Chapter 12: A Peaceful Demonstration as the Falun Turns; a Rising Storm Gathers in China (1st Half of 1999)
The year 1999 proved to be a troubled one for China.The Balkan Peninsula had always been regarded as a “powder keg,” and it was in 1999 that a fateful spark was finally ignited. The Serbian army that year slaughtered thousands of Albanian civilians in a wave of ethnic cleansing, forcing more than 1.5 million Albanians to flee their homeland. As described by the refugees, massacres took place in at least 75 cities and villages in Kosovo. More than 5,000 ethnic Albanians were eliminated in mass executions.
While the international community was outraged over Slobodan Milosevic’s genocidal crimes, the people of China had little idea of what had happened. China’s state-controlled media only allowed, as usual, one voice—that of the Party—and that voice told not the plight of the Albanians. The United Nations didn’t intervene militarily in the matter owing to protest by China and Russia. In the end it was NATO—led by the United States—that, out of humanitarian considerations, launched an air raid on Yugoslavia. The move took place on March 24, 1999.
The 2nd Session of the 9th National People’s Congress (NPC) had concluded two weeks before the air raid. In a NPC press conference, Premier Zhu Rongji said of his upcoming visit to the U.S., “Since you [the U.S.] are angry, I wish to visit so as to dispel the anger you feel.” However, with NATO air raids having begun, if Zhu Rongji went to the U.S. and made significant concessions on the matter of the WTO (to which China then sought admittance), it would be hard to pacify the nationalistic sentiment that had been stirred up among the general populace of China; people wouldn’t settle for a compromise. Were he not to go, though, a golden opportunity might be missed.
The Politburo held a meeting to discuss expressly this issue. Both Li Peng and Qian Qichen were against Zhu Rongji’s visit to the U.S. They thought his “appeasement diplomacy” amounted to begging for favors and showing weakness. However, Jiang Zemin urged Zhu to leave for the U.S. as scheduled. If the negotiations with the U.S. on WTO accession were to succeed, Jiang—as the General Secretary of the CCP—would naturally get credit. It would be an achievement during the Jiang Zemin era written into history. Were the negotiations to fail, it would stand to deflate Zhu’s arrogance—a prospect Jiang welcomed, as Zhu’s substantial contributions at the time jeopardized Jiang’s standing. Some of Jiang’s conversations with aids and staff indicated that he would rather Zhu return having failed.
If it weren’t for the fact that Jiang needed Zhu to clean up the mess that was then China’s economy, Jiang would never have utilized Zhu. Jiang had been envious of Zhu’s charisma since as early as the pair’s Shanghai days. When Zhu met with the press or spoke at meetings, he would say something sincere, which others found stirring. Zhu’s words were not only more honest than Jiang’s, but more upright and caring. He was even liked by the attractive female reporters from Hong Kong and Taiwan.
Zhu’s attitude was evident. He knew that the agriculture, telecommunication, and finance industries of China would be hurt by China’s joining the WTO. Moreover, given the low efficiency of the state enterprises, many enterprises would go bankrupt if fair competition were to be allowed. Zhu thus didn’t want to make too many concessions in his negotiations with the U.S. Jiang instructed him otherwise, however, saying, “I think we can consent to the U.S. demands in the agricultural product agreement between China and the U.S. and in the telecommunication and finance related items. As soon as you arrive in the U.S. you will announce that you agree to sign the agricultural cooperation agreement. I believe we can reach a tacit understanding with Clinton, and we can agree to the other things later on. Try to brilliantly win a political battle.”
Zhu’s “appeasement diplomacy” suffered great setbacks. Since the United States didn’t consider China a market economy, it proposed many additional terms. It was largely impossible for China to sign the WTO agreement before Zhu returned to China. Although every concession Zhu made was approved by Jiang, the CCP’s senior statesmen were unhappy with Zhu’s concessions. Qiao Shi, who seldom spoke out about anything, was outraged upon learning of the role Jiang had played, and said, “National interests are first and foremost. They should never be forgotten at any time or in any circumstance.” Party veterans such as Wan Li and Song Ping even called the agreements a “new Twenty-One Demands.” [1] Upon seeing their reactions, Jiang played a trick and replied to the criticism with a Chinese proverb, “When a general is away, even the emperor’s orders may sometimes not be obeyed.” [2] Jiang seamlessly shifted all the blame to Zhu Rongji.
