A China–Iran–Pakistan Alliance in the Making

Economic, military, and diplomatic cooperation is well underway.
A China–Iran–Pakistan Alliance in the Making
Pakistani naval personnel stand guard near a ship carrying containers at the Gwadar port during the opening ceremony of a pilot trade program between Pakistan and China, on Nov. 13, 2016. Aamir Quereshi/AFP via Getty Images
Stu Cvrk
Updated:
0:00
Commentary

Building partnerships in Southwest Asia is a key element of communist China’s inexorable march toward Xi Jinping’s goal of domination of the world economy.

Xi’s signature Belt and Road Initiative (BRI, also known as “One Belt, One Road”) involves China underwriting billions of dollars of infrastructure investment in countries along the old Silk Road, a transportation network that facilitated trade between China, the Middle East, and Europe from 130 B.C. to 1453 A.D.

The modern Silk Road includes branches to ports in Pakistan and Iran. BRI involves exporting Chinese infrastructure capacity as a mechanism for facilitating access to raw materials and energy resources needed by Chinese manufacturing concerns while concurrently developing new overseas markets for Chinese goods.

Beijing seeks to develop an integrated economic market consisting of “all Eurasian nations”—the economic component of a Chinese “new world order.” Integral to the network is the development of a series of land corridors to facilitate overland trade, including the China–Central Asia–West Asia Corridor running from Western China to Turkey.

The Chinese strategy involves greatly improved ties with Pakistan and Iran, which is becoming a de facto alliance of sorts.

Let us explore the issue.

China and Iran

Communist Chinese relations with Tehran were frosty from 1949 to 1970, as the Iranian diplomatic posture under the Shah was decidedly anti-communist in purpose and intent, with Iran signing the anti-communist Baghdad Pact in 1955. The Baghdad Pact was a pro-Western defense alliance between Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, and the United Kingdom.

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Shah moved his government toward closer relations with China, even as U.S. President Richard Nixon laid the groundwork for “opening China” with a surprise visit to Shanghai. In August 1971, the Chinese and Iranian ambassadors met in Islamabad, Pakistan, and signed a docu­ment in which Iran formally recognized the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) as the ruler of China. At that time, the two governments were aligned to counter the Soviet Union in Southwest Asia.

After the Iranian Revolution, China officially recognized the new Islamic Republic of Iran in February 1979. China became a major arms supplier of Iran during the 1980–88 Iran–Iraq War, as Iraq had become a Soviet client state.
Economic and technical cooperation between the two countries has increased ever since. In March 2021, Reuters reported that China and Iran signed a 25-year cooperation agreement under the BRI that focuses on various joint projects in the oil, mining, transportation, industrial, and agricultural sectors of the Iranian economy. The Associated Press noted this was “the first time Iran has signed such a lengthy agreement with a major world power.”

That agreement also included plans for cooperation on training and research, defense industries, and military joint ventures in asymmetric warfare, anti-terrorism, and combating drug trafficking, all of which have been slowed by United Nations sanctions on Iran. Nevertheless, technology exchanges and military cooperation will continue as those sanctions are eased.

Lastly, Iran formally joined the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in September 2021, indicating increasing economic ties with Beijing. China became Iran’s top crude oil customer, “[purchasing] an average 1.05 million barrels per day (bpd) of Iranian oil in the first 10 months of 2023,” as reported by Reuters.
A general view of the Abadan oil refinery in southwest Iran is pictured from the Iraqi side of Shatt al-Arab in Al-Faw, south of Basra, Iraq, on Sept. 21, 2019. (Essam Al-Sudani/Reuters)
A general view of the Abadan oil refinery in southwest Iran is pictured from the Iraqi side of Shatt al-Arab in Al-Faw, south of Basra, Iraq, on Sept. 21, 2019. Essam Al-Sudani/Reuters

China and Pakistan

China–Pakistan relations have strengthened greatly since Pakistan became the first Muslim country to recognize communist China in 1950. The countries have been diplomatically and militarily aligned as they share a common adversary—India. A key benefit of the relationship for Pakistan was China’s technical assistance in the development and testing of the first “Muslim nuclear weapon” in 1990, as noted by U.S. News and World Report.

