We’ve seen several banks fail in the first months of 2023. The failures seemingly came out of nowhere. However, there are a few commonalities among the banks that failed. I'll try to connect some dots for you.
This wasn’t former President Donald Trump’s fault, as some claim. Barney Frank heavily lobbied to change regulations in 2018 on smaller banks. Applying Dodd-Frank regulations to smaller banks killed community and regional banking. Community and regional banking kept the banking industry decentralized. That’s a good thing for risk management. The more centralized things are, the larger the point of failure.
Would the world have stopped with no bailout? Certainly, you feel a lot of empathy for startup firms that used these banks. They would have felt a cash crunch, but based on a presentation I saw from the international law firm Cooley, most would have seen 100 percent of their cash in time as the bank went through the receivership process. Innovation would have continued, maybe at a slower pace. Venture capital (VC) firms would have had to either renegotiate deals with startups or extend loans to them. That’s really the reason the VC firms were yelling like two-year-olds having a tantrum.
At the time, I wrote that it was one of the worst bills to pass Congress since the Affordable Care Act and that it would do nothing to stop future failures. I’ve since been proven correct. Capitalistic free market economies aren’t brittle. They bend but don’t break. Crony capitalistic economies are brittle and break constantly. The United States has a crony capitalistic economy today, and there are points of failure all over it in several industries because of over-regulation.
How, then, do we rectify this situation when we know writing more regulations isn’t an answer? In my past life, I was a commodity trader in a floor trading pit. When people made or lost millions of dollars, I watched with my own eyes. I think we can translate that experience to banks. If a bank doesn’t have a certain amount of assets, it can’t be a public company. It should have no access to capital markets. It must be formed like the old merchant banks before the cessation of Glass-Steagal. The management teams would have their money in the bank, and when the right arm was doing something the left arm didn’t like, they would have a face-to-face discussion about it. This was always the great thing about the old Wall Street partnerships at Lehman Bros., Bear Stearns, and Goldman Sachs. When one partner got out of line, another partner reined them in. That sort of internal peer pressure went out the door with the ability of those firms to access public markets.
How would that change banking? With no access to capital markets, they would have to get deposits to grow the bank. They also would have to hire qualified people who really understood banking and risk instead of hiring for reasons that made people feel good about themselves. Instead of a few super-banks, the banking industry would become more fragmented.
Don’t believe, then, the spin that the taxpayer won’t be on the hook for this. Bailouts aren’t free. There are opportunity costs and direct costs. If the Fed expands its balance sheet and takes in all the low-interest-denominated notes the banks bought, the Fed will lose money. Who backs the Fed? The taxpayer. If they charge banks higher rates for FDIC or other insurance, those costs will find their way to your bank statement and you'll bear the burden. If the Federal Reserve slows its interest-rate increases to fight inflation caused by profligate government spending, especially during COVID-19, that will have a different sort of economic cost to your pocketbook.
Don’t be confused. You, the taxpayer, are bearing the brunt of bailouts just like you did in 2008.