Zhu returned to China from his U.S. visit on April 21. So as to avoid seeing Zhu, Jiang went to Hubei with staff of the General Office of the CCP’s Central Committee to attend a meeting. He also instructed Li Lanqing to leave for Liaoning. When Zhu returned he received a rather cold and cheerless welcome. In a Politburo meeting that followed, Jiang turned toward Zhu and disdainfully questioned him, “In the negotiation why did you go beyond the bottom line set before by the Politburo?” In Zhu’s presence he praised Wu Yi, who had traveled to the U.S. with Zhu, saying, “Comrade Wu Yi was courageous to hold her ground and refuse to compromise her principles while making deals.” The remarks greatly embarrassed Zhu.
Jiang was filled with a sense of exaltation upon seeing Zhu’s eminence dashed to such a degree.
There appears to be a pattern whereby the CCP goes through something tumultuous in each year that ends with the number “9.” In 1949 the CCP fought the remainder of a civil war and established its regime. In 1959 it suppressed the Tibetan “rebellion” (as it was misleadingly called) and started a war with India. In 1969 it fought a battle with the Soviet Union. In 1979 there was the Sino-Vietnamese War. In 1989 the CCP first suppressed a so-called Tibetan “riot” and then, on June 4, there was the Tiananmen Square Massacre of student activists. In 1999 the CCP launched its suppression of Falun Gong.
The matter of Falun Gong calls for a certain amount of explanation. Outsiders typically have two misconceptions about the practice. First, many think that when Jiang Zemin initiated the suppression of Falun Gong he, as with other top CCP officials, knew little about the group. This is not accurate in the least, however. Secondly, many think that the suppression started in 1999 and that prior to that the CCP had been at peace with Falun Gong. This was not exactly the case, either, however. The fact is, China’s top Party officials learned about Falun Gong very early on and were quite clear about what the practice is. It was merely that some persons sought to stir up problems with the group, with the result that a number of complications came about.
Sometime before 1996 a Falun Gong practitioner in the Purple Bamboo Park area went to Jiang Zemin’s home to teach Jiang’s wife, Wang Yeping, the exercises.
Luo Gan similarly had heard of Falun Gong early on. In 1995, in fact, Luo’s former supervisor and colleagues in the Academy of Mechanical Sciences introduced him to Falun Gong.
Hu Jintao, China’s current leader, learned about Falun Gong no later than 1998. Zhang Mengye, his former classmate at Tsinghua University, had at one time suffered from cirrhosis of the liver and liver ascites. Zhang’s face turned dark and dropsical, and the hospital pronounced there was no hope of survival. But by taking up the practice of Falun Gong Zhang managed to escape from the jaws of death. When Tsinghua classmates gathered at alumni reunions in 1998 and 1999, Zhang attended both, healthy as ever, and personally shared with Hu his experience of recovery. Zhang also mailed the books of Falun Gong to Hu Jintao’s wife in hopes that the couple might in kind come to enjoy better health. Hu’s wife sent a postcard to Zhang wishing to express the couple’s gratitude. The 1999 alumni reunion happened to be on April 25—the day 10,000 followers of Falun Gong gathered in demonstration at the State Letters and Complaints Bureau near Zhongnanhai. Hu and his wife saw the dramatic scene on their way back to Zhongnanhai from the alumni party. Hu afterwards passed on word to Zhang, via a mutual classmate in Beijing, to be careful.
On Feb. 9, 1995, the Falun Gong Research Society of China submitted three detailed reports to China’s Scientific Qigong Research Association (and carbon copied them to other relevant departments). One of the reports responded factually to each and every false charge in the defamatory letters written by the eight from Changchun. Many leaders were surprised upon learning the truth of the matter. They responded, “Falun Gong is actually so good. Why didn’t you contact us earlier? We didn’t know about you. Please keep us posted in the future.” And that ended the 1994 episode of the defamatory materials.
The attempted 1996 suppression of Falun Gong thus fizzled out before it got off the ground, the main reason being that, in addition to the above presence, relevant government offices received hundreds of thousands of letters of support from the public describing what Falun Gong was about. Luo Gan then attempted twice—once in 1997 and again in 1998—to suppress Falun Gong on grounds that it was a “heretical cult.” This was not because, notably, Falun Gong had done something wrong. Instead, it was because Luo had been appointed Secretary of the Commission on Political and Legal Affairs, which was about as high of a rank as he could reach at the time, and as such he needed to do something impressive if he wished to gain further promotion. Just as servicemen are most esteemed in times of war, Luo wanted to muddy the waters of his country so as to himself become—as the Secretary of the Commission on Political and Legal Affairs—the political focus of things.
