Moscow Voices ‘Regret’ Over Armenian Decision to Skip Russia-Led CSTO Summit

The move by Yerevan comes after several months of deteriorating relations with its nominal ally Russia.
Moscow Voices ‘Regret’ Over Armenian Decision to Skip Russia-Led CSTO Summit
Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan addresses parliament following an escalation in hostilities over the Nagorno-Karabakh region along the border of Armenia with Azerbaijan, in Yerevan, Armenia, on Sept. 13, 2022. Tigran Mehrabyan/PAN Photo via Reuters
Adam Morrow
Updated:

The Kremlin has voiced its “regret” over Armenia’s reported decision to not take part in an upcoming summit of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), a six-nation military bloc led by Moscow.

“If it’s true, then it’s regretful,” Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov told reporters on Nov. 14.

“We understand heads of state and government have their own work schedules and circumstances. But it’s unfortunate.”

The summit is slated to be held in Minsk, capital of CSTO member Belarus, on Nov. 23.

According to press reports, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan announced his decision to skip the summit in a phone call with Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko.

Since 1991, Armenia has been a member of the CSTO, whose other members include Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan.

In recent months, however, Armenian officials have been notably absent from CSTO events and forums.

Armenian officials, including Mr. Pashinyan, have repeatedly said there are no plans to withdraw from the Russia-led military alliance.

But in early September, Armenia recalled its permanent representative to the CSTO and has yet to appoint a new one.

Mr. Pashinyan’s decision to not take part in the upcoming summit is hardly the first sign of strained ties between Moscow and Yerevan, Armenia’s capital.

In early September, CSTO member states conducted joint military drills in Belarus, a key Russian ally.

Notably, Armenia didn’t participate in the exercises—the only alliance member to refrain from doing so.

Later the same month, Armenia hosted elements of the U.S. army for several days of joint military drills at two facilities near Yerevan.

The exercises irked Moscow, which has long viewed the South Caucasus region—made up of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia—as its backyard.

Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan (L) and Russian President Vladimir Putin shake hands as they attend the Collective Security Treaty Organization summit in Yerevan, Armenia, on Nov. 23, 2022. (Hayk Baghdasaryan/Photolure via Reuters)
Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan (L) and Russian President Vladimir Putin shake hands as they attend the Collective Security Treaty Organization summit in Yerevan, Armenia, on Nov. 23, 2022. Hayk Baghdasaryan/Photolure via Reuters

Strained Relations

Relations again took a turn for the worse in October, when Armenia’s parliament ratified the Rome Statute.

Expected to come into force early next month, the move will give the Hague-based International Criminal Court (ICC) jurisdiction in Armenian territory.

Earlier this year, the ICC issued an arrest warrant for Russian President Vladimir Putin for alleged war crimes in Ukraine.

Moscow, which doesn’t recognize the court’s jurisdiction, vehemently rejects the allegation.

Nevertheless, the statute’s ratification means that Armenia—despite its CSTO membership—would have to arrest Mr. Putin if he ever visits the country.

In response, a Russian Foreign Ministry source told state-owned news agency TASS that the move by Yerevan would have “extremely negative implications” for bilateral ties.

Russia–Armenia relations have also been affected by the long-simmering dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

In September, Mr. Pashinyan accused Moscow of failing to stop a military offensive by Azerbaijan—Armenia’s perennial foe—in the Nagorno-Karabakh region.

While Nagorno-Karabakh is populated mainly by ethnic Armenians, it’s internationally recognized as part of Azerbaijan.

Moscow, which keeps a peacekeeping force in Nagorno-Karabakh, responded to Mr. Pashinyan’s criticisms by noting that Yerevan had formally recognized Azerbaijan’s sovereignty over the flashpoint region.

A Russian serviceman takes part in a joint military drill of the Collective Security Treaty Organization on Sept. 9, 2021. (Vyacheslav Oseledko/AFP via Getty Images)
A Russian serviceman takes part in a joint military drill of the Collective Security Treaty Organization on Sept. 9, 2021. Vyacheslav Oseledko/AFP via Getty Images

‘Strategic Future’

Last week, Armen Grigoryan, head of Armenia’s security council, visited Brussels to attend a forum titled “Armenia’s strategic future: Armenia–Europe.”

On the first day of the event, which was held on Nov. 9 and 10, Mr. Grigoryan reportedly said his country had “appealed to the EU ... to expand cooperation, even in the field of security.”

“In terms of Europe, the strongest factor for us is democracy,” he was quoted as saying in the Armenian press.

“And strengthening democracy in Armenia means strengthening relations with the European Union.”

In a final declaration, forum participants endorsed the view that Armenia’s “strategic future” lay in full EU membership and “integration into the Euro–Atlantic security system.”

“We support Armenia’s comprehensive integration into the European Union,” the declaration reads.

It also calls for the “entry of Armenian producers into European markets and expansion of European investment inflows into Armenia.”

Perhaps most contentiously, the text further calls on Armenia to withdraw from the CSTO, the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and to pursue its relations with Russia “exclusively in a bilateral format.”

Established in 2014, the EEU is an economic union of five Eurasian states, including both Russia and Armenia.

The CIS is a Moscow-led regional bloc made up of nine former Soviet republics, including Armenia. It was founded in 1991 to promote cooperation between member states.

On Nov. 9, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said Armenia, which he described as a “close ally,” was entitled to pursue its own foreign relations.

“We are all for Armenia ... deciding on its own how it should build relations with external partners,” Mr. Lavrov said in televised remarks.

However, he went on to repeat earlier claims that Western powers were actively “courting” Armenia in hopes of wooing it into the Western camp.

The assertion is hardly without precedent.

In mid-September, Leonid Slutsky, a prominent Russian parliamentarian, accused the United States of seeking to exploit the Armenia–Azerbaijan dispute to establish an “anti-Russian foothold” in the South Caucasus region.

In subsequent comments to The Epoch Times, a U.S. State Department spokesperson denied the claim.

“We do not compete with Russia with regard to our facilitation of the peace process in the South Caucasus,” the spokesperson said.

“Russia has used deployments to and basing in CSTO member states, including Armenia, to create a false perception of Russia being a good faith mediator to conflicts in the former USSR.

“Russia often drives and exploits these conflicts to its own benefit.”