Commentary

About 13 years ago, I postulated in my book “Humanity in Crisis“ that the East needs to be saved by freedom while the West needs to safeguard freedom.

Nearly 30 years before the first Trump administration, Washington had a policy of appeasement toward the authoritarian regime of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). This approach was based on the belief that assisting China in its economic development could encourage the CCP to voluntarily relinquish its dictatorial power and transition toward democratization.

The outcome was disastrous. After gaining economic power, the CCP quickly turned its material strength into a strategy for the global expansion of communist totalitarianism through political, military, and cultural means. This led to an unprecedented level of dictatorial power in human history and created a formidable adversary that posed a threat to the United States and freedom and democracy.

Amid this global political crisis, Trump 2.0 made a strong comeback, once again calling for voters to “Make America Great Again.” Since being sworn into office in January, Trump and his administration have been working quickly to reverse the decline of the United States in global politics.

The effectiveness of Trump’s national policies in achieving the goal of “Making America Great Again” hinges on whether his team possesses the ideological commitment and motivation necessary to protect freedom. “Making America Great Again” should focus on preserving freedom, as human will and spiritual energy are the key driving forces behind historical development.

While Trump advocates freedom in the West, Xi struggles to maintain his grip on power. The Trump administration’s strategic moves have left Xi feeling disoriented and weakened. Reflecting on his shortcomings, Xi may realize that Trump is not just a businessman looking to make deals, nor is he simply a politician trying to gain economic advantages through tariff wars. Instead, Trump’s goal is to dismantle the globalization process that has provided the economic framework for the rapid rise of the CCP. Politically, he sees the CCP as the greatest obstacle to his vision of making America great again.

Xi’s greatest concern regarding international politics is the joint effort by Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin to resolve the Russia–Ukraine war, which risks leaving the Chinese leader wholly excluded from this significant issue. Reports from my reliable sources within the CCP indicate that neither before nor after Trump’s recent call with Putin did Putin inform Xi, effectively sidelining him. This suggests that the relationship between the United States and Russia could improve once the war concludes, potentially evolving into a strategic alliance. The “no limits partnership” between China and Russia could also unravel as the Russia–Ukraine war ends, losing the foundation of their shared interests.

Under the strong pressure of Trump 2.0, Xi’s domestic political situation has worsened. Not long ago, the Political Work Department of the CCP’s Central Military Commission published an article calling for strengthening the ideological transformation of key military personnel. Meanwhile, Beijing has released a series of articles, including the “Internet Military Information Dissemination Management Regulations,” to strictly control the ideology within the military.

According to my sources within the second generation of CCP princelings who oppose Xi’s rule, the reason for publishing such articles is that, after the interrogation of Political Work Department head Miao Hua and his faction in late 2024, it was discovered that many of Miao’s trusted allies—including a few major generals, colonels, and senior colonels—had been privately discussing issues, such as the military’s nationalization and holding Xi accountable as the chairman of the Military Commission.

A senior officer in the Political Work Department downloaded reactionary articles—including a political action outline for a democratic revolution—from overseas websites and circulated them within a small circle. Upon discovery, Miao defended the officer’s actions, claiming that he was only staying informed about enemy situations. As a result, the officer was allowed to keep his position. This incident alarmed Xi, who then ordered a nationwide political education program within the military. The goal was to ensure absolute loyalty and to prevent the militarization of the armed forces, thus avoiding the risk of a military coup.

Xi faces another domestic political challenge: the growing trend of political resistance among the populace. According to reports from my sources within the CCP inner circle, a recent internal speech by Minister of Public Security Wang Xiaohong was circulated among grassroots-level police chiefs.

In this speech, Wang highlighted the importance of controlling civilian unrest. He identified China’s Democratic Revolution Party as an adversarial group and instructed the police to counteract hostile forces’ “cellularization.” What Wang referred to as “cellularization” is a metaphor for the decentralization of resistance movements, where each “cell” consists of only two or three people, thereby significantly complicating efforts by CCP agents to identify and dismantle such organizations.

One more crisis that Xi faces now is the unprecedented issue of the CCP’s infiltration into Taiwan. The situation primarily results from what some describe as unconstitutional and disorderly actions by the Kuomintang (KMT) and the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) in Taiwan’s unicameral legislative body.

These actions, particularly those led by key figures such as Fu Kun-chi of the KMT and Huang Kuo-chang of the TPP, have raised concerns about the parties’ collaboration with or tacit support for CCP interests, undermining Taiwan’s democratic integrity. The behaviors in question may include attempts to influence Taiwan’s policy direction in ways that align with Beijing’s agenda, as well as disruptions in legislative processes that weaken the self-ruled island’s sovereignty.

In response, there has been a large-scale recall campaign across Taiwan, with citizens mobilizing to remove what they see as pro-communist or “sell-out” legislators—those perceived as sympathetic to Beijing’s goals. This campaign has garnered significant momentum within Taiwanese society, reflecting widespread concern over the growing influence of the CCP on the island. As a result, removing certain legislators, particularly from the KMT, has become a highly probable outcome, signaling the intensifying polarization and resistance to the CCP’s influence.

Taiwan’s authorities have also initiated criminal proceedings against former KMT legislator Chang Hsien-yao, who, acting as an alleged CCP agent under the guidance of senior CCP official Wang Huning, intervened in Taiwan’s 2024 election, pushed for a blue–white (KMT and TPP) alliance, and attempted to manipulate the election in favor of CCP agents controlling Taiwan’s presidency.

The actions by Taiwan’s authorities to punish pro-CCP traitors have greatly shocked Beijing’s fifth column cultivated in Taiwan. In summary, recent developments in Taiwan have dealt a decisive blow to Xi’s strategy of destabilizing Taiwan from within and creating conditions for a military invasion.

Indeed, Xi is making a desperate attempt to maintain his rule in the face of an impending collapse of the CCP.

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