China Learning From the US in the Middle East While Washington Gets Distracted

Saudi King Salman bin Abdulaziz (L) arrives to attend a signing ceremony at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing on March 16, 2017. Chinese leader Xi Jinping welcomed visiting Saudi King Salman in Beijing as China continues a charm offensive toward the Middle East, a region where it has long kept a low profile. Lintao Zhang/AFP via Getty Images

Commentary

As Beijing studies U.S. wars in the Middle East to prepare for a potential conflict with Taiwan, Washington remains distracted by secondary conflicts.

On May 7, Chinese state-run media Global Times reported that a cease-fire had been reached between the United States and Yemen’s Houthi movement, a development expected to restore maritime security and ensure the free flow of international shipping. This is crucial to Beijing’s interests, particularly as the ongoing U.S. tariff war continues to reduce China’s export volumes.

Although U.S. President Donald Trump stated that the Houthis had approached his administration to end hostilities, Global Times credited Oman as the key peace broker, downplaying Trump’s role and denying the United States any credit for the breakthrough.

The article went on to emphasize that Houthi leaders had issued defiant statements clarifying that their operations against Israel would continue, framing their campaign as support for Gaza. This narrative, portraying the United States as neither victorious nor effective, appears designed to prevent Washington from claiming a diplomatic or strategic win.

At the same time, the Chinese regime’s detailed coverage of the development underscores how closely Beijing is observing U.S. military actions in the Middle East, not only to track outcomes but to extract operational and strategic lessons for training the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and preparing it for future asymmetric warfare.

According to recent reports, China is treating U.S. military operations in the Middle East, particularly its ongoing naval campaign against Houthi rebels in Yemen, as a live simulation for a future war over Taiwan. The PLA is closely studying how the U.S. Navy responds to asymmetric threats such as drones, shore-launched missiles, and complex strike patterns, all of which mirror tactics Taiwan might use in a defensive war.

The PLA, which lacks real combat experience, has long relied on observing U.S. operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and now Yemen as case studies to refine its doctrine, force structure, and training. Beijing has turned the Red Sea into a strategic proving ground, empowering proxy forces with satellite intelligence, drone components, and dual-use technology to harass Western vessels while sparing Chinese ships.

This model of leveraging proxies, denying responsibility, and exploiting the constraints of a rules-based order reflects a broader PLA learning system rooted in structured observation and internal experimentation, a method RAND Corporation describes as a substitute for battlefield experience.

China’s military reforms under Chinese leader Xi Jinping prioritize readiness for informatized local wars, with Taiwan as the central scenario. The PLA’s theater commands are now configured for high operational readiness across multiple strategic directions, and the Red Sea may preview how China intends to operate in the Indo–Pacific.

While China has used the Red Sea conflict to study American tactics and strengthen its own position, analysts at the U.S. Army War College argue that the United States has not made a corresponding strategic shift toward China. Although the National Defense Strategy identified the Chinese regime as the pacing threat three years ago, that focus has yet to be fully reflected in U.S. force structure, budgeting, or deployment decisions. Resources and attention remain divided across multiple theaters, especially Eastern Europe and the Middle East.

Washington’s continued focus on Ukraine and the Persian Gulf undercuts its ability to prepare for a potential near-peer conflict with the PLA. Instead of maintaining global military primacy across three or more theaters, the War College proposes that the Department of Defense concentrate on preparing for one major war, specifically in the Indo–Pacific, against the Chinese regime.

Meanwhile, the United States could rely on partners and allies to manage lower-tier regional contingencies elsewhere. In some respects, this is already happening, as Trump pushes European nations to take greater responsibility for Ukraine’s defense. However, U.S. strategic focus has not significantly narrowed toward preparing for a near-peer conflict with China.

One factor supporting the War College’s recommendation is that, in Europe and the Middle East, the United States can delegate some of its security responsibilities to NATO and regional powers. However, in the Asia–Pacific, there is no corresponding coalition capable of balancing against China without direct U.S. involvement.

Therefore, the War College recommends prioritizing U.S. naval and air forces in the Pacific and shifting force structure and basing accordingly, including redeploying carriers away from the Atlantic and Middle East. This, once again, aligns with steps that Trump is already taking, such as upgrading and reoutfitting the airbase and port at Guam and making greater use of U.S. overseas territories in the Pacific defense strategy.

As Trump requests a record $1 trillion defense budget, the War College highlights the ongoing mismatch between strategy and resource allocation under the previous administration. For example, the United States has allocated a total of nearly $183 billion in various forms of aid to Ukraine since the Russian invasion in 2022. That figure averages out to roughly $60 billion per year—more than the annual defense budget of any U.S. ally except the United Kingdom.

At the same time, the United States was also committing money, resources, and strategic attention to Iran and the Persian Gulf. The resulting drawdown on munitions stockpiles has left the United States in a questionable position if a war with the Chinese regime were to break out tomorrow.

Fortunately, the United States has the economic and military resources to win a war for Taiwan. Deterring and defeating the Chinese regime does not necessarily require increased defense spending. Still, it does require a reallocation of existing resources away from theaters deemed secondary to the core mission in the Indo–Pacific. This includes delegating security operations in the Middle East and Europe to regional allies.

Views expressed in this article are opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Epoch Times.