The following data show the severity of the financial difficulties that the Chinese regime is now facing:

In 2008, China’s GDP was about 30 trillion yuan ($4.2 trillion), and by 2023, it had grown to 126 trillion yuan ($17.8 trillion), making the CCP’s efforts to rescue its economy much more difficult.
In 2008, M2 (a broad measure of money supply) was 47.5 trillion yuan ($6.7 trillion); by the end of 2023, it had reached nearly 300 trillion yuan ($42 trillion), leaving little room for further monetary expansion.
In 2008, household debt was less than 18 percent; by June 2024, it had risen to 62.6 percent.
By the end of 2008, local government debt was around 5 trillion yuan ($707.6 billion), and the balance was roughly maintained; by 2023, the outstanding explicit debt of local governments stood at 40.74 trillion yuan ($5.7 trillion), with a total of 9.34 trillion yuan ($1.3 trillion) in local government bonds issued throughout the year.
By the end of 2008, China’s national debt stood at about 5.33 trillion yuan ($754 billion), with about 854.9 billion yuan ($121 billion) issued that year; by the end of 2023, the national debt had risen to 30.03 trillion yuan ($4.2 trillion), with a total issuance of 11.14 trillion yuan ($1.57 trillion) for that year.

Third, the State Council is weak and struggles with infighting among its members.

China’s Economic Stimulus Package Is Just for Show