Czech Report Highlights CCP’s Covert Operations to Influence Academia and Politics

Lawmaker delivers a speech to the Czech parliament in Prague on March 27, 2018. Michal Cizek/AFP via Getty Images

A Czech national intelligence agency report highlights the Chinese regime’s covert operations, including using fake LinkedIn identities and offering money to gather information and build a network of influencers in the Czech Republic to further its interests.

China “poses a fundamental threat to the Euro-Atlantic civilization, including the Czech Republic,” the Czech Security Information Service said in its annual report published on Sept. 12.

“Falling into China‘s sphere of influence means gradually surrendering technological and strategic know-how to a system representing a different socio-economic concept based on communist dictatorship, which is corrosive to the fundamental principles of our civilization, namely democracy and the free market.”

The agency said that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has utilized its diplomatic mission to gather information about Prague’s political landscape as part of its influence operations within the Czech Republic.

The regime also deployed intelligence agents to cultivate relationships with local influential figures. According to the report, this involved engaging with academics to obtain “non-public information” and gain a deeper understanding of the Czech environment.

Influencing Academia and Politics

One method they’ve been using in approaching Czech academics is to create fake identities on LinkedIn, posing as representatives from fictitious consulting or headhunting companies in Hong Kong and Singapore.

The intelligence operatives would then request reports or studies “in areas corresponding to China’s political interests,” offering “financial reward” under the guise of professional cooperation, the report said.

“These studies generally serve as a preliminary step toward further cooperation, involving the provision of specific information.”

Once foreign scholars agree to produce these reports, Chinese agents might invite them to visit China, with Beijing covering all expenses. The objective was to “create a network of contacts who feel indebted and may be inclined to support Chinese interests in the Czech Republic in the future,” the agency stated.

According to the report, in addition to researchers, these invitations to visit China could be extended to former and current political figures, representatives from national and local governments, and influential business leaders.

“Participants may be approached by Chinese intelligence services, or their presence may be used for propaganda purposes, not to mention that there can also be a certain sense of obligation created by the hospitality of the Chinese, which they would be willing to exploit at a later date.”

The Czech intelligence agency’s report came after a series of allegations of Chinese spies across the world, raising concerns about the CCP’s espionage activities.

In the United States, Linda Sun, a former high-ranking aide in the New York governor’s office, was convicted earlier this month by a U.S. jury for acting as an agent for the CCP in exchange for millions of dollars in business and other benefits.

In Britain, a parliamentary researcher who once worked for a senior lawmaker in the governing Conservative Party was charged with providing judicial information to Beijing in April along with another man.

In Germany, police arrested a longtime aide to a member of the European Parliament (MEP) in April on suspicion that he works for the CCP’s secret service and spies on Chinese dissidents in the country.

In January, the Belgian federal prosecutor’s office opened an investigation into former senator Frank Creyelman. The investigation involved allegations that the CCP spies had bribed him for years to influence discussions in Europe.

Efforts to Silence Critics

In addition to targeting influential figures, the Czech intelligence agency also sounded alarms over the CCP’s efforts to silence critics while promoting its propaganda.

The agency said it has recorded Beijing’s interest in suppressing dissent and monitoring events that the CCP considers a threat to its authoritarian rule. Their primary targeted groups, which the CCP termed as “five poisons,” are Falun Gong practitioners, Uyghurs, Tibetans, supporters of Taiwanese independence, and advocates for democracy in China.

“Whenever the Chinese learn of an event in the Czech Republic where negative comments about China might appear, it begins to take systematic steps to obtain sensitive information about the location, content, and participants of the event,” it stated.

In 2023, the Czech intelligence service monitored the “cooperation between Czech and Chinese media scenes,” finding that Chinese content was being distributed mainly to smaller local TV channels to influence the Czech public’s perception of China.

The Chinese content shows “only the positive aspects of the communist regime while completely omitting or denying any trampling of human rights, oppression of ethnic minorities, and territorial aggression.”

“For China, its image in the eyes of the domestic audience and foreign partners is highly important, which is why it has long been trying to suppress any information that damages the image of a hegemon promoting global peace and order.”