New revelations by Canadian media on leaks from the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) are quickly pushing Canada beyond a point of no return. A reckoning of how Chinese influence operations and long-arm policing actually work is needed, or there is no point in even trying to resist.
Most recently, the news has been filled with the latest revelations on Chinese election interference. This is nothing new, and was the subject of a parliamentary committee focused on the 2019 federal election, and later, when it became clear such had expanded in scope, extended to cover the 2021 election too. Since then, detailed information on those activities, seemingly long hidden from the public, has pushed the need for attention to the issue into overdrive.
Not long before this, the presence of Chinese overseas police “service stations” in Canada made headlines, and as more stations were uncovered one by one, caused outrage.
Yet, frankly, this barely scratches the surface. One development that has received little to no attention is the systematic co-opting of formerly independent Chinese-language media. This global phenomenon, first studied in detail by the Financial Times back in 2020, represents yet another influence operation in Canada.
Until recently, vibrant Chinese diaspora communities around the world had a myriad of local TV, radio, and print media serving those communities, and even if not necessarily political in nature, they were certainly strongly independent. Those days are long gone, and in Australia, the first primary target, it’s estimated that 95 percent of all local media outlets had been co-opted by 2020, and started spewing official Chinese propaganda. Canada, the United States, and Europe have been targeted by similar campaigns.
Similarly, the role of Confucius Institutes, or ties between embassies and consulates and local Chinese student groups at Canadian universities, pop up in the news but are rarely studied in any detail. The student groups are well known to be controlled by said entities. One student, tired of the constant propaganda of the main student group in North America, the Chinese Students and Scholars Association, decided to start his own group that would be entirely social and stay away from politics. It didn’t take long for the nearby consulate to hear about his plans, and a phone call later, all those plans were abandoned.
In Sweden recently, there were revelations showing that Ph.D. students from China had to sign an agreement with the state-run Chinese Scholarship Council before taking up their positions. The students had to swear to remain loyal to the Chinese Communist Party and serve the interest of the state, and failure to do so could lead to relatives and family members back in China being penalized. In other news, the head of a Confucius Institute in Belgium was recently expelled after trying to recruit spies for China.
All the above examples, from direct election influencing, to policing operations, to control of students and business associations, and co-opting of local media, are of course complemented by a wide range of state-organized refugee espionage, as recent cases in Sweden and the UK have shown. On top of this there’s Chinese embassy-supported operations for tracking down claimed fugitives by Chinese police via Operation Fox Hunt, in which a recent indictment from the U.S. government shows one such operation blatantly carried out on Canadian soil.
The sheer amount of operations—and the sheer amount of different state- and Party- affiliated entities responsible and the different shapes these operations takes—is what makes a reckoning of them of such great importance.
Central government police, local police jurisdictions, Confucius Institutes, business and cultural associations, student bodies, the Chinese Ministry of State Security, and embassies and consulates are only some of the entities involved. Far more important perhaps, and far most vast in scope, are CCP entities under the umbrella organization of the United Work Front Department, whose goal is to monitor, guide the opinion of, and control Chinese diaspora groups worldwide.
Take the recent issue of Chinese overseas police “service stations.” These are established by local police in China, yes, but the way it’s done is what is important and has not been paid much attention to. The local police identify a trade association or cultural association somewhere in Canada where a large diaspora group exists. They then convince the association to establish an overseas “service station” on their behalf, and then work under the command of the relevant local police back in China. Whether they establish an actual physical office with signs and name plaques (rare, but has happened in some countries), or simply establish a liaison phone number via a local Chinese store or restaurant, etc. (more common), is not really relevant—the real work takes place in the office of the association, away from the public eye.
These associations are supposed to be registered and declare their purpose and mission, but of course none have done so. They are registered yes, but not for this role, nor for maintaining a relationship with a foreign police entity.
In essence, almost every entity tied to either the Chinese state or the Chinese Communist Party, regardless of whether such ties are official or unofficial, are acting as foreign agents, and they do so without limitations or any risk of punishment. Failure to understand how the Chinese Party-state works will allow it to continue, to expand, and do so without being exposed or punished. And Canada’s response will not just impact Canada, but have significant consequences for such operations in other democratic countries.
As the Canadian public becomes more aware of the scope and variety of Chinese influence operations, it is of utmost importance to avoid a witch-hunt, which would be beneath Canada’s proud democratic traditions. Sure, the police and the CSIS must be given more resources and a wider scope to investigate specific instances of such actions; however, most of the work ahead lies elsewhere.
To avoid politicizing the issue and creating a witch-hunt, the Trudeau government must establish clear administrative rules that would apply to all foreign state (and Party) actors, and equip the relevant regulatory bodies with the power—and the backbone—to enforce those rules, and do so consistently. Consistent application is key to maintaining Canada’s strong commitment to the rule of law.
A foreign agent registry requirement is a good first step, with clear and harsh penalties. Another good step would be to give greater powers to the regulatory body in charge of maintaining the registration of associations and foundations, in order to penalize those that operate outside their declared mission, or shut them down for that matter. Commissioning a study on the development of local Chinese media operations in Canada is another, and the broadcast and telecommunications regulator, CRTC, which deals with China’s main networks CCTV and CGTN, needs to be given the political backbone to actually implement existing rules.
A detailed study commissioned by Parliament will find plenty of details on how these Chinese operations work, and the key for the government will be how to find ways to counter them within set regulatory frameworks and oversight bodies, operating on clear rules, with the power to actually combat the interference.