The two investigations conducted by Luo did, however, have severe, adverse consequences for Falun Gong in some areas. For example, the Public Security Bureau in Chaoyang City of Liaoning Province issued in 1998 a certain Document No. 37, titled “Notice on Forbidding Illegal Activities of Falun Gong.” The item was sent to its subsidiary public security branches. Some of Falun Gong’s volunteer helpers [3] were fined multiple times, with total fines in excess of 4,000 yuan; no receipts, or only unofficial receipts, were given. More than 40 people went to the Ministry of Public Security to petition authorities on the matter. More than 1,000 persons submitted a joint complaint to Chaoyang Public Security Bureau on grounds that the bureau’s actions were unlawful and violated citizens’ rights. In other areas, such as Xinjiang, Heilongjiang, Hebei, and Fujian Provinces, local public security offices used force to disperse people who had gathered in public to do the exercises of Falun Gong. They unlawfully ransacked adherents’ homes, broke into private residences, and confiscated personal property.
Upon learning of what Luo had done, Zhu Rongji had reprimanded Luo, accusing him of “using the most advanced spy tactics to deal with common people, instead of focusing on more major and serious matters.” Luo was quite dejected by this. Unremorseful, Luo banked on his good relationship with Jiang Zemin and dared to withhold a positive memo on Falun Gong written by Zhu, stopping it from being passed down to subsidiary departments.
In May 1998, Luo Gan’s brother-in-law, He Zuoxiu, fomented an incident involving Beijing Television. He Zuoxiu rigged up a story about Falun Gong for a program run on Beijing TV, called Beijing Express. He told the reporter that a Ph.D. student at the Chinese Academy of Sciences had developed psychosis as a result of practicing Falun Gong. While the student did exhibit abnormal behavior, it in fact had nothing to do with Falun Gong. This was something He Zuoxiu knew, as the student’s roommates and classmates had explained the matter to him. But He went ahead with plans and, fully aware of the truth of the matter, proceeded to frame up Falun Gong on the television program. Many persons who had benefited from the practice of Falun Gong went in response, acting of their own accord, to Beijing Television to explain the truth of the matter. One person at the station, a deputy director, noticed the peacefulness of the group. Upon learning the truth of things he decided at once to produce another program, this time to undo the negative impact of the erroneous story. The issue was resolved satisfactorily.
While He Zuoxiu is known as an “academician of two academies,” [4] he would be more accurately described as a political opportunist. He is good at passing himself off as a statesman while in the company of scientists and a scientist while in the company of politicians. He is extremely skilled in critiquing genuine science on politically-informed ideological grounds. He won favor with the section chief responsible for scientific affairs in the Central Ministry of Propaganda for promoting the theory of “the class nature of the natural sciences,” and was transferred to the Central Ministry of Propaganda after graduating from college so that he could do work in ideological propaganda. He thus rode high just about everywhere in scientific and technical circles despite having limited knowledge.
A few examples are illustrative. Frederick Kekule discovered benzene’s ring structure at the beginning of the 20th century. During the next several decades, however, chemists failed to explain why benzene was structured as it was. Later, Linus Pauling, a Nobel laureate in chemistry, established the Resonance Theory, which offered a convincing explanation to the Kekule Model. This was the beginning of the application of quantum theory to structural chemistry. He Zuoxiu, however, accused the proven Kekule Model of being a “manifestation of compromise of social classes in the scientific world.” Hundreds of structural chemistry experts in China were thus, at He’s proclamation, implicated and forced to write statements of “self-criticism” detailing their purportedly “capitalist leanings.” Quantum theory research in China was thus dealt a severe setback from which it would not soon recover.
Nobort Wiener was a well known Jewish academic who once taught at Tsinghua University in Beijing. In 1965 Wiener discovered through research that a hawk seldom missed when snaring a rabbit owing to a feedback system in the hawk’s brain; hawks could adjust as often as needed their flight trajectory in response to the location and speed of the rabbit being pursued. If a similar system were installed in an anti-aircraft gun, the chances of hitting a target would be vastly improved. Wiener came to believe that there were traits in common between the biological world and that of man-made artifice. But He Zuoxiu, meanwhile, held that from the perspective of the CCP’s doctrine of “class struggle,” different social classes fundamentally could not reconcile with one another, let alone could animate and inanimate entities. He and others again banished many scientists on these political grounds, claiming them to have wrongly identified with a theory that recognized “the reconciliation of social classes.”
The State Sports Administration carried out a comprehensive investigation of Falun Gong in May 1998. To support the investigation, in September of that year a team of medical experts conducted a survey of 12,553 Falun Gong practitioners in Guangdong Province. The survey found that overall Falun Gong was effective in improving the health and/or fitness levels of 97.9 percent of those involved. Meanwhile, on Oct. 20, the head of a research team that was dispatched to the northern cities of Changchun and Harbin by the State Sports Administration said in a speech explaining its team’s findings, “We believe the exercises and efficacy of Falun Gong are both excellent. It has achieved remarkable results in improving society’s stability and moral ethics. This should be amply affirmed.” During the same period of time, an investigation of Falun Gong conducted by non-governmental organizations in Dalian City, Beijing, and other places arrived at similar results.
