China Concludes Major Policy Conclave, Expels Former Foreign Minister From Top Political Body

Police officers patrol outside the Jingxi Hotel, where China's leaders were conducting the Third Plenum, a key economic meeting, in Beijing on July 15, 2024. (Greg Baker/ AFP via Getty Images)

News Analysis

China’s communist regime wrapped up a four-day political conclave on July 18, promising to implement “comprehensive reforms,” including those targeting its economy. Beijing also announced its decision to remove its former foreign minister from a top political body.

China experts say the conference was merely a formality, but the leadership reshuffle suggests infighting among Beijing’s top ranks.

The twice-a-decade conclave, known as the Third Plenum, was convened by the Chinese regime’s Central Committee, which is chaired by Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leader Xi Jinping. According to China’s state-run media Xinhua, the committee adopted a resolution that included all of its decisions but made only a summary of the resolution available to the public, in the form of a communiqué.

The communiqué is packed with broad policy targets—touching on areas ranging from social security and income distribution to health care and financial system reforms—but offers few concrete details.

Experts said the communiqué lacks substance but offers some insight into possible political infighting within the communist regime.

“The communiqué was just some political slogans and clichés,” said Feng Chongyi, associate professor of China studies at the University of Technology in Sydney, who called the economic reforms outlined in the communiqué “nothing new.”

Kung Shan-Son, an assistant research fellow at the Institute for National Defense and Security Research, a think tank in Taiwan, told The Epoch Times that the CCP “is singing the old tune,” even though the communiqué mentions reforms in many areas, including the military, economy, rural regions, technology, and talent development.

Mr. Kung said more can be learned about China’s new reform agenda only if the CCP decides to publish the full text of the Central Committee’s resolution. Should the text become publicly available, Mr. Kung said, the outside world could tell if the reform agenda includes new content and anything directly from Xi himself.

Policies

The communiqué discusses the need to “resolve” risks in the real estate sector and address mounting debts faced by local governments and small and medium financial institutions. It also mentioned the need to “deepen the reform of foreign investment and outbound investment management systems.”

“Foreign investors and businesses have concerns about their safety due to China’s extensive control and risk prevention, which are the main causes of China’s economic stagnation,” Mr. Kung stated. “The theft of foreign technology has also caused international resentment.”

Additionally, one reform would aim to “improve and advance” China’s foreign infrastructure policy, known as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The House Select Committee on the CCP has warned that Beijing is using the BRI to force developing countries into debt to exert influence over them.

All the reforms would be completed by 2029, the communiqué states, allowing China to achieve “socialist modernization” by 2035.

The communiqué also discusses the importance of national security, social control, and the Party’s leadership role—issues that Mr. Kung said revealed Xi’s concerns about maintaining his tight grip on power. Social control, or what the CCP calls “stability maintenance,” refers to the regime’s repression of protesters or dissenters who publicly criticize Beijing.

As for the Chinese regime’s future after the conclave, Mr. Feng said he is not optimistic, given that the CCP appears to continue prioritizing the Party’s control over the people’s prosperity.

“The meeting doesn’t change the Party’s direction, which is to restore [Maoist-style] totalitarianism and reinforce the Party’s authority,” Mr. Feng said. “Despite the steep decline in its economic performance, the Party is tightening its control over society.”

Former Chinese Foreign Minister Qin Gang (2nd R) and Chinese Ambassador to the Philippines Huang Xilian (R) attend a meeting with Filipino Foreign Secretary Enrique Manalo at the Diamond Hotel in Metro Manila on April 22, 2023. (Gerard Carreon/Pool/AFP via Getty Images)

Political Infighting

In addition to policy targets, Beijing announced that Qin Gang—China’s shortest-serving foreign minister who had vanished from public view for more than a year—has formally stepped down from the CCP’s top leadership body.

According to a communiqué released through state media Xinhua, the CCP accepted Mr. Qin’s “application for resignation” and revoked his membership in the Central Committee.

Mr. Qin, once considered Xi’s protégé, was replaced without any explanation in July 2023, only seven months after he was promoted to the foreign minister’s post.

The lack of clarity fueled speculation among outside observers about the reasons behind one of the most significant shakeups within the CCP. Many linked his ouster to an extramarital affair, while some pointed to political infighting among the Party’s elites.

The July 18 statement did not provide further details or say that Mr. Qin was subjected to any investigation.

Analysts, however, interpreted it as a good sign of the former diplomat’s fate.

“Qin Gang was referred to as ‘comrade,’ indicating that he hasn’t been expelled from the Party and is not subjected to any punishment, aside from being stripped of his titles,” Mr. Feng said.

“It’s more like a soft landing” for Mr. Qin, he said, which can also avoid embarrassing the Party’s leadership, given that Xi promoted Mr. Qin to the ministerial position ahead of other elder, veteran diplomats.

Chinese Defense Minister Li Shangfu attends a meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin and Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu in Moscow on April 16, 2023. (Sputnik/Pavel Bednyakov/Pool via Reuters)

Mr. Kung, who has closely monitored China’s political system, said the latest statement suggested that the circumstances behind Mr. Qin’s dismissal are not as severe as expected.

He compared the CCP’s description of Mr. Qin to that of another former minister, Li Shangfu.

According to the communiqué, the CCP said the conclave endorsed its Politburo’s decision to expel Mr. Li for “serious violation of Party discipline and the law,” a euphemism often used for corruption charges.

“Qin Gang’s resignation was accepted, which is clearly distinct from the treatment of Li Shangfu,” Mr. Kung said, indicating that the severity of their violations perceived by the CCP is also different.

The statement appears to confirm political infighting, according to Mr. Kung. He said the downfall of Mr. Qin is “more likely” related to the power struggle with the CCP’s top diplomat, Wang Yi.

Before Mr. Qin was appointed as foreign minister in December 2022, Mr. Wang had held the post for nearly a decade. Mr. Wang reassumed that post after Mr. Qin’s dismissal. The senior diplomat is also the director of the Party’s foreign affairs commission, making him the principal adviser on foreign policy to the CCP’s top leader.

Since Mr. Qin’s departure, Beijing has officially fired more than a dozen senior military officials and leaders from the country’s biggest defense-technology firms. Targeted officials include those commanding the Rocket Force, a military unit overseeing the nation’s conventional and nuclear missiles.

The CCP also announced on July 18 that Sun Jinming, the Rocket Force’s chief staff, has been expelled from the Party for “severely violating discipline and law,” according to the communiqué.

Luo Ya contributed to this report.