The 10-year-long battle between factions in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has been waged to keep terrible secrets hidden, with the outcome hanging on the choice of successor for Party head Hu Jintao.
Former Party head Jiang Zemin and his faction have lived in fear of not controlling the CCP. They know they cannot allow the people of China or the world to learn of the enormous crimes committed against the practitioners of the spiritual practice of Falun Gong.
The battle to keep what has been done secret has been focused for the past five years on the figure of Xi Jinping. Jiang’s faction could not prevent Xi from being named as Hu Jintao’s successor as head of the CCP, but neither could they risk Xi ever holding power.
Xi is unacceptable to Jiang’s faction because he is not implicated in the persecution. The Jiang faction needs to keep the persecution going, to keep quiet the crimes that have been committed, and to assure they will never be held accountable for what they have done.
Keeping Control
As Jiang faced retirement in 2002 at the 16th Party Congress, he had to make sure that he would continue to hold the real power, even while formally ceding authority to Hu Jintao.
The key to controlling the Party is the Politburo Permanent Standing Committee (PSC)—the small body whose consensus rules the CCP. Jiang sought to pack the PSC with his followers and in particular added Zeng Qinghong, then head of the CCP’s Organization Department.
While Hu Jintao was building a network of officials loyal to him throughout the Party, in 2002 the PSC was dominated by Jiang’s people.
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Nonetheless, in order to assure that Zeng could lead the PSC in Jiang’s stead, Jiang needed to find a way to neutralize Li Ruihuan. Li Ruihuan had been a member of the PSC since 1992.
Li was popular among Party officials and was recognized as being more capable than Jiang himself. If Li stayed on the PSC, then Zeng would likely not be able to run things.
Li was due to turn 68, so Jiang and Zeng invented a new rule: “Seven Up, Eight Down.” The meaning of this phrase was that PSC members who were 67 at the time of the Party Congress could serve another term, but those who were 68 had to step down. Li was forced off the PSC.
This stratagem got Jiang and Zeng through five years, but in 2007, at the 17th Party Congress, they got caught in their own snare. With the Congress approaching, Zeng was due to turn 68 and thus was disqualified from continuing to serve on the PSC. His place was given to Xi Jinping, at the time the Party chief of Zhejiang Province.
Zeng attempted to put the best light on things by circulating the slogan, “Zeng Qinghong sacrifices himself for Xi Jinping.” The truth is that Zeng had no choice in the matter.
Choosing a New Chief
Joining Xi as a new PSC member was Li Keqiang, then the Party chief of Liaoning Province.
In fact, Jiang and Zeng did not want either Xi or Li to join the PSC. They had originally wanted Zeng to stay on and to add Bo Xilai.
Jiang had rewarded Bo for his ruthless persecution of Falun Gong by rapidly promoting him. Bo moved up from mayor of Dalian City to governor of Liaoning Province in 2000, and to commerce minister in 2004. The PSC seemed within his grasp.
Bo’s candidacy was damaged by the death in January 2007 of his father, Bo Yibo, an influential CCP elder statesman. But it was most likely sunk by the opposition of Wen Jiabao.
Bo had been under consideration to be chosen as vice premier, but Wen pointed out that because Bo had been sued in several countries for atrocities committed against Falun Gong practitioners, he was not an appropriate representative of the CCP on the international stage. That disqualification also ended his shot at the PSC in 2007, and Bo was shunted off to become Party chief of Chongqing.
Continued on the next page: Hu Jintao needed to arrange for a successor ...
Meanwhile, Hu Jintao had to arrange for a successor to take his place as head of the CCP at the 18th Party Congress in 2012. He had in mind either Xi Jinping or Li Keqiang.
Li Keqiang was a known quantity—his loyalties lay with Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao. Who Xi would back was not so clear, although his pedigree suggested his sympathies would tilt toward Hu Jintao.
Xi’s father, Xi Zhongxun, belonged to the reformers within the CCP. Fairly humane, Xi Zhongxun shared the same point of view as former CCP general secretaries Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang and was very close to them.