In the latter half of 1998, several retired senior officials of the National People’s Congress, with comrade Qiao Shi as the head, launched their own investigation into Falun Gong upon receiving a large volume of letters from the general public telling of public security agents mistreating them (at Luo Gan’s instigation) for their practice of Falun Gong. The investigation concluded that “Falun Gong has many benefits and does nothing to harm the state or the people.” It was submitted to the Politburo—headed by Jiang Zemin—towards the end of 1998.
Many followers of Falun Gong felt, after seeing the piece, that unless its irresponsible (and dishonest) claims were straightened out, not only might it effect the loss of legal rights for the group, but further drag the body of practitioners into the unpleasant political battles instigated by persons with ulterior motives. Thereupon several thousand followers of the practice went of their own accord to see the editorial department of the journal and talk about the matter. Several were given an audience with the editors. But just as the group was about to end what had been a calm and rational meeting and the publisher, moreover, was ready to publish a correction, the Tianjin City government suddenly dispatched riot police to disperse those who had gathered outside the office. A total of 45 Falun Gong practitioners were beaten and arrested. Media outside of China astutely identified Luo Gan as the figure behind the violent measures. The Tianjin municipal government then told those present that the order to quell the crowd had come from Beijing, and thus encouraged the group to go to Beijing to report the matter.
News of the incident quickly reached Beijing. The persons then in charge of the Beijing Falun Gong Research Society—among whom were Li Chang, Wang Zhiwen, and Ji Liewu—discussed the situation and decided to lodge an appeal with the State Letters and Complaints Bureau on April 25. Those who heard about the decision contacted one another, with the result being some 10,000 persons appearing at the State Letters and Complaints Bureau—located adjacent to Zhongnanhai—that day. The episode, known among Chinese speakers as “the April 25th event,” astonished persons everywhere.
At the time, Zhu Rongji had just returned from his visit to the United States. Zhu—who was himself twice ostracized under Mao—by all appearances regarded the group’s effort to petition the government in a positive light. He saw it as a sign of trust in the government. And just one year before he had himself written a positive valuation of Falun Gong. So it was that Zhu did something in stark contrast to the CCP’s manner of handling petitioners—the usual being not making contact, not dialoguing, and not making compromises. Zhu came out of the Zhongnanhai complex to meet in person with the gathered crowd.
Zhu told representatives of the group, “You are entitled to freedom of belief! If you have any future problems, you can send representatives here to report them. Come with me into Zhongnanhai and let’s talk about this.” Zhu paused for a moment and then continued, “I can’t possibly talk to so many of you all together!”
As the Falun Gong group had come on something of a spontaneous, unplanned decision, most of those present didn’t know each other and nobody had been selected to act as representatives. Zhu thus picked the first three practitioners who raised their hands. As Zhu turned and led the three to towards the west gate of Zhongnanhai, he asked in a loud voice, “Didn’t I write an instruction on the issues you reported to me before?”
The practitioners were stunned. One replied, “We haven’t seen any instructions from you.” It was then that Zhu may have realized his instructions had been shelved.
Zhu quickly changed the topic. “I‘ll get the director of the State Letters and Complaints Bureau to speak to you. I’ll have the deputy Secretary-General talk with you as well.” As Zhu said this he turned to his staff and asked them to find the two figures.
The requests the Falun Gong petitioners presented that day were simple. One was that the Tianjin government release the fellow practitioners it had just detained. The second was that freedom to practice Falun Gong be ensured. The third was to once again allow Falun Gong books to be published in China. Zhu Rongji instructed the Tianjin government to release the detainees at once.
The conversations that took place inside Zhongnanhai weren’t all that smooth, however. Luo Gan (then the Secretary of the Committee of Political Science and Law), Wang Gang (Deputy Director of the General Office of the Central Committee of the CCP), Jia Chunwang (Minister of Public Security), Cui Zhanfu (Deputy Secretary-General of the State Council), and Meng Xuenong (Deputy Mayor of Beijing) took part in the dialogue with Falun Gong representatives. They made no promises in the discussion, because for one, Jiang Zemin hadn’t told them the bottom line as to how to handle the meeting, and secondly, Luo Gan wanted to find fault with Falun Gong. Later Li Chang (an official at the Ministry of Public Security) along with Wang Youqun (an official in the Ministry of Supervision) and three others came to Zhongnanhai to join the dialogue.
