Military Reform Will Backfire on China’s Leader, Veterans Say

Chinese military delegates leave the closing session of the 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party at The Great Hall of People in Beijing on Oct. 22, 2022. Kevin Frayer/Getty Images

Since Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leader Xi Jinping took office, he restructured the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), particularly reorganizing its hierarchical structure. Veterans say Xi’s primary objective is to eliminate his rivals, but his efforts will fail due to a lack of recognition and understanding of the military’s culture.

“The ongoing military reforms, despite dismantling power bases, may compromise the military’s combat effectiveness,” Hunter Li, a former member of the PLA currently residing in the United States, recently told the Chinese language edition of The Epoch Times.

The disruption of the military culture will lead to “a breakdown in the camaraderie between soldiers and officers,” and “consequently, Xi Jinping actually ambushed himself with the tactic,” said Mr. Li.

He described the Chinese military culture as a brotherhood that shares a strong bond, loyalty, and honor—qualities that would take time to build, but Xi’s reform could erase all that history.

Erasing ‘History’

Previous military reform policies emphasized reducing troop numbers, consolidating military regions, or adding new units. For example, “army” was renamed “group army” in the 1980s, and the Central Military Equipment Development Department was established in 1998. Nevertheless, the primary structural system remained essentially unchanged.

However, Xi’s military reforms are unprecedented. Since 2015, he has overhauled the military structure by reorganizing seven former military regions into five theater commands. He restructured four General Departments into 15 smaller organizations under the Central Military Commission (CMC), with Xi as its chairman.

Mr. Li drew a parallel, stating that this action is akin to “not only removing the monks but also tearing down the temples.”

He pointed out: “The 38th Group Army, the 1st Group Army, the 27th Group Army, the 54th Grouop Army, and the 42nd Group Army were elite units. After the comprehensive military reforms, they were dismantled or merged with other groups.”

According to various Chinese media reports, the PLA underwent restructuring, consolidating from 18 group armies to 13 and renaming them. These forces are now distributed across five theaters, with each group comprising around 12 brigades and a total of about 60,000 soldiers.

In a 2016 release by the CMC, the military reform served two goals: to guide the “political direction” of the PLA under the “control of the CCP,” and to build a “combat army” that is fundamental to a “socialist state with Chinese characteristics.”

Mr. Li described how his unit, which he did not disclose out of fear of reprisal, was restructured. Each battalion was subdivided and deployed to different locations in China, he said. The division was reconfigured into three brigades, which were dispersed and integrated with regiments from other group armies.

“Some soldiers were deployed to Beijing, others to Inner Mongolia, and another to Hebei. ... Practically, everyone became just a drop in the ocean. It became difficult to differentiate one from another,” he said.

Citing the 27th Group Army as an example, which fought in the Korean War (1950–53) and the Sino-Vietnamese War (1979), Mr. Li said the restructuring suddenly erased its “history,” adding that this is Xi’s goal.

“Xi’s intention is quite evident—from now on, you are not the CCP’s military but exclusively Xi’s military,” he said.

Military a ‘Threat’ to Xi’s Power

Former Navy Commander Yao Cheng said Xi aimed to build a formidable fighting force prepared for war, but disbanding the groups compromised the military’s combat effectiveness. “His conflicting strategy exposed his view of the PLA—a threat to his security,” he said.

Under his anti-corruption campaign, Xi has eliminated nearly all his rivals in the military, creating adversaries, said Mr. Yao, who contends that the CCP leader lacks an understanding of military affairs.

“A military leader builds his prestige through military accomplishments, determination, and genuine concern for the well-being of soldiers, who are willing to sacrifice their lives for their country. However, Xi perceives the military as an adversary, readily resorting to making arrests within its ranks.”

Under the Xi administration, dozens of senior military officers—including the vice chairmen of the CMC, Xu Caihou and Guo Boxiong—were purged in the anti-corruption campaign. Both men were loyalists of the late former CCP leader Jiang Zemin.

Members of the People's Liberation Army band file out after the closing session of the 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party outside The Great Hall of People in Beijing on Oct. 22, 2022. Kevin Frayer/Getty Images

The nine senior military officers who were reportedly ousted from China’s rubber-stamp legislature, the National People’s Congress, on Dec. 29 were part of Xi’s latest purge, which targeted the Rocket Force, including its former commander, Gen. Li Yuchao, and four other senior officers.

In an unprecedented move, Xi promoted two naval staff officers, appointing Gen. Wang Houbin as the commander of the Rocket Force and Adm. Dong Jun as the defense minister.

According to Mr. Yao, the move was linked to the investigation of Gen. Li Shangfu, the former defense minister who was removed from his post on Oct. 24, 2023.

“Xi doesn’t care about talent; he’s employing sycophants,” Mr. Yao remarked.

“He might think that he’s achieving something remarkable by promoting two individuals like Dong Jun and Wang Houbin, but he has offended a significant number of people.”

He explained, “For instance, when someone becomes a division commander, the next promotion would be to corps commander, but the chances of promotion are now slim” because of the newly appointed leadership.

“Military members are not like ordinary people; they are spirited individuals who resist coercion. These are people who have taken lives, and if you threaten them, they won’t yield. Xi doesn’t understand this; he’s truly asking for trouble. I predict he won’t survive for three more years; let’s see what happens,” Mr. Yao said.

Song Tang, Yi Ru, He Jiaxing, and Ning Xin contributed to this report.