “critical for regional stability and global peace.”
Question of Sanctions
Certain hardline critics of Putin’s Russia, meanwhile, have openly stated their hope for an opposition victory.In January, Vladimir Milov, an official at the anti-Putin Free Russia Foundation, expressed hope that the election would bring “political change” in Turkey.
“The opposition CHP is showing an inclination to join the West on certain measures and probably join the [anti-Russia] sanctions regime,” Milov said at an online forum hosted by the Atlantic Council, a Washington-based think tank.
In a March 19 interview, Kilicdaroglu appeared to rule out such a scenario, saying that sanctions “should be in accordance with international law … and only within the framework of U.N. Security Council resolutions.”
Somewhat ambiguously, he added, “Apart from this, the dynamics of the countries themselves come into play regarding decisions taken.”
According to Sezer, who conducted the interview, Kilicdaroglu has explicitly stated that “there will be no sanctions imposed by Turkey [on Russia] outside UNSC resolutions.”
While acknowledging that Turkey is under Western pressure to implement sanctions on Russia, Sezer was quick to point out that the economic ties that bind the two countries are “deep” and “based on mutual dependence.”
Because of this interdependence, he added, Turkey “does not have the luxury to impose sanctions [on Russia] like Western countries.”
