A Timetable
While initial demands by the students groups were unyielding, it’s possible that at this point, a sufficiently large proportion of protesters may accept a second-best option: promises by the government for a timetable to bring greater democracy to the nomination process.
“I think a significant number of people would not come out to the streets again if the government made a realistic promise and provided a timetable,” said Kist Chan, 25, a protester who demonstrated close knowledge of the constitutional questions at play and a strong commitment to the movement. He has been coming to Mong Kok and sleeping overnight for nearly a month.
Accepting a timetable is much less than the initial demand, but students have already backed away from earlier demands, which included the resignation of Leung Chun-ying, the chief executive, and the retraction of the National People’s Congress Standing Committee decision of Aug. 31, which set in place the framework that has frustrated so many here.
MORE: Hong Kong Uncensored: Police and Protesters Clash in Mong Kok
Rotten Apples
“You want me to pick an apple to eat, but you’ve only given me rotten ones to choose from,” said Chan, characterizing how the NPC decision made him feel. “There are good ones I can eat. Why do I want to eat a rotten one?”
“If they gave us a plan in which they laid out for us how they’re going to eventually give us the right to choose our own leaders, that would be OK. Even if they cheated us,” he said. “Right now, they won’t even cheat us.”
Another possibility, of course, is if Xi Jinping steps in to resolve the crisis himself directly.
An Executive Decision?
The potential for such an outcome may present itself after the Hong Kong government submits another report to the Chinese Communist Party—which Carrie Lam, the chief secretary, promised to do—that accurately reflected the public’s frustration and sentiments.
In this optimistic scenario, Xi Jinping and the top communist leadership could then use this as a cover to retract the original decision by the National People’s Congress Standing Committee, which is headed by Zhang Dejiang, an ally of Xi’s political opponent Jiang Zemin, a former leader of the Chinese regime.
Despite Xi Jinping’s sweeping anticorruption campaign and purge of powerful opponents, including Zhou Yongkang, the former security czar, and Xu Caihou, formerly the second most powerful officer in the military, he has not still not fully consolidated power over all parts of the Party and government apparatus.
This line of analysis has appeared in Hong Kong and overseas political journals, and appears to be accepted knowledge among the politically aware in Hong Kong. Some of Jiang Zemin’s holdouts, including Zhang Dejiang, are still able to pursue policies detrimental to Xi’s interests. Leung Chun-ying, the chief executive, is known to have ties to the broad political network associated with Jiang Zemin.
Xi Jinping’s own messaging on Hong Kong has not been as hardline as the Zhang camp. Li Keqiang, his premier, was believed to be communicating Xi’s views last month when Li said “the people of Hong Kong have the wisdom” to resolve the crisis.
After retracting and amending the original National People’s Congress decision, Xi could conceivably present another interpretation, not as absolute, of how candidates for the position of chief executive could be nominated. He could then sack the widely-loathed chief executive Leung Chun-ying, as a token to the protesters, for Leung’s unseemly business dealings that came to light in early October.
The result would surely still include a level of control and veto of candidates by Beijing, but the conciliatory gestures may be enough to defuse the crisis without bloodshed. This scenario, which right now seems rather far off, would of course require Hong Kong’s protesters to stay right where they are—out on the streets.
