Last month, various Chinese Communist Party (CCP) mouthpieces echoed a call by Chen Yixin, Minister of State Security, to launch a nationwide “five-antis campaign” targeting “subversion, hegemony, terrorism, secession, and conspiracy.”
Analysts on Viewpoints in Pinnacle View, a program on New Tang Dynasty TV, interpret this move as indicative of the CCP’s state security apparatus being granted expanded authority to bolster the struggling government.
Over nearly a century, previous generations of the CCP staged two five-antis campaigns for its survival, both marked by violence and political infighting.
Rise of State Security Ministry
Du Wen, a Chinese legal scholar residing in Belgium, remarked on Pinnacle View that the Minister of State Security’s arguments on five-antis campaigns aren’t merely rhetoric but “are built on the framework of the CCP’s National Security Law, which emphasizes the responsibilities of the national security authorities and further reaffirms existing party laws.”“It [initiating five-antis campaigns] is more likely a deterrent and a warning.”
Viewed through a broader political lens, Mr. Du suggests the five-antis campaign has more profound implications for the CCP. “It may be political padding for the upcoming Third Plenary Session and the Politburo meeting, especially as it may define the punishments of some high-ranking military officials, such as Li Shangfu, who may be accused of involvement in subversion, espionage, and other severe charges,” he said.
Mr. Du pointed out that following Xi’s rise to power, a State Security Council was established, with its office situated within the Ministry of State Security. This council spearheads collaborative efforts with other departments, notably the Ministry of Public Security. The Ministry of State Security has undergone considerable elevation, emerging as the focal point and driving force within the CCP.
Meanwhile, the public security department has long been a crucial weapon of the state for the CCP. “Without public security, I am afraid the Communist Party regime would not be able to hold on for even a month,” Mr. Du remarked.
But the public security system has always been a high and frequent source of corruption, Mr. Du noted. Some violent law enforcement police often clashed with the public, stirring up public anger and deepening a systemic crisis of confidence in the CCP.
“The Public Security Department is an essential force for regime stabilization, but Xi cannot trust it and does not dare to trust it; on the other hand, he has to trust it, but he cannot trust it all.”
Therefore, in Mr. Du’s view, growing a force that can override the public security department may be a solution for the Xi regime.
“The rise of the state security department and its elevated status is, to a certain extent, an attempt to balance and supervise the power of public security,“ he said. ”In this way, Xi is attempting to strengthen national security while at the same time tightening control and supervision over the public security system.”
“The functions of the CCP’s state security department have been elevated to an unprecedented level, turning it into a comprehensive organization,“ he added. ”This represents a significant shift in the CCP’s political line over recent years.”
Xi Alters CCP’s Power System
Since taking office, Xi Jinping has implemented a series of political system reforms, Mr. Du noted on Pinnacle View. Among these, the most notable is the creation of several central-level councils, including the State Security Council, which operates beyond the framework of the Chinese constitution.Mr. Du noted that, according to the previous party framework established under former leader Deng Xiaoping, the CCP serves as the ruling party, with its members comprising the central government, known as the State Council. The head of this government, the Premier of the State Council, operates under a system of shared responsibility with the cabinet. Additionally, the CCP’s Constitution specifies that the leadership of the State is an organization, not a person.
“However, by setting up various committees, Xi has taken back the power of the State Council to the head of the party and the state, thus changing the political system to a presidential system,” Mr. Du said.
Three ‘Five-Antis Campaigns’
Reflecting on the two “five-antis” campaigns in CCP history, Guo Jun, editor-in-chief of the Hong Kong edition of The Epoch Times, noted on Pinnacle View that the initial campaign in 1952 targeted “anti-bribery, anti-tax evasion, anti-cutting corners, anti-deception of state property, and anti-stealing of national economic intelligence.”According to Ms. Guo, the CCP authority used this movement to crack down on private enterprises and capitalists.
“During the 1950s, the cost of the Korean War consumed about 40 percent to 50 percent of China’s GDP, and the five-antis campaigns forced those enterprises, especially the capitalists, to contribute to the war,“ she said. ”As a result, a large number of private enterprises closed down and went bankrupt or were merged by the CCP.”
The CCP’s second Five-antis Campaign was launched in 1963, together with the Socialist Education Movement, under the slogans “anti-corruption and theft, anti-speculation, anti-waste, anti-decentralization, and anti-bureaucracy.” Its goal was to target officials within the system and strengthen the central government’s control, Ms. Guo said.
“1963 was the year when the three-year famine had just ended, and 40 million people were starved to death. At that time, public anger was widespread,“ she said. ”To deflect responsibility, the CCP carried out a five-antis campaign to target officials at the grassroots government, blaming them for the starvation deaths.”
“With the help of this campaign, Chinese people could vent their anger on scapegoats, and the party’s central government remained politically correct,” Ms. Guo said, adding that after the second five-antis campaign, conflicts within the party intensified, triggering the Cultural Revolution that eventually paralyzed the entire government.
As for the new five-antis campaign proposed by Chen Yixin, Ms. Guo said the CCP wants to consolidate its ruling position in the country as it feels insecure about various pressures from the international community.
According to Ms. Guo, political security is the core issue for the CCP.
“What is political security? When the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) announces the arrests of senior officials, there are usually two major charges for them: violation of political rules and failure to uphold the core leadership of the party and the leader. This is seen as an indicator of dissatisfaction and disloyalty to Xi.”
Ms. Guo believes the CCP’s tactic in launching the five-antis campaigns was to make enemies and create hatred. “But this scheme is not efficient enough nowadays because the situation in China is, after all, very different from that of Mao Zedong’s era.” Ms. Guo said.
