Wagner fighters reportedly occupied two military bases, including in the southern Russian city of Rostov, where Moscow has its main military headquarters for the south. The Rostov headquarters also serves as a key node for Russia’s occupation of Ukraine.
Columns of Wagner troops headed to Moscow on June 24 to deliver “justice” to Russia’s military leadership.
Around 9 p.m. on the night of June 24, Prigozhin announced that he had reached a deal through the president of Belarus, a near-vassal state of Russia. Prigozhin told his troops, then on the march, to turn around. A Russian official said charges would be dropped against Prigozhin, who would be sent to Belarus.
Prigozhin has a number of crocodile tear complaints against the Russian military, including its bombing of Ukrainian civilians, supposed failure to deliver ordnance to Wagner’s front line, and an alleged attack by the Russian military against Wagner forces on June 23.
Perhaps Prigozhin knows this, as at the time of writing, a Kremlin spokesman said he did not know his whereabouts. Prigozhin was last photographed on Saturday night as he left the Rostov headquarters.
Ukraine immediately took the opportunity of the rebellion to reinvigorate its military counter-offensives on multiple fronts, according to Ukraine’s deputy defense minister.
Russian officials said Putin was still in the Kremlin, but planes used by Russia’s leadership departed Moscow for St. Petersburg on June 24. This fueled speculation that Putin was on the run.
If Prigozhin or someone like him were to replace Putin as Russian head of state, it would not necessarily be an improvement.
The Russian air force reportedly struck Wagner forces in Voronezh, a city midway to Moscow where Wagner forces occupied a second military base. In turn, the Wagnerites reportedly shot down multiple helicopters and a plane. Voronezh’s main fuel depot exploded into flames that could be seen from the other side of town.
If Prigozhin does not surrender, Ukrainians may hold fire against Wagner’s forces so he can build his effort against Moscow. That does not mean they want Prigozhin to win. They probably prefer to let Prigozhin build his military and advance in Russia enough to fight a war of attrition against the Russian military that leaves neither Putin nor Prigozhin strong enough to defend Russian gains in Ukraine.
If given the opportunity, the Ukrainians could attempt to march on Moscow. Before Prigozhin’s Belarus deal, Ukrainian President Zelenskyy responded to the mutiny by noting, “In one day, they lost several of their million-plus cities and showed all Russian bandits, mercenaries, oligarchs and anyone else how easy it is to capture Russian cities and, probably, arsenals with weapons.”
It is possible that a Ukrainian army on the attack within Russia could capture a Russian nuclear weapon and use it to deter attacks on their own forces.
Prigozhin reminded us that history is a series of surprises. Remarkably, given today’s surveillance technologies, even Putin was apparently surprised by the rebellion. Officials in cities throughout Russia only started removing Wagner recruitment banners on the day of the mutiny.
The least immediately risky U.S. strategy in response to such a mutiny is what we are apparently doing—waiting to see if the two killers weaken themselves through infighting, leaving more reasonable Russians to transition the country to a democracy. But this might be a long-time coming, if it ever comes.
An alternative is to use the mutiny as an opportunity for action, as the Ukrainians did. That strategy could be extended to Asia by promoting democratic gains against Putin’s most powerful supporter, Chinese leader Xi Jinping, while he is distracted or demoralized by internal strife in Russia.
Xi likely worries whether something similar to the Wagner mutiny could happen to him if he invaded Taiwan. With the Russian rebellion fresh, a window of opportunity for the United States and allies to take any number of Taiwan measures previously thought of as “provocative,” including Taiwan publicly announcing independence or accepting more United States and allied boots on the ground.
Internal divisions in Russia should not be watched passively by Washington, Brussels, Taipei, Tokyo, and New Delhi. Democracies worldwide need to actively plan how to use Russian disunity and other such opportunities to freedom’s advantage, including for the benefit of regular citizens in China and Russia. Plan to strike when the iron is hot, or the opportunity may not return.
