Talks on Russia’s entry into the WTO were stalled on Monday, symptomatic of the festering conflicts in the formerly Soviet-dominated part of the Caucasus.
Although nearly forgotten by many, the brief war between Georgia and Russia in the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in 2008 has left unresolved conflict with consequences still reverberating beyond the borders of the small sovereign nation.
It may not seem like a big deal: Georgia, as a member of the WTO, demands international monitoring and transparency of trade across the disputed borders in the areas of Abkhazia and South Ossetia to agree to Russia joining the organization.
But the conflict behind it all is something of a Gordian knot that it involves issues like Georgia’s possible entry into NATO, EU/NATO-Russia relations, the difficult question of when it is legitimate for an area to declare independence, and the whole power balance in the volatile Caucasus area.
The Caucasus, divided between Russian autonomous republics in the north and independent states in the south, is home to over 50 ethnicities, and was subjected to widespread deportations and ethnic cleansing, both under the Russian empire and the Soviet Union. When the latter collapsed, several drawn-out, bitter conflicts followed, the wars in Chechnya being the most well known.
Ossetians and Abkhaz are two relatively small ethnic groups, whose homelands were both autonomous oblasts (provinces) under the Soviet Union. Due partly to Soviet population politics, these areas both had large Georgian communities and became internationally recognized as parts of Georgia after the collapse of the union.
They have never been fully under the control of the central government in Tbilisi, however, despite Georgia’s attempts to bring them into the fold by various means. In the early ’90s, somewhat overshadowed by the Balkan wars, bloody civil war erupted between Georgians and Russia-backed separatists in both regions.
In Abkhazia, where other Caucasian militants also participated, the violence became particularly apocalyptic, with ethnic cleansing and other atrocities. Georgia lost both wars, and thousands of Georgians were killed and up to 250,000 expelled from Abkhazia alone.
In the summer of 2008 the events that led to the declaration of independence for South Ossetia and Abkhazia took place. Who actually started it, and who planned what in advance, is still shrouded in the fog of war. The facts are that skirmishes between Georgian and Russian peacekeeping troops and local militias led to a large-scale Georgian military operation against South Ossetia on Aug. 7. This in turn triggered a Russian invasion of Georgia where Russian troops took control of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, as well as other parts of Georgian territory.
EU and NATO was then, and still is, firmly behind West-friendly Georgia and strongly critical of Russia for invading a sovereign nation. Russia pulled out of Georgia proper after mediation by the EU, but remained in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, both of which declared independence. Only Russia, Venezuela, Nicaragua, and some small island states have recognized them, however.
Three years down the line, both republics are relatively calm, but operate in a kind of limbo, heavily dependent on Russia. Both have signed treaties that leave Russian troops there for decades, and current South Ossetian President Eduard Kokoity has even said that he thinks South Ossetia should form some sort of union with Russia.
But this is a misconception, according to professor George Hewitt of University of London, a longtime scholar and friend of Abkhazia. He is very critical of the West’s support of Georgia.
“Georgia’s role [in Abkhazia] has been nothing if not destructive and disastrous,” he said in an email to The Epoch Times. He put the blame for both the initial wars in the ’90s and the continued unrest firmly on Georgia. That is not to say that Russia is acting out of altruism in supporting Abkhazia’s independence, it is more a case of intersecting interests, he argues; Abkhazia seeks backup for its independence, while Russia is concerned about maintaining its local sphere of influence.
Furthermore, Hewitt stated that anything less than independence for the small, but relatively prosperous Black Sea-province is out of the question, which makes the international community’s unwillingness to recognize it unreasonable.
“[There is] no chance whatsoever that Abkhazia will ever again belong to Georgia or exist in any way within the Georgian state. … The Abkhazians [also] have no reason to think of union with Russia, and this is most assuredly not what the Abkhazians want or, since the collapse of the USSR, have ever wanted,” he wrote.
Tom De Waal, senior associate of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, said that the situation “looks to be deadlocked for the foreseeable future,” in an email to The Epoch Times.
“Russia will not revoke its unilateral recognitions of the two territories as independent and Georgia will continue to insist that they are ‘occupied.’ Both positions do not reflect the more nuanced reality of the situation but they won’t change any time soon,” he wrote.
With regard to South Ossetia, which is less populous and more of a natural part of Georgia, both geographically and demographically, than Abkhazia, De Waal found it likely that they will eventually make some kind of deal with Georgia but not anytime soon.
The question of the legitimacy of the two breakaway republics can also be seen in the light of the case of Kosovo, whose independence from Serbia was supported by the West but strongly opposed by Russia.
De Waal is of the opinion that Kosovo is not necessarily entirely legitimate, and neither is Abkhazia and South Ossetia necessarily entirely illegitimate. But, he argues, Abkhazia must at least respect the rights of the displaced Georgians from the early ’90s to return to Abkhazia to be taken seriously. Their right to return has also been recognized by a U.N. resolution. For Russia, however, the example of Kosovo is something to hold on to in order to justify its support of the breakaway republics.
Apart from local unrest, this conflict also has delicate international consequences, since NATO has declared its willingness to make both Georgia and Ukraine members, much to the chagrin of Russia (although none of them have been given an action plan yet). NATO does not accept members whose borders are disputed, however, so for Georgia to join, the situation must somehow be resolved.
Georgia’s refusal to let Russia join the WTO, which naturally has potential consequences for all the organization’s members, could therefore be seen as the latest move in this complicated high-stakes Caucasian wrestling match.