Some 10,000 Falun Gong waited quietly outside Zhongnanhai as representatives of the group discussed inside with staff from the State Council. The dialogue ended not until after 8:00 p.m. Upon learning then of the release of those detained in Tianjin, the crowd outside the compound quietly left the scene. Not a piece of paper was left behind. The group had gone out of its way to keep the site clean and orderly.
International media portrayed in a positive light both the Falun Gong demonstrators (for their composure) and the government (for its open-mindedness). The event was seen as the first nonviolent, rational dialogue to have taken place between officials and the public since the CCP had come to power. There was no precedent for something like this in the Party’s history.
Had the tensions between Falun Gong and the state ended on this note, it would have undoubtedly been a win-win situation. But there was one figure in particular who would have it otherwise. So otherwise, that is, he flew into a rage. That person was Jiang Zemin.
Jiang Zemin’s jealousy towards the founder of Falun Gong, Li Hongzhi, dated back some time. As early as 1993 Jiang heard often about Li.
There was a certain person who was close to Jiang who was very enthused about Falun Gong and knew a thing or two about the practice. Each time he came back from Falun Gong activities that he had participated in he would tell Jiang things such as “so-and-so was quite sick but fully recovered after taking up the practice” or how “so-and-so had to be carried [due to illness] into the auditorium [where Li gave a talk], but was able to walk out unassisted.” Occasionally the associate would say things to the effect that Master Li revealed that somebody was a high-ranking official in his previous life. Jiang grew ever more anxious upon hearing such things, for he wanted to know who he himself was in his last life. One day while Jiang was napping in bed, eyes closed, he heard that friend enter. Jiang sprung from his bed and anxiously asked, “Did Master Li talk about me? Did he tell who I was in my previous life?” He told with regret that Master Li had never said a word about Jiang. The mixture of disappointment and anger that showed on Jiang’s face made a deep impression on those present.
In 1994 Wang Yeping, Jiang’s wife, was herself practicing Falun Gong. One evening when she was doing the practice’s exercises she sensed that someone was mirroring her movements. She opened her eyes to discover that it was none other than Jiang by her side, surreptitiously emulating the movements. His hands crossed before the abdomen, just as did hers. Jiang was both embarrassed and angry when he saw Wang had caught on to him. It was at that point that Jiang ordered his wife to stop practicing Falun Gong. He said, “Even my wife believes in Li Hongzhi. Who’s going to believe in me, the General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party!”
At the time Jiang loved to imitate Li’s gestures and movements. The most typical position he used was that of the hands crossed before the abdomen. Jiang had used to let his hands dangle at the side when he spoke in public, but later, after finding that Li usually kept his hands folded in front of the abdomen, he followed suit.
When Jiang was inspecting a dike during the 1998 flood he happened upon a group of citizens toiling away as part of the relief effort. Jiang felt a sense of pride seeing them, and told his subordinates, “These people must be Party members.” He greeted the group, only to learn that they were students of Falun Gong. Jiang burned with jealousy. He turned his back to the group and left, his countenance sullen.
If these incidents were merely annoying to Jiang, then the events of April 25 were downright frightening.
Jiang was a part of the Tiananmen Square massacre as well as its biggest beneficiary. When in the spring of 1999 the 10th anniversary of the Massacre was approaching Jiang, it is believed, worried that the mass demonstrations of 10 years before would repeat. The Massacre not only left Jiang with power as the “core” of the “red dynasty,” [6] but also a profound lesson: that he must suppress a movement while still in its embryonic stages, lest suppression at a later stage—which comes at a much higher price—be necessary.
It was thus that Jiang, on this day in April 1999, promptly called the Beijing garrison force and asked whether the army stationed in Beijing could immediately march to the scene of Zhongnanhai and drive off via force the surrounding Falun Gong adherents; this was to be done on the condition they didn’t disperse by midnight. The one who answered the phone declared at once, “The Beijing Military Region is prepared to follow Chairman Jiang’s orders at any time.” Jiang was most satisfied. He felt less on edge at hearing this. Later Jiang would promote the person several ranks.
The afternoon of the gathering Jiang called You Xigui, Director of the Central Guard Bureau, and told him to enact martial law as soon as possible. Jiang said he wanted to come out and personally “inspect” the scene.
Jiang then went about “inspecting” the scene from behind the tinted glass of a bulletproof passenger vehicle, in which he rode. Outside, in front of the Falun Gong demonstrators was the cordon set up expressly for Jiang’s inspection. In Jiang’s eyes, that so many people practiced Falun Gong meant it was competing with the Party for the masses; that Falun Gong students adopted a peaceful and reasonable means of demonstration owed to their having a tight organization; and that the Falun Gong group would come to Zhongnanhai was taken as an open challenge to Jiang. What drove his irritation especially was that he saw at least a few dozen servicemen bearing military insignia who apparently followed Falun Gong instead of, as he saw it, himself—the Chairman of the Military Commission of the CCP.
