Armenia’s Parliament has voted to ratify the Rome Statute—thereby endorsing the International Criminal Court (ICC)—in a move that’s sure to antagonize Russia, which has long viewed Armenia as a regional ally.
“The resolution [on ratification] has been approved,” Parliament Speaker Alen Simonyan said after the Oct. 3 vote, which was broadcast live online.
Sixty lawmakers voted in favor, while 22 voted against. If Armenia’s president approves the decision, it will officially come into effect after 60 days.
Earlier this year, The Hague-based ICC issued an arrest warrant for Russian President Vladimir Putin for alleged war crimes in Ukraine.
Moscow, which doesn’t recognize the court’s jurisdiction, vehemently rejects the allegation.
Armenian lawmakers who supported the decision insist it isn’t directed at Russia.
Rather, they claim, it’s meant to help Armenia prosecute war crimes allegedly committed by Azerbaijan, Armenia’s longstanding enemy.
Lawmakers who voted against the move, for their part, say the decision isn’t in Armenia’s interest and is meant to serve wider geopolitical goals.
Opponents of the move also accuse the government of Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan of jeopardizing Armenia’s decades-old alliance with Russia.
Since 1991, Armenia has been a member of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), a six-nation military alliance led by Moscow.
Ratification of the Rome Statute means that Armenia—despite its CSTO membership—would have to arrest Mr. Putin if he ever visits the country.
“Needless to say, we wouldn’t want there to be any reason for the [Russian] president to choose not to visit Armenia,” Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said when asked about the decision on Oct. 3.
On the same day, Russia’s TASS news agency cited an unnamed Foreign Ministry source who warned that the move would likely have “extremely negative implications” for Russian–Armenian relations.
Strained Ties
The move by Armenia comes against the backdrop of increasingly strained ties between Moscow and Yerevan, Armenia’s capital.In mid-September, Armenia hosted elements of the U.S. army for 10 days of joint military drills.
The exercises angered Moscow, which continues to view Armenia as an ally and considers the South Caucasus region as its backyard.
However, it was Armenia’s ongoing dispute with Azerbaijan over the flashpoint Nagorno-Karabakh region that brought the diplomatic crisis to a head.
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, Armenia has fought two major wars with Azerbaijan over the mountainous region.
While Nagorno-Karabakh is populated mainly by ethnic Armenians, it’s internationally recognized as part of Azerbaijan.
On Sept. 19, Azerbaijan carried out a successful military offensive to assert its control over Nagorno-Karabakh and disarm ethnic Armenian separatist groups.
The operation ended within 24 hours after separatist leaders agreed to a ceasefire deal brokered by Moscow.
At the time, Mr. Pashinyan repeated claims that Russia, which has had peacekeepers in the region since 2020, wasn’t doing enough to stop Azerbaijani “aggression.”
Following the offensive, ethnic Armenians began leaving Nagorno-Karabakh in droves, claiming that they feared persecution by the Azerbaijani authorities.
Mr. Pashinyan blamed the apparent humanitarian crisis on Russia’s peacekeeping contingent, which, he said, had “stood idly by” during Azerbaijan’s offensive.
On Sept. 24, Mr. Pashinyan said Armenia had decided to ratify the Rome Statute because its “strategic partnership” with Russia wasn’t enough “to ensure its external security.”
Russia’s Foreign Ministry described the remarks as “an attempt to shift responsibility for [Yerevan’s] domestic and foreign policy failures by placing the blame on Moscow.”
After the Oct. 3 parliamentary vote, Mr. Peskov likewise took issue with Mr. Pashinyan’s assertions.
“We absolutely disagree with the prime minister’s claim that Armenia’s decision to join the Rome Statute was due to the inadequacy of the CSTO and the Armenian–Russian partnership,” Mr. Peskov said.
“Most Armenians understand that the CSTO and the Armenian–Russian partnership are indispensable at this time.”
Moscow has also been quick to point out that Nagorno-Karabakh is internationally recognized—even by Mr. Pashinyan himself—as part of Azerbaijan.
Wooing Yerevan
Some Russian officials have claimed that Washington seeks to woo Armenia away from its alliance with Moscow with the aim of establishing a “foothold” in the South Caucasus.The claim appears to have some basis in fact.
At a Sept. 14 hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Yuri Kim, acting U.S. assistant secretary of state for European and Eurasian Affairs, openly called for stepped-up efforts to “persuade” Armenia to throw in its lot with the West.
Last week, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov claimed that “certain officials” in Yerevan—an obvious reference to Mr. Pashinyan—sought to put Armenia on a pro-Western course.
“There are many [in the Armenian government] who wish to lose Russia and make new friends,” Mr. Lavrov said.
On the eve of Armenia’s parliamentary vote, he addressed suggestions by Yerevan that Armenia could eventually decide to withdraw from the CSTO.
“If, as some Armenian leaders assert, having been disenchanted with Russia and the CSTO, they will now seek security partners elsewhere, this is their sovereign choice,” Mr. Lavrov said.
“I only hope the centuries-old relationship between the Russian and Armenian people won’t be destroyed by a temporary administration.”
