Although South Korea faces yearly rice surpluses, the government and most citizens are not inclined toward resuming high levels of aid that two former liberal governments supplied to the North.
The majority of North Korean defectors also oppose unconditional food aid, although some claim that the aid will lower the market price of rice, thus alleviating the economic burden for hungry residents who are excluded from the food rationing system and depend solely on the market.
Two cargo ships, one carrying 5,000 tons of rice and another 3 million cups of instant noodles left South Korean ports on Oct. 25 and 26 respectively, making it the first government funded food aid since President Lee Myung-bak took office in early 2008. Both former liberal governments sent almost half a million tons of rice and 300,000 tons of chemical fertilizer every year to the North from 2000 to 2007, but there have been reports from North Korean defectors that the rice donations were distributed to the political elite and the military, only strengthening the regime’s control over the people.
Hyoun In-ae, vice president of North Korea Intellectuals Solidarity (NKIS) says, “[The] majority of North Korean defectors oppose food aid, mainly because they never received the South Korean rice when they lived in the North.”
NKIS is an academic group of North Korean scholars who have defected to the South. Hyoun, a former philosophy professor at Cheong-jin Medical University of North Korea, says the concern, is that aid can have a negative long-term impact. “What the defectors are most concerned about is that the food aid would only extend the lifespan of the regime.”
According to her, the military and the communist cadres still benefit from the nationwide food rationing system, while common residents depend on the market. The military and the cadres can buy the food at very low prices within the food rationing system, which allows their wages to be kept very low. But in the market, the price of food is much higher than the so-called “national price.”
For example, currently 1 kg (2.2 pounds) of rice is 50 won (US$0.05) in the rationing system, while the market price is 1,000 won—20 times higher than the national price. Hyoun says, “When the regime could not provide sufficient food, some members went out of control. The financial situation is so dire that it cannot raise wages enough for officials to buy food in the market. So when any food aid comes to the North, where do you think it goes? Only to the military and the cadres, who are the agents that suppress the people.”
Since President Lee Myung-bak came to power in February 2008, his conservative Grand National Party government has been reluctant to provide rice or any other aid to the North, unless Pyongyang allows aid workers to monitor its distribution, which the North refuses to agree to. The Lee administration believes that the massive economic and food aid of former liberal governments did not bring any reform to the North, and only resulted in long-range missile tests, and the first nuclear test in 2006. Lee insists instead that the North needs to take significant steps toward giving up its nuclear weapons in order to get any aid from the South.
Since the policy shift toward denuclearization, relations between the two Koreas have steadily deteriorated: In 2008, a South Korean tourist was killed near North Korea’s Diamond Mountain resort; North Korea conducted a long-range missile test and its second nuclear test in 2009; this year, North Korea sank South Korean naval ship, Cheonan, killing 46 soldiers.
However, with the news that flooding caused serious damage in North Korea, especially in Sin-ui-ju—a North Korea-China border city with population of 370,000, where 92 percent of the farmland was devastated by floods in late August, according to a U.N. investigation team—the liberal parties and civic groups put pressure on the government to resume food and other major aid. At the same time while the North was suffering enormous losses from the flood, the South was dealing with an oversupply of rice from the last season, as the next harvest was approaching.
South Korea has a rice surplus of about half a million tons every year. The government needs to buy it to prevent the price from plummeting in order to protect farmers. Many pro-aid groups insist that giving food aid to the North can help secure the price of rice in the South as well as eliminate storage costs for the government.
However, Seoul is not showing any signs that it will resume its previous massive assistance program. On Oct. 25, the day the first food aid was sent North, the spokesman for the ministry of Unification told reporters that this aid was for humanitarian purposes for the flood stricken area, implying that government had no intention of resuming regular aid.
During a South-North Red Cross meeting held Oct. 26–27, the North asked the South to send half million tons of rice and 300,000 tons of fertilizer, the same amount the North used to receive under both previous liberal governments. But the following day, South Korea’s minister of foreign affairs explained to Josette Sheeran, executive director of the U.N. World Food Program (WFP) who requested the aid, that Seoul could resume aid.
A survey conducted on Oct. 23 by Korean firm World Research on behalf of the ruling party, shows that majority of South Koreans oppose unconditional aid. Forty-one percent of respondents answered that North Korea should apologize first for attacking the Cheonan in order to receive the food aid; 22.8 percent opposed any kind of aid even if the North softens its attitude. Almost 80 percent of South Koreans surveyed believe the rice aid was diverted to the military or to privileged groups.
However, 32.5 percent of respondents agreed to unconditional food aid even if the North does not change its attitude toward the South. Some North Korean defectors also support unconditional aid. Hyoun says, “Some defectors claim that even if the rice aid cannot reach hungry residents, it will lower the market price of rice, alleviating the economic burden of the residents who solely depend on the market. This is true.”
She further explained that when the outside aid entered the North Korean economy, the overall supply of goods increased, lowering the market price. “Last year a Korean-Chinese trader who sold goods in the North Korean market told me that her business depended on whether South Korea would send rice or not. When South Korea sent rice to the North, her goods sold well, but after the rice aid stopped they did not sell well.” Overall, Hyoun says that even though a majority of defectors oppose food aid, it is really hard to reach a consensus since the claims of aid-supporters are also very persuasive.
But one thing is clear, says Hyoun, “The food shortage cannot be solved until the demise of the current regime because the Kim Jong Il regime will not give up the collective farm system.” In addition, she explains that as North Korea has many mountainous areas that are not good for farming, and since the country does not have technologies or resources to increase productivity of farmland, “structurally it is impossible [for them] to feed themselves.”
While South Korea’s aid dilemma is not likely to be solved in short term, by all indications, hunger in North Korea is getting worse. According to the 2010 Global Hunger Index (GHI) published by International Food Policy Research Institute, 32 percent of North Koreans are undernourished, and North Korea is the only country in Asia in the last two decades that’s seen its GHI get worse. Since 1990, the North’s GHI has deteriorated by 20 percent, rising from 16.2 to 19.4, while the world’s overall score decreased, which means improved, by nearly 25 percent.
Hyoun suggests that the only way North Korea can survive is to open up its market to the outside world and develop industry, as in the South. However, she’s skeptical her prescription will be considered by Pyongyang. The regime is more likely to see the medicine as a poison, “the regime is afraid it will crumble,” she says.