Coupled with this was the fact that international media reported in a positive light on both parties involved in the event, which undoubtedly bolstered the merits of Zhu Rongji. This only served to fan the flames of Jiang’s jealousy.
In October 1994, the CCP formally announced in its 4th Plenary Meeting that the “second generation” of the CCP leadership group had completed its transfer of power to the third. Following the meeting Jiang fought, with the assistance of Zeng Qinghong, several successful political battles. The first involved ousting Beijing mayor Chen Xitong, after which Jiang then consolidated his power in the military. Soon, with the passing of Chen Yun and Deng Xiaoping and the return of Hong Kong to China, Jiang had an ever more firm foothold in the Central Committee.
All the same, Jiang lacked the boldness of a Mao Zedong, who often set himself up as the king of the world. Neither did Jiang have the weight of a Deng Xiaoping, who was decisive. Every important issue Jiang faced had to be discussed and approved by the Politburo or the Standing Committee of the Politburo. Jiang came to see that the Falun Gong was a pacifist group that made a practice of turning the other cheek, and as such he thought that in Falun Gong he had found a non-threatening rival. He thus came to believe that he could, by way of suppressing the group, force all figures in the Party to take a stand. He could finally see who was really on his side. What Jiang had in mind was a classic case of Zhao Gao “calling a stag a horse.” [7]
Although there was no compelling evidence for Jiang to marshal, he nonetheless put everything at his disposal into portraying Falun Gong as a “dangerous” political group that was supported by “hostile overseas forces.” This imbued with much larger significance what was in reality a personal vendetta against Falun Gong, turning it into a matter of survival for the Party. So if Jiang’s decision to suppress the group was seen as an act to “save the Party at a critical moment,” he would surely enjoy an important place in the history of the Party and encounter little opposition to the plan. Jiang believed that he could swiftly eliminate Falun Gong within but three months, thinking that the means of suppression the Party had gathered in past political movements were more than enough to destroy any man’s will. Jiang’s grand plans counted on a successful, risk-free suppression, from which he would amass an enviable amount of political capital within the Party.
Taking a page from Mao—who launched the Cultural Revolution in 1966 with a letter, titled “Bombard the central command”—Jiang wrote a letter to the Politburo the evening of April 25 without so much as consulting a soul. He pretended to be gripped with anxiety in his letter, writing, “Can’t the Marxist theory of our Communist Party and the materialism and atheism in which we believe defeat that stuff Falun Gong propagates?”
To garner support for his decision among members of the Standing Committee, Jiang posed in his letter, “Might [Falun Gong] in fact have connections with overseas and Western forces? Might it have been manipulated and directed by a ’master hand' at work behind the scenes? This is a new signal, and we must pay great heed. The sensitive period is fast approaching. We must take efficient measures at once to strictly prevent similar events from unfolding.” Jiang then added, “We cannot underestimate the appeal of religious organizations such as Falun Gong. The relevant departments must strengthen their research and formulate precautionary measures. Since Falun Gong is headquartered outside China, we should not exclude the possibility that this event was orchestrated by overseas forces.”
The letter was later printed and distributed as a notice from the General Office of the Central Committee of the CCP. It stated in particular that, “Please note that this notice is distributed by the General Office of the Central Committee and to be studied and implemented; it is not meant to solicit opinions or for discussion and exploration.”
The day after the events of April 25, Luo Gan, Jia Qinglin, and members of the Standing Committee of the Politburo held a meeting to discuss how the issue should be handled. Jiang had a ghastly look on his face when he entered the meeting room. He pulled out a bundle of materials, heaved them onto the table, and barked, “Who said no clues could be found as to the Falun Gong practitioners gathering at Zhongnanhai? There was a notice on the Internet telling Falun Gong practitioners to gather at Zhongnanhai. Over 20,000 who live in all different places entered Beijing by ‘breaking the whole into parts’ and encircled Zhongnanhai in one day—a well organized event. And yet the public security departments knew nothing of it beforehand. Such dereliction of duty cannot be allowed again!” Jiang turned and looked at Luo Gan. He said with a stern voice, matching his glare, “Our security department and the Beijing municipal government were so dense. Our power is in jeopardy and yet they sensed nothing. Comrades, this is just horrible. If we don’t learn our lesson, how can we guarantee this won’t happen again and again?”
From that time on Jiang began to pretend he had never heard of Falun Gong before. He would make remarks such as, “When I heard the words ‘Falun Gong,’ other than thinking the term a little odd, I didn’t know what kind of organization it was, how it came about, or who was its leader.”
