Coalition forces in Afghanistan are gearing up for their withdrawal, slated to begin in July. The gradual troop pullout has set the clock ticking for Afghan security forces. When the full pullout date arrives in 2014; fighting the Taliban and providing security for the country will be in their hands.
The commander of NATO and U.S. forces in Afghanistan, Army Gen. David Petraeus, said he is confident Afghan forces are up to the challenge, yet each step now is critical to the mission’s success. He outlined the situation to the House Armed Services Committee on March 16, according to the military’s American Forces Press Service (AFPS).
Experts typically agree that passing the bar to Afghan forces by 2014 is feasible, yet there are issues to be overcome.
“My main concern is that we’re going to declare victory and get out,” said Barry Searle, American Legion director of National Security and Foreign Relations, in a phone interview.
In order for operations to succeed in Afghanistan, the local military, police, and intelligence groups—broadly categorized as Afghan security forces—will need to hold their own. The Afghan people will also need to recognize the Afghan government for it to be stable, which ties into how secure they feel under the security forces.
Searle oversaw training of Afghan forces from 2007 to 2008 when he was the commander of Afghanistan’s Regional Coalition Assistance group East, with the embedded training teams.
During his work with Afghan forces, Searle said there were some units that were mature and ready, yet there were others—particularly in the police force—which still had a ways to go.
The disparity of readiness between teams is known. Afghan President Hamid Karzai will announce next week areas that are ready to transfer responsibility to the Afghanis, which will go according to conditions on the ground, according to AFPS. This ties both into which units are mature and which areas still require foreign troops.
Training has been difficult, as Afghanis had a difficult starting point. “You’re trying to teach them things in a matter of five or six years that took the United States and other nations hundreds of years to develop,” Searle said.
They have also had to unlearn what they were taught before. Many of the older Afghan commanders were trained by the Soviets, yet that system is night and day compared to the U.S. military’s structure.
Under the Soviets, the commanders call every shot from top to bottom, rather than having mid-level officers who can make on-the-fly decisions like in the U.S. military. “The Afghan army trained by the Russian army would say ‘well the commander said do X, and we’ll do X even if it doesn’t make sense,’” Searle said.
Sand and dust can be a worst enemy to guns and vehicles without maintenance, and the rough terrain coupled with remote locations means that getting new supplies to certain areas is costly.
Their vehicles and their weapons would be rusty, and there were things we had to do with that,” Searle said.
He recounted that in the winter, the diesel trucks would freeze up and Afghan forces would often start bonfires beneath the truck engines to get the oil moving. “You would walk around and see these diesel trucks and cargo trucks and you’d think they were on fire. Some things would just curl your hair,” he said.
Drew Berquist, former U.S. intelligence officer, and author of, “The Maverick Experiment,” echoed the concern.
“You might have a great unit who is in top notch for security ... but the logistics and the support personnel that are in place are a point of failure for them,” Berquist said in a phone interview.
He added that problems faced by Afghan forces are “the types of things that start to stack up and hurt what they’re doing,” and if coalition forces are pulling out “they’re going to need to improve on that.”
A problem is that with Humvees and troops moving throughout the country, Afghan civilians may have reservations recognizing the government as legitimate. Since the United States originally put Karzai in power, the Afghan people tend to connect the government to the foreign occupation.
If the full pullout will work, Berquist believes keeping U.S. Special Forces and intelligence personnel in the country will be necessary, so they “can continue to mentor these groups and work with them.”
A similar view is shared by Howard Gambrill Clark, author of “Revolt Against Al Qa'ida.” Clark is a former senior intelligence analyst for the Department of Homeland Security and led intelligence operations in Iraq with the CIA and Defense Intelligence Agency when he was a Marine officer.
His book is a policy recommendation for the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan. He states that the large military presence supports recruiting efforts of al-Qaeda and the Taliban, which are based around the concept that Islam is under attack. He suggests reducing the troop footprint and maintaining operations with Special Forces in order to cancel out the Taliban propaganda and end insurgency.
In the long run, this strategy could very well be chosen. Although it has not been stated what types of troops will remain, Defense Secretary Robert Gates suggested the United States may keep what the AFPS describes as a “greatly reduced force” in the country after 2014. He made the statement to troops at Bagram Airfield when he arrived in Afghanistan on March 7 to review progress.
“We are fully prepared to have a continuing presence here, assisting the Afghans after 2014,” Gates said, AFPS reported. “I think there is a desire on both sides to have some arrangement.”
Maintaining a small presence will mean, “We’re still making sure they’re doing the job, we’re making sure they’re not skimming money off the top, and we’re making sure that we’re getting intelligence and information as well,” Berquist said. “I think that as long as it works like that everyone will succeed in it.”