The current emphasis of their relationship is developing the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which aims to connect the deep-sea Pakistani ports of Gwadar and Karachi to Kashgar in China’s Xinjiang region, also known as East Turkmenistan, and beyond.

As a premier project under the BRI, CPEC aims to develop and modernize Pakistan’s transportation infrastructure to accelerate trade between the two countries. It emphasizes improving electrical distribution and transportation networks.

A key Chinese accomplishment under CPEC was Pakistan’s granting of a 40-year lease of the Gwadar port to China. This lease provides far-reaching economic and military benefits as the Chinese navy increases operations in the Arabian Sea and the Gulf of Oman.

Pakistan and Iran

Pakistan (predominantly Sunni Muslim) and Iran (predominantly Shia Muslim) share a 565-mile border that arbitrarily divides “greater Baluchistan” into separate provinces in the south. Pakistani and Iranian relations have evolved greatly over the last 40 years.

In the last two decades of the 20th century, geopolitical differences led to tensions and challenges, as Iran was aligned with independent Mujahadeen after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan while Pakistan supported the U.S.-led coalition and hosted large numbers of Afghan refugees.

After the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, both countries joined the international anti-terrorism coalition and increased “border security, trade, energy, and cultural exchanges,” according to an analysis published by the think tank Republic Policy. However, each country backed different factions in Afghanistan, leading to continued competition and tensions between the two countries.

Each has accused the other of supporting insurgent groups and militant attacks in their countries in recent years. The problems escalated in January 2024, as Iran conducted a cross-border missile and drone attack in the Pakistani province of Baluchistan that targeted the Jaish al-Adl group, which Tehran claimed was responsible for several attacks inside Iran.

That said, both countries remain interested in security cooperation, especially regarding anti-terrorism activities and overall regional security measures.

Concluding Thoughts

In August 2023, The Diplomat reported “the first meeting of the China-Iran-Pakistan trilateral consultation on counterterrorism and security.” The focus was increased collaboration among the three nations on counterterrorism, economic integration, and energy cooperation. This includes cooperation in handling common Baluchi insurgency problems for Iran and Pakistan, while China seeks to shape its BRI investment objectives in Iran and Pakistan.
This budding alliance could pose major political-military challenges for the United States. It could be “the beginning of an anti-access, area denial strategy against the U.S. Fifth Fleet in the Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea region,” according to an analysis by a retired U.S. Army Reserve colonel.

And on the economic front, with Gwadar port as a commercial trading outlet to the Arabian Sea/Indian Ocean firmly ensconced within China’s web, the CCP can focus BRI development efforts on another Arabian Sea outlet at the nearby Iranian port of Chabahar. Additionally, it can connect the Chinese land port of Khorgos on the Kazakhstan border with the Pamir Highway through Kyrgyzstan to Dushanbe, Tajikistan, and the north/south road through Afghanistan.

Will China next improve the Makran Coast route in southeastern Iran to Bandar Abbas to further ensnare the Euro-African-Middle East trade with China? With the Khorgos to Tehran railroad realized and the Bandar Abbas road simply needing improvement, the BRI web is inexorably tightening.

Any seasoned China watcher can easily visualize the potential of these geopolitical and strategic chessboard moves. The budding China–Pakistan–Iran alliance is a key milestone that will bring the CCP’s dreams of the new Silk Road to fruition in Southwest Asia.

Views expressed in this article are opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Epoch Times.
Stu Cvrk
Stu Cvrk
Author
Stu Cvrk retired as a captain after serving 30 years in the U.S. Navy in a variety of active and reserve capacities, with considerable operational experience in the Middle East and the Western Pacific. Through education and experience as an oceanographer and systems analyst, Cvrk is a graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy, where he received a classical liberal education that serves as the key foundation for his political commentary.
Related Topics