Of the seven members of the Standing Committee of the Politburo, all but Jiang openly expressed objection to the idea of a suppression. Zhu Rongji said, “Most of the Falun Gong adherents are middle-aged or older people, and women at that. Their biggest aspiration is no more than to become healthy and fit. One practitioner said, ‘Now our company doesn’t reimburse our medical expenses. Falun Gong can make a person stronger and healthier—what’s wrong with it? And so many workers are laid off now. Falun Gong can improve people’s moral character. Such people never cause trouble and surpass model citizens. Why wouldn’t the government support an activity that’s so good?’ So I don’t think it is reasonable to say these people have political motives. Moreover, we shouldn’t solve ideological problems by means of a [Mao-style] political campaign. It’s detrimental to our greater goal of economic development, and even more harmful to the image of our country as being open. If there are any bad apples among the Falun Gong, then sure, we should deal with them. But let’s allow the ordinary practicing populace to just be.”
Jiang immediately stood up, pointed at Zhu’s nose, and shouted, “Foolish! Foolish! Foolish! That would spell the demise of the Party and the country! I’m so distressed that our comrades lack political consciousness. If we don’t solve the Falun Gong problem right away we are making a mistake of historical proportions!”
“So what does the General Secretary suggest we do?” Luo Gan asked cautiously.
“Exterminate it! Exterminate it! Decisively exterminate it!” Jiang flailed his hands, shouting. “The priority right now is to determine Falun Gong’s population, distribution, and who is in charge. Every organization or institution, every company and every resident’s committee must be investigated. Comrades, Falun Gong is competing with us for the masses. We must understand this issue as a political one—as one that involves the very existence of the Party and the nation. We must thoroughly investigate it and show zero tolerance!”
Throughout the Politburo meeting Jiang leaped up and down, shouting himself blue in the face. Other members of the Standing Committee grew silent seeing Jiang so hysterical.
Actually Jiang had another reason for suppressing Falun Gong that he didn’t articulate. It was that Qiao Shi supported Falun Gong.
Qiao Shi retired after the CCP’s 15th National Congress in 1997. It was he who disclosed to the world the secret that Deng Xiaoping had appointed Hu Jintao as the core of the “fourth generation” leadership group. That was to say, it dictated that Jiang must retire after the 16th National Congress and could only pass his position on to Hu Jintao. No matter how badly Jiang might have wanted to renew his term of office or choose his own successor, he wouldn’t be able to. On this account alone Jiang was against anything Qiao supported. For instance, Yang Shangkun and his brother Yang Baibing had promoted 100 mid- and high-ranking military officers. Some of them didn’t belong to Yang Shangkun’s faction and were promoted only for their outstanding work abilities. Jiang, in narrow-minded fashion, made sure that every one of the group was later demoted. For example, He Qizong became a deputy Chief of Staff at the age of 42. But merely on grounds that he was held in high-esteem by the Yang’s, Jiang sent He to the Nanjing Military Region as a mere deputy Commander, his rank was reduced. He would never be promoted again.
That same narrow thinking was behind Jiang’s desire to suppress Falun Gong and utterly wipe out the group. It had to do with Qiao’s support.
Qiao not only concluded in 1998 that “Falun Gong has many benefits and does nothing to harm the state or the people,” but in connection to the matter mentioned the Chinese adage that “whoever wins the support of the people wins the world; whoever loses the support of the people loses the world.” This only upset Jiang further. He then dashed off a comment, the main point of which was, “The report [by Qiao] was vague in its contents. I don’t understand it.” He forwarded the report to Luo Gan. Luo Gan understood Jiang’s intention, and it was thus that he constantly sought, with the excuse that Falun Gong had a “foreign political background,” to create problems for the group and attribute blame to it.
Li Ruihuan strongly opposed the suppression of Falun Gong and expressed his objection on many different occasions. Sadly he had no organizational support and occupied the largely powerless position of Chairman of the Political Consultative Conference, so his words carried no weight. A popular jingle circulating in China listed out the top four examples of idleness: the tycoon’s wife, [8] the leader’s money, [9] the laid-off workers, and Li Ruihuan.
Jiang Zemin and Zeng Qinghong knew the huge political role that the intelligence system could play in both seizing and consolidating power and attacking those with dissenting views. For this reason they all along made an effort to control tightly the Ministry of State Security.
After Jiang seized the position of General Secretary of the CCP, he established, so as to control the Ministry, a “team to study central policies” that would direct the Ministry in its collecting of information. In 1997 Zeng became an alternate member of the Politburo and Minister of the Organizational Department, and then arranged for someone from his faction to become the Minister of State Security. Jiang and Zeng thus managed to gain a tight grip on the Ministry and could use it in the direct service of their own political agenda.