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Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang had pushed forward economic and political reforms. The death of Hu Yaobang was the inspiration for the Tiananmen Square student movement in 1989. Zhao Ziyang’s refusal to back the use of force against the Tiananmen students led to his dismissal and house arrest.
Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao were originally selected by Hu Yaobang and benefited from Hu Yaobang’s tutelage. Naturally, Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao were close to Xi Zhongxun and were very respectful toward him. In a way, Xi Zhongxun was one of their mentors.
Jiang and Zeng did not have a suitable candidate to put up and they had to decide whether to back Xi Jinping or Li Keqiang. They blocked Li Keqiang, whom they considered Hu’s preferred successor, and backed the unknown quantity that was Xi Jinping.
Conspiracy to Rule
Jiang and Zeng were buying time. Their real candidate remained Bo Xilai.
The plan was for Bo to gain power and prestige through his rule of Chongqing. Then, at the 18th Party Congress, Bo could be appointed to the PSC and could also succeed Zhou Yongkang as the head of the PLAC.
In Chongqing, Bo launched the Sing Red and Smash the Black campaigns, seeking to whip up popular enthusiasm for a kind of Maoist revival while claiming to demonstrate that the CCP could stamp out corruption and the mafia. This came to be known in China as the “Chongqing Model” and was viewed by Party hardliners as a way forward for the CCP.
According to Jiang and Zeng’s plan, after Bo was appointed to the PSC and as director of the PLAC, Bo would promote his Chongqing Model nationally. This would excite popular support for Bo, they thought. Meanwhile, Bo could increase the weaponry available to the already heavily armored People’s Armed Police.
Then, when the time was right, with Bo’s command over the 1.5 million strong Armed Police and the 1.7 million strong Public Security Bureau police, and, with Jiang expected to retain influence over the military, Bo would easily remove Xi Jinping from office or arrest him. Jiang’s faction would be safe.
Jiang and Zeng’s plan, after Bo was defeated in the 2007 bid for PSC membership, was carried out smoothly, with Bo Xilai and Zhou Yongkang accomplishing half of the process. Bo had already become a national figure due to the Chongqing Model and was talked about as a likely PSC appointee at the 18th Party Congress. He was known to be Zhou’s hand-picked successor as head of the PLAC. Zhou had worked to strengthen the PLAC in general and the Armed Police in particular.
Then, on Feb. 6, Bo’s deputy mayor and former police chief Wang Lijun fled Chongqing for his life, seeking refuge in the U.S. Consulate in Chengdu. When Wang was taken to Beijing, he revealed the details of the conspiracy, which has given Hu and Wen the ammunition they needed to collapse the plan and begin rolling up those responsible. It is only a matter of time until the Jiang faction is completely disintegrated.
China’s Future
As that faction falls apart, so too does its ability to control events. Right now, there is a debate within the top levels of the Party about whether to reveal the crimes committed against Falun Gong practitioners.
In this debate, officials are positioning themselves with regard to Falun Gong. Some have recognized that those who committed atrocities against Falun Gong practitioners need to be held accountable.
They see that by bringing criminals like Jiang Zemin, Zeng Qinghong, Zhou Yongkang, and Bo Xilai to justice, the Chinese nation will begin to repay an awful debt. At the same time, a great moral lesson will be imparted to the Chinese people.
In public trials, the Chinese people will see the state recognize the pure and selfless conduct of Falun Gong practitioners. Their living example will come to be seen as a precious legacy. That example, rooted in China’s ancient culture, will instruct and guide the Chinese nation as it renews itself after more than six decades of communist tyranny.
Some Party leaders fear that if what has been done to Falun Gong practitioners is known, the facts will be so shocking that the CCP will quickly collapse. They are right about that.
Nonetheless, these officials are at this late date desperately casting about for a way to keep the CCP alive a little longer. They are willing to turn their backs on Falun Gong for the sake of the power they have become accustomed to holding.
But that power will soon slip out of their grasp. They are wrong in thinking they can keep these secrets hidden much longer—information is already starting to be revealed. As the Jiang faction collapses, individuals will increasingly come forward with information. The truth will come out, and as it does, a new era will begin in China.