The commander of NATO and U.S. forces in Afghanistan, Army Gen. David Petraeus, said he is confident Afghan forces are up to the challenge, yet each step now is critical to the mission’s success. He outlined the situation to the House Armed Services Committee on March 16, according to the military’s American Forces Press Service (AFPS).
Experts typically agree that passing the bar to Afghan forces by 2014 is feasible, yet there are issues to be overcome.
“My main concern is that we’re going to declare victory and get out,” said Barry Searle, American Legion director of National Security and Foreign Relations, in a phone interview.
In order for operations to succeed in Afghanistan, the local military, police, and intelligence groups—broadly categorized as Afghan security forces—will need to hold their own. The Afghan people will also need to recognize the Afghan government for it to be stable, which ties into how secure they feel under the security forces.
Searle oversaw training of Afghan forces from 2007 to 2008 when he was the commander of Afghanistan’s Regional Coalition Assistance group East, with the embedded training teams.
During his work with Afghan forces, Searle said there were some units that were mature and ready, yet there were others—particularly in the police force—which still had a ways to go.
The disparity of readiness between teams is known. Afghan President Hamid Karzai will announce next week areas that are ready to transfer responsibility to the Afghanis, which will go according to conditions on the ground, according to AFPS. This ties both into which units are mature and which areas still require foreign troops.
Training has been difficult, as Afghanis had a difficult starting point. “You’re trying to teach them things in a matter of five or six years that took the United States and other nations hundreds of years to develop,” Searle said.
They have also had to unlearn what they were taught before. Many of the older Afghan commanders were trained by the Soviets, yet that system is night and day compared to the U.S. military’s structure.
Under the Soviets, the commanders call every shot from top to bottom, rather than having mid-level officers who can make on-the-fly decisions like in the U.S. military. “The Afghan army trained by the Russian army would say ‘well the commander said do X, and we’ll do X even if it doesn’t make sense,’” Searle said.
Poor Maintenance
Experts will speak in unison of Afghan forces not taking care of their equipment. “They would just beat things to pieces, throw it away, and ask for a new one,” Searle said, after a short bout of laughter.Sand and dust can be a worst enemy to guns and vehicles without maintenance, and the rough terrain coupled with remote locations means that getting new supplies to certain areas is costly.
Their vehicles and their weapons would be rusty, and there were things we had to do with that,” Searle said.
He recounted that in the winter, the diesel trucks would freeze up and Afghan forces would often start bonfires beneath the truck engines to get the oil moving. “You would walk around and see these diesel trucks and cargo trucks and you’d think they were on fire. Some things would just curl your hair,” he said.
Drew Berquist, former U.S. intelligence officer, and author of, “The Maverick Experiment,” echoed the concern.
“You might have a great unit who is in top notch for security ... but the logistics and the support personnel that are in place are a point of failure for them,” Berquist said in a phone interview.
He added that problems faced by Afghan forces are “the types of things that start to stack up and hurt what they’re doing,” and if coalition forces are pulling out “they’re going to need to improve on that.”
Read More . . . Experts Speak
A Sustained Presence
However, Berquist believes that the troop pullout may be the best thing for Afghanistan. He said U.S. and foreign troops having a smaller footprint in the country would take pressure off the Karzai administration and the Afghan people.A problem is that with Humvees and troops moving throughout the country, Afghan civilians may have reservations recognizing the government as legitimate. Since the United States originally put Karzai in power, the Afghan people tend to connect the government to the foreign occupation.
If the full pullout will work, Berquist believes keeping U.S. Special Forces and intelligence personnel in the country will be necessary, so they “can continue to mentor these groups and work with them.”
A similar view is shared by Howard Gambrill Clark, author of “Revolt Against Al Qa'ida.” Clark is a former senior intelligence analyst for the Department of Homeland Security and led intelligence operations in Iraq with the CIA and Defense Intelligence Agency when he was a Marine officer.
His book is a policy recommendation for the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan. He states that the large military presence supports recruiting efforts of al-Qaeda and the Taliban, which are based around the concept that Islam is under attack. He suggests reducing the troop footprint and maintaining operations with Special Forces in order to cancel out the Taliban propaganda and end insurgency.
In the long run, this strategy could very well be chosen. Although it has not been stated what types of troops will remain, Defense Secretary Robert Gates suggested the United States may keep what the AFPS describes as a “greatly reduced force” in the country after 2014. He made the statement to troops at Bagram Airfield when he arrived in Afghanistan on March 7 to review progress.
“We are fully prepared to have a continuing presence here, assisting the Afghans after 2014,” Gates said, AFPS reported. “I think there is a desire on both sides to have some arrangement.”
Maintaining a small presence will mean, “We’re still making sure they’re doing the job, we’re making sure they’re not skimming money off the top, and we’re making sure that we’re getting intelligence and information as well,” Berquist said. “I think that as long as it works like that everyone will succeed in it.”
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