The jealousy Jiang felt toward the popular Falun Gong ultimately blotted out his faculties of reason, and he grew bent on suppressing the group. The other six members of the Standing Committee didn’t concur with Jiang, however, feeling Jiang’s dislike was groundless. With Zeng’s help Jiang came up with an effective way to force the other committee members over to his side. The two would use the Ministry of State Security to fabricate alleged “evidence” that could justify a program of suppression. Soon special agents of the Ministry stationed in the United States sent back the falsified information Zeng and Jiang sought. They claimed that the founder of Falun Gong was supported by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and that the institution had furnished Falun Gong with tens of millions of dollars. This “significant information about the enemy,” as it was called, was passed on to China’s top authorities through the Ministry of State Security. The other members of the Politburo couldn’t determine the veracity of the report.
Back in 1992, just before the CCP’s 14th National Congress was to take place, Jiang and Zeng had conspired to instruct people on spreading rumors throughout Beijing alleging that Yang Shangkun and Yang Baibing were attempting to “seize military power” and “redress the Tiananmen Massacre.” The rumors played a key role in misleading Deng Xiaoping, who later removed the Yang brothers from the Central Military Commission; it was that move which allowed Jiang to consolidate his position in the military. The CIA story was thus more of the same tricks from Jiang and Zeng.
The CCP had over the years always guarded itself against and both feared and hated what it thought of as “hostile forces.” So it was that Jiang, acting on the “conclusive evidence” from overseas, claimed that Falun Gong would “spell the demise of the Party and the country” and must be suppressed at all costs. As a result of Jiang’s conniving, the issue was inflated to one concerning the welfare of the Party and the nation. Nothing does the CCP fear as much as its demise. And nobody wanted on his hands the responsibility of the nation’s demise. How could the members of the Standing Committee now dare to oppose Jiang’s suppression? Jiang thus managed to “unify” the group’s viewpoints and start up the CCP’s violent, suppressive machinery with Falun Gong as its target. With the rumor they began, via the Ministry of State Security, about Falun Gong being supported by the CIA, Jiang and Zeng managed to mislead not only the people of China but many a foreigner as well. For example, the French have always been spiteful of America’s leading position in the Western world and have often been in competition with the U.S. So it was that the French at first blindly believed the CCP’s misinformation. Only later, after a long investigation by its own intelligence system, did the French come to realize that the CIA rumor was bogus and that they could let down their guard against Falun Gong. Today it is well known that Falun Gong is independent of any political backing.
On May 8, 1999, during NATO’s war with Yugoslavia, the Chinese Embassy (in Belgrade) was hit by three missiles, resulting in the death of three reporters. The United States explained the bombing as a mistake. China refused to believe this account.
After the bombing China’s military asked Jiang Zemin to put on his military uniform at once and make a statement, as Chairman of the Central Military Commission, on television. Others suggested Jiang wear a suit and lodge a statement of protest as the nation’s chairman and immediately summon the U.S. Ambassador to China. The country’s top officials thus were quickly entangled in a quarrel.
The ever-timid Jiang was flustered by this. He had no idea what he should say or to what extent he should protest. After discussing things with Zeng Qinghong he decided to hand off the knotty problem to Hu Jintao. Hu was Vice Chairman of the nation then. Never would he be in the spotlight as such normally, save for if the chairman’s health were in critical condition. The matter should have been handled by either Jiang, the Chairman, or Zhu Rongji, the Premier of the State Council. Jiang and Zeng hatched a rather nasty scheme, however, that would in effect kill two birds with one stone. If Zhu didn’t come to the fore on this issue, China’s angry masses would naturally associate the bombing with Zhu’s “appeasement diplomacy” and shift their anger to him; he could thus serve as a scapegoat. But on the other hand, Jiang insisted that Hu Jintao act as the point person. If Hu’s attitude towards the U.S. came across as soft, his reputation would suffer dramatically in the minds of an angry public. But were he to take too much of a hard line, he would surely exacerbate already-tense Sino-U.S. relations. Erring in either direction could be reason enough to stop Hu from succeeding Jiang as General Secretary at the 16th National Congress.
For the next two days Jiang was nowhere to be seen. Jiang’s response to the affair—or lack thereof—aroused great indignation in China, for he was the nation’s Chairman and the Chair of its Central Military Commission. It was only on the second evening that somebody—Hu Jintao—went on national television and delivered a statement. As of the third day Jiang still hadn’t shown himself. Slogans such as “Jiang Zemin—a turtle hiding in its shell,” “Our leaders must have all died” could be heard at the People’s University of China. The nation as a whole was indignant.
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